

JFQ




East Asian Security



**Interservice
Training**

Rwanda



JFACC—The Next Step

**Battle for the
Marianas**




Uphold Democracy



95
Spring

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 1995		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-1995 to 00-00-1995	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Joint Force Quarterly. Number 7, Spring 1995				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) National Defense University, 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 2504), Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 20319				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 136	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			



To have command of the air means to be in a position to prevent the enemy from flying while retaining the ability to fly oneself.

— Giulio Douhet

JFQ



FOREWORD



PHOTO CREDITS

The cover photograph shows USS San Jacinto with USS Barry (astern) transiting the Suez Canal (U.S. Navy/Dave Miller); the cover insets (from top) include Chinese honor guard (U.S. Army/Robert W. Taylor); T-37 trainer (U.S. Air Force); refugees in Goma, Zaire, during Operation Support Hope (U.S. Air Force/Marv Krause); Marines landing in the Marianas (U.S. Coast Guard); soldiers on board USS Dwight D. Eisenhower preparing for Operation Restore Democracy (U.S. Navy/Ken Riley).

The front inside cover features F-16s on the flight line at MacDill Air Force Base (U.S. Air Force).

The background photo on these pages depicts Marine AAVs from USS Dubuque moving toward a beach near Vladivostok during Exercise Cooperation from the Sea (U.S. Navy/Charles W. Alley). The insets (from top left) are of a color guard at Japan Defense Agency headquarters (DOD/R.D. Ward); a psychological operations loudspeaker team in Haiti (55th Signal Company/Jean-Marc Schaible); a B-2 bomber being refueled by a KC-135 tanker during a test flight at Edwards Air Force Base (U.S. Air Force); and British soldiers arriving in Kigali during Operation Restore Hope (Combat Camera Imagery/Marvin Krause).

The back inside cover catches members of the 5th Special Forces Group jumping with British and Kuwaiti commandos (U.S. Army/Tracey L. Leahy).

The back cover reproduces a painting by Harry A. Davis of the 28th Division marching through the streets of Paris in 1945 (U.S. Army Center for Military History).

4 A Word from the Chairman
by John M. Shalikashvili

6 Asia-Pacific Challenges
by Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin

JFQ FORUM

8 A Commander in Chief Looks at East Asia
by Richard C. Macke

16 The PLA: In Search of a Strategic Focus
by Ronald N. Montaperto

20 Japan's Emergent Security Policy
by Patrick M. Cronin

23 Assessing the U.S.-North Korea Agreement
by Masao Okonogi

26 South Korea's Defense Posture
by Young-Koo Cha and Kang Choi

32 Asian Multilateralism: Dialogue on Two Tracks
by Ralph A. Cossa

37 America and the Asia-Pacific Region
by William T. Pendley

43 The Joint Challenge to Interservice Training
by Henry Viccellio, Jr.

48 Why Goldwater-Nichols Didn't Go Far Enough
by Robert B. Adolph, Jr., Charles W. Stiles, and Franklin D. Hitt, Jr.

54 Joint Intelligence and Uphold Democracy
by Thomas R. Wilson

60 JFACC—Taking the Next Step
by Marcus Hurley

66 UNAMIR: Mission to Rwanda
by R.A. Dallaire and B. Poulin



OUT OF JOINT

72 Joint Education for the 21st Century
by Robert B. Kupiszewski

77 When Waves Collide: Future Conflict
by Richard Szafranski

86 Struggle for the Marianas
by Bernard D. Cole

Special: The Air Force White Paper

94 Global Presence
*by Sheila E. Widnall and
Ronald R. Fogleman*



OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN

100 Chester William Nimitz

FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

101 Letters to the Editor

IN BRIEF

105 Learning from Rwanda
by Steven Metz and James Kievit

109 Writing Joint Doctrine
by Charles M. Edmondson

111 JTFs: Some Practical Implications
by Susan J. Flores



THE JOINT WORLD

114 Doctrine, Lessons Learned, Education, and Literature

OFF THE SHELF

119 A Reader's Guide to the Korean War: A Review Essay
by Allan R. Millett

126 Getting to Know Jomini: A Book Review
by Michael D. Krause

129 Joint in Spite of Themselves: A Book Review
by Brian R. Sullivan

POSTSCRIPT

132 A Note to Readers and Contributors

Joint Force Quarterly
A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

Hans Binnendijk
Editor-in-Chief

Patrick M. Cronin
Executive Editor

Robert A. Silano
Editor

Martin J. Peters, Jr.
Production Coordinator

Calvin B. Kelley
Senior Copy Editor

The Typography and Design Division of the U.S. Government Printing Office is responsible for layout and art direction.

Joint Force Quarterly is published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, to promote understanding of the integrated employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, contingency planning, combat operations conducted by the unified commands, and joint force development.

The editors invite articles and other contributions on joint warfighting, inter-service issues that support jointness, and topics of common interest to the Armed Forces (see page 132 for details). Please direct editorial communications to:

Editor
Joint Force Quarterly
ATTN: NDU-NSS-JFQ
Washington, D.C. 20319-6000

Telephone: (202) 475-1013 /
DSN: 335-1013
FAX: (202) 475-1012 / DSN 335-1012

Internet: JFQ1@ndu.edu

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. Copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted without permission of copyright proprietors. An acknowledgment to *Joint Force Quarterly* should be made whenever material is quoted from or based on its contents.

This publication has been approved by the Secretary of Defense.

February 1995

ISSN 1070-0692

Publisher

GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USA
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chairman of the Advisory Committee

Lt Gen Ervin J. Rokke, USAF
National Defense University

Members of the Advisory Committee

BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.)
Office of the Chairman

Brig Gen David E. Baker, USAF
The Joint Staff

MG Richard A. Chilcoat, USA
U.S. Army War College

A. Denis Clift
Joint Military Intelligence College

Brig Gen Marvin R. Esmond, USAF
Armed Forces Staff College

Col Robert C. Hughes, USAF
National War College

Col Paul V. Kelly, USMC
Marine Corps War College

Lt Gen Walter Kross, USAF
The Joint Staff

Col Andrew Pratt, USMC
Marine Corps Command and Staff College

BG Randall L. Rigby, USA
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Maj Gen Peter D. Robinson, USAF
Air War College

RADM Jerome F. Smith, Jr., USN
Industrial College of the Armed Forces

RADM Joseph C. Strasser, USN
Naval War College

Col John A. Warden III, USAF
Air Command and Staff College

Chairman of the Editorial Board

Hans Binnendijk
Institute for National Strategic Studies

Members of the Editorial Board

Richard K. Betts
Columbia University

COL William D. Bristow, Jr., USA
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Eliot A. Cohen
The Johns Hopkins University

COL Robert A. Dougherty, USA
U.S. Military Academy

LtCol Robert C. Figlock, USMC
Marine Corps War College

Aaron L. Friedberg
Princeton University

Alan L. Gropman
Industrial College of the Armed Forces

COL Peter F. Herrly, USA
National War College

Col Douglas N. Hime, USAF
Naval War College

William T. Hodson
Information Resources Management College

COL Richard L. Irby, Jr., USA
U.S. Army War College

Mark H. Jacobsen
Marine Corps Command and Staff College

William Manthorpe
Joint Military Intelligence College

Thomas L. McNaughton
Brookings Institution

Col Charles H. Mead, USAF
Armed Forces Staff College

John J. Mearsheimer
University of Chicago

Col Philip S. Meilinger, USAF
Air Command and Staff College

LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.)
Hudson Institute

James H. Toner
Air War College

LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.)
Harvard University

LTG C.A.H. Waller, USA (Ret.)
RKK, Limited

East Asia is a region bursting with superlatives. It is propelled by economic growth rates unrivalled by any other region. It contains the world's most populous nation and teems with over a quarter of its people. It is also the most heavily armed corner of the world, containing the forces of three major nuclear powers, the three largest armies, and the most overheated international arms market.

While a young America still hugged the Atlantic coast, we could and did ignore this vast region. Westward expansion changed that. As California and the Pacific Northwest swelled with new citizens, our gaze turned more and more to the Pacific and East Asia.

A Word from

As late as the early part of this century, we sat idly by as European powers and a rising Japan vied with each other in the region. We remained so disengaged that we occasionally served as a neutral peacemaker. By the 1930s this no longer sufficed. It was challenges arising in Asia, not in Europe, that led us into World War II.

After destroying imperial Japan's war machine, America became a blocking force to Soviet domination. In the most tempestuous

years of the Cold War, we fought more conflicts and lost more lives in Asia than in the rest of the world combined. For forty-five years, our view of this region was solidified by

Cold War realities. But with that era over it is time to find new bearings. The East Asia Strategic Initiative begun in 1989 was intended to start that process.

As this initiative recognized, our interests in this vibrant region are now so great that it is impossible for us to withdraw or take a back seat as East Asia moves into the next century. That is not just an external

**the world's most dynamic
region needs dynamic solutions**



the Chairman

The Chairman greeting the deputy chief of the PLA general staff as the Secretary of Defense looks on.

view but one shared by East Asian nations as well. Nearly all agree that America's presence and power are an irreplaceable counterbalance to the region's greatest perils.

Today, our commitment is anchored on alliances with Japan and South Korea, the latter challenged by the regime to its north. But Asia is poised for great change. China is on a path of economic reforms that many think will catapult it to world power and lead at some point to political changes. Hong Kong will revert back to China in 1997, and there is the unresolved question of Taiwan. Russia—in the midst of its own economic and political reforms—remains every bit a great Asian power. For decades Moscow fed instability and conflict in the region. And, in the very heart of the region, the divided Korean peninsula will one day mend, hopefully through peaceful means although that is by no means assured. These are merely the future events we know about: in an uncertain world much more could occur.

The burgeoning markets of East Asia hold immense promise, but economic progress will only succeed if stability and peace are maintained. Can current security arrangements adequately preserve these conditions? Unlike

Western Europe, Asia is still a very divided region of the world. There are no NATO's or CSCEs where East Asian nations work collectively to calm one another's distrusts and insecurities. Today, these states take their cues from their perceptions of what others are doing or are adding to their arsenals. On the other hand, many believe that Europe and Asia are too different to expect that security arrangements that work in one area can work in the other.

Already the region has reached the point where economic relations have become far more integrated than security relations. Over the past five

years, the growth of trade between Asian nations has outstripped that with the rest of the world. Is it prudent to anticipate that economic relations will eventually lead security relations to a more stable plateau? If so, can existing security arrangements provide enough time?

These and other concerns need to be addressed. The world's most dynamic region needs dynamic solutions. That is why I am pleased that the JFQ Forum in this issue of the journal is focusing on the challenges to this region. There was a time when Americans viewed Asia as a distant and exotic land full of mystery. It is now our back yard—and, some would be quick to point out, it may well be our front yard in the next century.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

DOD (R.D. Ward)

Today more than ever the economic and political rhythms of the Asia-Pacific region affect our national interests. Growing interdependence with the economies of the region is altering the international security landscape. The GNP of Asian countries presently amounts to a quarter of global GNP and may climb to half by the middle of the next century. Meanwhile, American jobs tied to the region's economy will double from 3 to 6 million in the next five years. Japan and China are the world's second and third largest economies, while India shows great potential. New concentrations of

Strategically, the interests of the major powers intersect in East Asia. The subregion is the nexus of three of five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (China, Russia, and the United States), and Japan is a leading aspirant for that status. For the moment, none of these major powers sees the others as a threat. Historical and contemporary trends, however, as well as the virtual absence of regional security institutions, suggest that a long-term great power concert is far from certain, particularly if economic fortunes change. China is a rising power, at once eager to continue its economic boom and ultrasensitive to questions of sovereignty. Russia is a declining power whose weakness, ironically, poses a greater threat to the region than its military strength. Japan is a maturing industrial democracy still defining its identity within the international security realm. The United States remains the preeminent guarantor of regional stability, yet alone it lacks the resources to contend with the entire region. Adding these strategic factors to Asia's economic dynamism, many analysts view the region as the global crossroads of the next century. One thing seems certain: the United States will face greater competition and expend much effort to win the cooperation of other major power centers in the region.

At the same time, new patterns of competition are emerging. China's economic growth and opaque military modernization set the stage for the rise of a major regional power. Japan will retain its security relations with the United States but may inch toward greater autonomy. India appears ready to buttress its ambitions by expanded involvement in the global economy. The Korean peninsula seems likely to stay divided for some time, although it will eventually unite into a formidable power. Moreover, the members of ASEAN promise to grow in stature and potential, making it increasingly necessary to engage such countries as Indonesia and Malaysia.

Intense competition could lead to regional conflict. Asia has fault lines based on historical differences: territorial claims in the South China Sea, the future status of Taiwan,

Asia-Pacific Challenges

By HANS BINNENDIJK and
PATRICK M. CRONIN

wealth have led some nations of the region to redefine their contacts around the world. U.S. prosperity and security will be increasingly inseparable from this dynamic growth.

Because of widespread, sustained economic development the region is relatively peaceful. Gloomy predictions of famine, civil war, and state failure do not seem to apply to Asia. Despite the potential for large-scale conflict there, none has occurred since the Vietnam War. Instead, prosperity, productivity, and development have dominated the landscape.

Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin are, respectively, the Editor-in-Chief and the Executive Editor of *Joint Force Quarterly*.

China's boundary disputes with India and Russia, the question of Korean unification, friction between India and Pakistan, turmoil in Cambodia, and Japan's quarrel with Russia over the Kuril Islands. Other conflicts could arise from economic competition, particularly in Northeast Asia. While there is no Bosnia in Asia, many territorial, maritime, and resource disputes could escalate. In Europe, NATO has weathered the discord over the violent breakup of the former Yugoslavia. In Asia, it is not clear that America's key alliance with Japan is equal to that level of divergence, and thus putting our compact with Japan on a solid footing for the next century must be a national priority.

At the same time, the United States must ensure that its security relations with South Korea withstand the lingering challenge posed by North Korea's nuclear and conventional programs and, on the other hand, a

sudden rush toward reunification. In the short term, Washington must continue to ensure full implementation of the October 21, 1994 Agreed Framework. If it endures, this accord will help focus more attention on working with

Seoul to provide a "soft landing" for Pyongyang as well as on the future of the Korea peninsula within the region.


Moreover, we must integrate China into both regional and international systems. There is no more critical security task than engaging that nation in transparency and confidence-building measures to increase great power cooperation in regional and global issues. Territorial questions remain a concern, given that actions taken with regard to Taiwan could bring China and America into confrontation. Similarly, the way in which China views the use of force and, conversely, its willingness to seek peaceful resolution of other territorial and resource disputes will be pivotal to a regional stability

upon which to found continuing economic growth and prosperity.

Asian states have reached an unspoken consensus that stability is essential in coping with domestic issues that may take years to resolve. In this context, all can agree that there is little to be gained—and much to lose—by altering the status quo. As Asia moves through this transitional period, a basis for a new regional security order will emerge. This order will inevitably reflect the aspirations and strengths of major Asian powers. Our challenge is to secure stability, and by doing so to secure our own interests.

The keys to this task will be severalfold: to recast our alliance with Japan in post-Cold War terms and put it on a firm foundation for the next century; strengthen our alliance with the Republic of Korea to bolster deterrence in the short run and provide long-term regional support; engage China in ways that link it to regional and international systems; promote ties with South Asia; advance multilateral institutions where they can make a difference (as in Northeast Asia); further relations with other regional allies, particularly Australia, our southern anchor; develop our relations with the dynamic states of Southeast Asia; and maintain a credible overseas presence both to reassure the region and to be ready for rapid crisis response.

Notwithstanding a more vibrant multilateral and regional security architecture, an important role remains for the Armed Forces. Even if a concert of great powers can be achieved and works well—both big *ifs*—the United States will have a key part in underpinning that stability, providing balance for regional powers, responding to aggressive middle powers, containing chaos from failed states, or building coherent regional support for contingencies in other parts of the world. If we are willing to adjust alliance relationships and able to use political and economic relations wisely, our forces will continue to be welcomed as agents of peace and stability. **JQ**



U.S. Army (Robert W. Taylor)

American and Korean
securing flight line.

A Commander in Chief Looks at East Asia

U.S. Air Force (Paul Caron)

By RICHARD C. MACK E

My priorities as Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), are *warfighting* and *people*. After all the international economic analyses, the careful political-military considerations, the strategic military planning—the fundamental business of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) is warfighting. Warfighting is readiness—our constant focus. But people are an inextricable part of that focus. It wasn't just technology, equipment, or doctrine that won the Cold War and Operation Desert Storm. It was the excellence of our people. Just as a warfighting priority drives readiness, the people priority demands quality of life.

Although these priorities may be clear, no simple, singular view of East Asia can provide a complete perspective on this complex region. East Asia is a point of convergence for the interests of major powers and still exhibits the strategic dynamics of the contingency era and the Cold War. PACOM

lies at the nexus of diplomatic and military affairs, strategic and operational concerns, and joint and service matters. In the face of such complexity, only strategy—the effective linkage of ends, ways, and means—can fully address my responsibility for applying joint forces to achieve U.S. objectives in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Intersection of Interests

East Asia has seen the intersection, not always peaceful, of the strategic interests of several major powers. As one senior regional leader quipped, "This is a tough neighborhood." Russia maintains significant regional military capabilities as it makes the transition from socialism to a market economy. Simultaneously, China is unleashing the economic energy of one-fifth of the world population and seeks to define a regional and global role commensurate with its burgeoning economy.

regional diversity and dynamism produce an environment where crises are inevitable

Japan has increased its political clout and financial resources throughout the region and the world over a few decades. Now the second largest economy in the world, Japan is undergoing its most significant political change in 38 years, but it remains a firm treaty ally and is strategically more important than it was during the Cold War. South Korea, a thriving market economy and another close ally, is a maturing democracy. In

North Korea, the struggle of an isolated regime to survive with its military capabilities intact poses a challenge to the South and to regional stability. Strategic circumstances, however, differ fundamentally in Southeast Asia where the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has begun a multilateral security dialogue. Two members of ASEAN, Thailand and the Philippines, are U.S. allies. The combined voice of this organization gains increased attention from both regional and global audiences.

East Asia is a tough neighborhood, perhaps—but it is also a promising one. The stability made possible by decades of U.S. commitment and forward presence has generated astounding rates of economic growth. Our economy grew sevenfold over the last hundred years. Indonesia and the other Asian “tigers” will do that in a generation. East Asia offers both the greatest peril and the most promise for the Asia-Pacific region and the world.

Cold Wars versus Contingencies

As South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung Joo observed, “During the Cold War period, a fault line ran across East Asia. Now the trends of reconciliation and cooperation have replaced unproductive confrontation here and elsewhere. Every country in the region except North Korea has joined in these trends, rendering the fault line obsolete.” Obsolete perhaps, but certainly not irrelevant.

The Korean peninsula still presents the ghastly potential for high intensity conflict. If North Korea violates the armistice and breaks across the demilitarized zone (DMZ), there will be no need for a U.N. Security Council vote or chance to seek the sense of the Senate. America will be at war. Desert Storm will not be the model; thousands will die.

In addition to a classic Cold War confrontation, I face diverse contingency requirements. The PACOM area of responsibility (AOR) takes in half of the world’s surface and two-thirds of its population. The area enjoys the fastest economic growth on earth, but attendant changes could disrupt political and social orders. Together with recurring natural disasters, the regional diversity and dynamism produce an environment where crises are inevitable. PACOM must be prepared for both cold wars and contingencies, major regional conflicts and minor crisis response, forward presence and rapid reinforcement.

A Matter of Perspective

East Asia has lacked a convergent perception of threat—the traditional cause of multilateral security arrangements. Therefore it does not have (and probably does not need) comprehensive, NATO-like institutions. But interest is rising in sub-regional, multilateral security dialogues based on mutual interests rather than common perceptions of threat. Such developments have a long way to go before taking shape, and in the meantime the lack of a multilateral security organization puts CINCPAC at the diplomatic-military interface of many issues. Security and economic concerns are similarly intermingled. I tell my friends at the Department of State that total coordination and cooperation are essential for our mutual success.

Even in the military sphere my perspective must be multifaceted. I link operational goals of joint task force (JTF) commanders and General Gary Luck, commander of our forces in Korea, with the strategic goals of the National Command Authorities and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am a supported as well as a supporting CINC. I lead forward presence forces in East Asia, forward-based forces in Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska, and forces on the West Coast.

Many have characterized PACOM as a maritime theater. Although my largest component force is Navy, this is more than a

Admiral Richard C. Macke, USN, is Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command. He has served as Commander, Naval Space Command; Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (J-6), Joint Staff; and Director of the Joint Staff.



U.S. Army (Romona E. Joyce)

Royal Cambodian soldiers drilling.

maritime theater. Air forces offer great flexibility in overcoming the tyranny of distance in this huge AOR; but this is not an air theater. It includes the seven largest armies in the world; however, this is not a land theater—or an amphibious theater, even though I command two-thirds of the active combat power of the Marine Corps. PACOM is a joint theater.

How should one begin to look at this mosaic of interests, perspectives, and considerations? The answer is through the lens of strategy—the effective linkage of ends, ways, and means.

Ends, Ways, and Means

Ends. There is no confusion over strategic ends in East Asia. Our current national security strategy of engagement and enlargement enhances U.S. security, promotes prosperity at home, and extends the community of free market democracies. President Bill Clinton made his first overseas trip to Japan and Korea where he outlined a vision of a Pacific community built on shared strength, prosperity, and commitment to democratic values and ideals. He delineated clear security priorities for a new Pacific community:

- ▼ a continued American military presence in the Pacific
- ▼ stronger efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- ▼ new regional security dialogues
- ▼ support for democracy and more open societies.

Our commitment to the region and its stability is unequivocal. As the President has stated: “America is, after all, a Pacific nation . . . America intends to stay.” In peace we seek to promote stability throughout the region; in crisis we seek to deter violence and promote cooperation; and, in the event of war, we would seek swift and decisive victory.

Means. The means to achieve these ends include more than 330,000 soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen of PACOM’s unified armed forces. We employ not only forces, but also diplomatic and defense programs, funds, and activities to engage nations in the AOR.

Ways. PACOM has three principal ways to apply the available means to achieve our strategic ends.

▼ *Forward presence.* If we are not forward in the Pacific, we can’t engage and participate. If we don’t participate, we have no influence. Our forward presence is the linchpin of our Pacific strategy. There’s no better way to demonstrate U.S. commitment than to station and deploy American men and women in the region.


▼ *Strong alliances.* Five of the seven U.S. mutual defense treaties currently in force are in the PACOM AOR—a solid guarantee and foundation of regional stability.

▼ *Crisis response capabilities.* Commitment without capability is hollow. Ready, effective military capabilities are essential as tools of engagement and response.

The PACOM theater military strategy of cooperative engagement takes advantage of every recognized role for military forces, including compellence, deterrence, and reassurance.

Compellence in War. Applying military power to make people do things—by violence or threat of violence—is known as compellence. The American way of war is swift, decisive victory, employing every available capability of the joint combat team. It depends on ready military capabilities applied in close coordination with our diplomatic and economic means. The Korean peninsula remains a potential arena for the application of PACOM forces in their compellence role. General Luck leads the effort there with our inseparable ally, the Republic of Korea (ROK). I have the greatest confidence in the U.S.–ROK combined team. PACOM would work closely with General Luck and our friends in the region to coordinate the flow of forces to Korea

Two-Tiered Command and Control



and the supporting political, economic, and military activities of off-peninsula forces. Our war plans for Korea are solid—studied and refined to the highest levels of detail. Our fervent hope is that operation plans will never become operation orders. But commanders and staffs of the Joint Staff, PACOM, and U.S. Forces Korea have totally met their obligation to prepare for war.

Deterrence in Crisis. Although we must be prepared for war, it is far better to deter a potential enemy or defuse a developing crisis. The basis for deterrence is the same: a ready, agile, joint military capability—both forward and reinforcing.

the basis for deterrence is a ready, agile, joint capability—both forward and reinforcing

The Asia-Pacific region, interestingly, has been the setting for some painful lessons in the art of joint warfare in the past. We do not intend to relearn the lessons of history. A single-service staff cannot masquerade as a joint staff. Crises must be managed with increased speed and efficiency—and with total joint teamwork.

Pacific Command has thus adopted a two-tiered command and control concept, whereby a JTF reports directly to the unified commander (CINCPAC). These joint task

force headquarters are predesignated and undergo a focused training and exercise program. To help these service headquarters transition from their normal, service-oriented, tactical responsibilities to true joint operations, CINCPAC has developed a cadre of trained personnel, the Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC). The cell is a tailorable group of subject matter experts with communications and intelligence equipment available for air deployment on a few hours notice to augment a JTF commander's staff. This group of 20–60 officers and enlisted from the PACOM staff and service components are experienced in crisis action planning, joint operations, and a wide range of warfighting skills. They participate in initial PACOM headquarters planning for a crisis and then carry that knowledge to the JTF commander. Members of the group are neither helpers nor note takers from higher headquarters. Once the cell reports to the JTF commander, he owns them. JTF commanders who use this type of cell consider it critical to successful JTF operations.

Two-tiered command and control and DJTFAC are good concepts—but useless unless we exercise them. We've done exactly that 31 times over the last three years in either real-world crises or exercises. Each of the predesignated JTF headquarters is exercised at least twice a year. I take care to participate personally in these exercises, and the JTF commanders and I get together at least once a year to discuss warfighting issues and our joint exercise program.

Reassurance in Peacetime. As Sir Michael Howard noted in "Lessons of the Cold War," reassurance is a military function that we recognize less easily than deterrence or compellence. Reassurance is the use of military power to engage others through peacetime military activities such as combined exercises, port visits, humanitarian assistance, or search and rescue exercises.

where China goes, so goes the future of Asia

Through these diverse peacetime military activities, reassurance creates a general sense of mutual security that is not specific to any particular threat or scenario. We reach out to each other in military-to-military contacts and relations. We maximize the transparency of our capabilities and intentions. By taking advantage of such training opportunities, we increase our ability to cooperate in times of crisis. Working together, we sustain the conditions of stability necessary for prosperity and democracy.

A tally of some of the PACOM peacetime military activities gives one an idea of the dimensions of this endeavor. In FY94, those activities included:

- ▼ 325 bilateral exchange and training programs
- ▼ reciprocal exercise and small unit exchange programs supporting 155 joint and combined exercises and treaty obligations
- ▼ 77 humanitarian and civic assistance programs in 23 countries
- ▼ 606 port visits in 25 countries
- ▼ 411 staff talks with the ministries of defense and services of 28 nations
- ▼ 18 conferences promoting the professional development of officers and militaries that are nonpolitical, obedient to the rule of law, and respected by society (over a thousand representatives, the future military leadership of 36 Asia-Pacific nations, participated).

While the activities of reassurance may seem peripheral to the more traditional missions of deterrence and compellence, they are in fact closely associated since reassurance activities generate the conditions of stability—conditions that preclude the need for warfighting. This stabilizing role of peacetime military activities is the basis of the U.S. transition to a strategy of engagement. Reassurance will be one of the fundamental roles for military forces in the Asia-Pacific region. But reassurance does not negate the need for capabilities of deterrence and compellence. Without the capability to prevail in war, our ability to reassure is compromised. Therefore we must resist any temptation to build forces solely for reassurance.

The Way Ahead

The United States will continue to pursue a strategy of cooperative engagement throughout East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. In every country I have visited the primary concern is, "Will America stay?" It is in our interest and that of the countries of the region that we remain engaged.

Japan. Our alliance with Japan is a linchpin of stability in Asia. Continued American guarantees and close cooperation with Japan underscore our commitment to the doctrine of forward engagement on a global scale. We enjoy an extraordinary strategic situation in which the security interests of the number one and number two global economic powers are inextricably linked. Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating once remarked that this arrangement has "bought a lot of stability." Security guarantees to Japan, embodied in the forward presence of 47,000 American service men and women, immeasurably advance U.S. strategic interests in the region. Japan, meanwhile, demonstrated that our security relationship transcends government transitions, with Socialist Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama acknowledging the constitutionality of the Japanese Self Defense Force and the requirement for the U.S.-Japan security relationship. That security guarantee is an indispensable, stable foundation as the United States and Japan work together, as Ambassador Walter Mondale puts it, "to put our economic relationship on as firm a footing as our political and strategic relationships."

China. Where China goes, so goes the future of Asia. We cannot ignore a country



Russians and
Americans on
Malamute DZ.

U.S. Army (Robert Ryan)



Combat Camera Imagery (Raymond T. Conway)

Australian F/A-18
during Pitch Black '93.

with more than one-fifth of the world's population, intercontinental nuclear weapons, a veto in the U.N. Security Council, and one of the most dynamic economies in the world. All the countries of this region watch China closely. Is China a threat? A threat is composed of capabilities and intentions. Everything we know today tells us that improved Chinese capabilities are highly probable. The key is their intentions. If China wants to be a contributing member of the community of Asia-Pacific nations dedicated to advancing regional stability, then all of our efforts will be easier. The key is to engage the Chinese so they will work with us to maintain stability.

We have overcome the diplomatic hurdles of the last year and are advancing our program of cooperative engagement with China. There have been a number of visits at the senior level including a recent trip by the Secretary of Defense. We are working our contacts with the Chinese in a deliberate fashion. Both parties are learning, enhancing

the transparency of our relationship, and addressing basic questions on roles, doctrines, and strategies. In short we are reassuring each other, a process of cooperative engagement that holds great promise for furthering the stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

Russia. After a lifetime preparing for military deterrence or compellence vis-à-vis Soviet military forces, it is encouraging to see our relationship with Russia move to a new phase where our military activities advance mutual reassurance. PACOM has conducted the first combined exercises with the Russians, a series of search and rescue exercises that began last year. Two have been very successfully completed and a third including Canadian forces is scheduled for March. In June 1994 an amphibious exercise, Cooperation From the Sea in Vladivostok, featured a Marine company and its Russian naval infantry counterpart in an amphibious disaster relief scenario. A Russian Federation Army squad visited and trained with a battalion of the 6th Infantry Division in early September. PACOM and Russia maintain a Far East Field Grade (O-6) Working Group to develop cooperative engagement activities that reinforce mutual, long-term trust and confidence.

Korea. There are two dimensions to the Korea story. In South Korea we have a long-term ally that has become a mature democracy and achieved economic prosperity, a success story for U.S. forward presence and commitment. Our security commitment to



U.S. Army (Brian Gavin)

Rangers boarding Thai helicopter during Cobra Gold '94.

Korea is solid, irreversible, and a linchpin to stability on the peninsula. North Korea presents an altogether different picture: we are a long ways from reassurance in the cooperative engagement sense with North Korea. But the October 1994 agreement regarding its nuclear program may be the first small step in that direction. We are hopeful that as North Korea's power transition unfolds, we will see a regime committed to policies that offer promise for the future. With patience and close coordination with our allies, I am optimistic that we can move from the requirements of military deterrence to military reassurance on the Korean peninsula.

Multilateral Military Activities. As outlined in President Clinton's trip to Asia, one of the administration's security priorities is to advance new regional security dialogues. The Asia-Pacific area is cautiously examining regional dialogues such as the ASEAN Regional Forum. PACOM will advance regional security dialogues by seeking opportunities for multilateral military activities that supplement our current bilateral relationships. Combined training, seminars, planning arrangements, or exercises reinforce transparency and mutual confidence by allowing nations of the region to advance their common security interests through reassurance rather than reaction to perceived threats. We are content to proceed in incremental steps, perhaps starting with small sub-regional arrangements, advancing at a rate with which

our partners in the Asia-Pacific region are comfortable.

C⁴I Innovations. The way ahead must include further command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C⁴I) innovations. Without effective C⁴I, training and operations are not feasible—in East Asia or anywhere else in my AOR. PACOM maintains an integrated view of C⁴I, the key to which continues to be effective partnerships with:

- ▼ government agencies to develop leading-edge technologies (PACOM will host DOD's Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration for FY95)
- ▼ component commands (the Theater Convergence Oversight Board will continue to direct efforts to enhance the convergence of all C⁴I systems throughout the theater)
- ▼ countries in the AOR (our Combined Interoperability Program is expanding its focus through numerous memoranda of understanding).

To stay on the leading edge of technology, we are prepared to take some risks. It's O.K. to "build a little, test a little," even "falter a little," but with full interoperability as the one inviolable criterion. The operational and strategic payoffs of effective C⁴I are immense.

Training Efficiencies. No amount of technology or restructuring will obviate the need to train for war, but resources for training execution will be limited. Thus training efficiency must be improved. In PACOM we continually review our Exercise Road Map, looking for opportunities to bring service training requirements under the umbrella of joint exercises. We extend that analysis to combined exercise requirements, looking for ways to capture combined training opportunities and requirements while simultaneously meeting service and unified command needs. This is an area where we have great hopes for our increased emphasis on multilateral military activities. The Chairman has laid out a challenge to have joint training meet the high standards we currently set for service training. We intend to meet this challenge through careful planning, close coordination, and a judicious balance of distributed simulations—headquarters and field exercises that get the maximum out of our precious training dollars and our service members' valuable time.

PACOM has a mature program of joint procedures and training. We've been at the

warfighting and people are job one

joint training business for some time and have learned some valuable lessons. We've learned that we must carefully balance the number of pre-designated CJTF headquarters against the available training resources and the personnel turnover cycles for those headquarters. We've learned that careful and continuous long-range coordination with the service components is essential. And we've learned that an up-front investment in adequate exercise simulations—and an adequate C⁴I network to support the distributed conduct of those simulations—is essential.

As ACOM assumes a greater role in joint training, we are working closely with that unified command to both share lessons learned and coordinate our efforts.

Warfighting and People. Warfighting and people, my command priorities, are job one. In a time of shrinking defense resources, I increasingly find myself in the business of supporting and coordinating service requirements within the PACOM AOR. Beyond synchronizing service, joint, and combined training, I play a role in identifying the impact of Base Realignment and Closure decisions. PACOM is also an active participant in the important work of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). As the JROC process develops, we are approaching the level of total service integration envisioned by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, to the benefit of our people, our readiness, and our country.

A Pacific Nation

The PACOM theater military strategy of cooperative engagement enables me to link ends, ways, and means and to maintain multiple perspectives on East Asia and the entire AOR. In the final analysis, however, only one perspective matters—the perspective of the American people. Asians worry about this. They know that American presence and commitment have made their emerging prosperity possible. They are glad to hear our government assure them we intend to stay. But they worry about the perspective of the American people. Does America have the will and the resources to continue its extraordinary contribution to regional peace and stability? Will America forget the Asia-Pacific region?

America will not forget, because its commitment is based on its best interests. The Nation understands that its economy is poised to participate in the extraordinary economic growth of the Asia-Pacific region—a growth we helped make possible. America understands the burdens and the benefits of global leadership. The United States has a long history of Asia-Pacific engagement and will not forget that it has lost more than 100,000 sons and daughters in three Pacific wars in this century. America is and will remain a Pacific nation.

JFQ

The Rationale for Continued U.S. Forward Presence in Asia

U.S. military forward presence in the Asia-Pacific region is an essential element of regional security and America's global military posture. Forward deployed forces in the Pacific ensure a rapid and flexible worldwide crisis response capability; discourage the emergence of a regional hegemon; enhance our ability to influence a wide spectrum of important issues in the region; enable significant economy of force by reducing the number of U.S. forces required to meet national security objectives; overcome the handicaps of time and distance presented by the vast Pacific Ocean; and demonstrate to our friends, allies, and potential enemies alike a tangible indication of [U.S.] interest in the security of the entire region.

—Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs,
United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region
(February 1995)



The PLA

In Search of a Strategic Focus

By RONALD N. MONTAPERTO

Trooping the line
in Beijing.

China's influence reaches every corner of Asia and, increasingly, the world. Your future is important to us and to all of the Asia-Pacific region, indeed is important to the world. . . .

—Secretary of Defense William J. Perry

In a recent address to the National Defense University of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), the Secretary of Defense outlined the strategic basis of relations between Washington and Beijing and stressed the importance of solid, mutually beneficial military-to-military contacts. His remarks came as China is deeply involved in defining strategic priorities for the next century. How these priorities are defined, in turn, will determine PLA capabilities, roles, and missions. By acknowledging China's central role in guaranteeing peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and by proposing a broad strategic dialogue, Secretary Perry faced—and attempted to disarm—the perception now prevalent among PLA leaders that the United States regards China as a hostile peer competitor of the future. The effect of the Secretary's remarks may not be evident for some time because

PLA strategic planners are apparently deeply divided in their assessments of the regional security environment. The terms of this debate should interest U.S. strategists for two reasons. First, the debate reveals much about assumptions implicit in Chinese strategic thinking. Second, it explains the purposes of China's military modernization program.

Chinese analysts agree that regional security is in a state of flux. The bipolar order, based on containment, is fading as a complex multipolar order emerges. Economic development means that Asian powers are identifying more national interests and have resources to pursue them with greater independence. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and an increasingly confident Association of Southeast Asian Nations question, and in some cases are revising, long-held notions on the proper roles and relations among regional powers. The Chinese have no doubt about the implication of such developments for the United States. The PLA perceives America as a nation which is unable to unilaterally determine the course of Asian affairs. It also sees the new security order as probably multipolar, though it is impossible to discern more than a glint of their vision.



DOD (Helene C. Stikkel)

It is here that PLA analysts diverge in determining which regional relations will be the most influential. Some think that the evolution of the American partnership with Japan will be decisive. Conflicting priorities and competing interests between Washington and Tokyo will grow and act as a constant source of instability. Eventually, U.S.-Japanese competition will be the fault line along which the region divides. Other analysts hold that relations between Washington and Beijing will drive regional events while still others think that the engine of change will be conflicts between rich and less affluent regional powers. Finally, a few analysts see a future shaped by American efforts to maintain a defining Asia-Pacific role despite a growing regional resistance to such a U.S. role.

These analyses illustrate that Marxist dialectic—which assumes that a system is the product of contradictions between opposite forces—is pervasive among PLA strategic thinkers. Although communism is defunct as a basis of political economy, much less as

a means of legitimizing the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, typical Marxist categories of mind on international relations persist

over the last few years China's officially published defense budget has roughly doubled

in the debate among PLA strategists. The thrust of Beijing's security policies and the future PLA force structure will be directly shaped by this debate, which also is a context for interpreting military modernization. Over the last few years China's officially published defense budget has roughly doubled. This development, coupled with aircraft purchases from Russia, an intransigent stand on territorial claims in the South China Sea, and a commitment to build a force projection capability, sparks universal concern among regional security planners.

Whatever their disagreement may be over the future shape of the regional security system, Chinese strategists concur that a crucial juncture has been reached. In this light Beijing's major security challenge lies not in

preparing to deal with a near-term military threat. Rather the problem is twofold: immediate and tactical on one hand, more broadly strategic and future-oriented on the other. Immediately and tactically, China is determined to maintain control over situations with the greatest potential for conflict. This means putting teeth in claims to sovereignty in the South China Sea and being able to enforce Chinese demands on Taiwan, although the Chinese remain sanguine about future developments in both areas. This leads to the other more broadly strategic and future-oriented dimension of the problem. Mindful of an uncertain future, Beijing must create an economy capable of supporting a range of economic, political, *and military* options that guarantee a major voice in the new structure and secure its place at the table.

China's relationship with the United States and other regional powers as well as the forces which the PLA is presently designing serve both imperatives. They can alert the region to China's priorities as the security system unfolds. Military modernization in particular is a manifestation of Beijing's commitment. Together these policies and programs ensure that China's position is well-considered by other regional powers.

The PLA is focused on strategic issues and concerns. In the near term, given the centrality of economic development and severe deficiencies in key military capabilities, Beijing will wish to avoid disrupting a regional stability that supports broad economic contacts. This might not apply, however, if the territorial dispute in the South China Sea altered the status quo or Taiwan declared its independence. In the long run the situation is less clear. Chinese strategists, like counterparts in other countries of the region, will continue to face ambiguities and uncertainties. Their approach will reflect a high degree of nationalism manifested through a determination to secure China's role as a pivotal force in regional affairs. Much depends on policies implemented by the United States in concert with regional allies. Such policies can resolve uncertainties or exacerbate them. In any event, broad engagement with China and especially strategic dialogue with the PLA are essential to shaping regional security to support vital American interests.

JFQ


Ronald N. Montaperto is a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. He has served as an analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency and taught at the U.S. Army War College.

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND (PACOM)




MISSION: PACOM has a four-fold mission: to foster peace, democracy, and freedom throughout the Pacific Ocean region; to deter conflict through forward presence and combat ready forces; to strengthen political, economic, and security cooperation; and to win in war should deterrence fail. PACOM stretches from the west coast of the Americas to the east coast of Africa and from the Arctic to the Antarctic, an area of responsibility which is more than 100 million square miles or roughly half of the earth's surface.

BACKGROUND: PACOM was among three unified commands—including Far East Command and Alaskan Command—established in the region in 1947. The Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) later absorbed the responsibilities of Far East



South Korean sentry,
Fool Eagle '93.

U.S. Air Force (Mike Reinhardt)



USS Tarawa at anchor
in Hong Kong.

U.S. Navy (Jeff Hilton)



Command when it was disestablished in 1957. That same year PACOM service component commands were formed with their headquarters in Honolulu and CINCPAC headquarters were transferred to Camp H.M. Smith near Pearl Harbor. Army, Navy, and Air Force components reported to CINCPAC and the Marines, under a type commander, to Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet.

Due to the extent of command responsibilities, CINCPAC was relieved of direct command of Pacific Fleet in 1958, although Deputy CINCPAC had previously assumed de facto command.

Command relations were further realigned by the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 with combat-ready forces placed under the operational command of CINCPAC. PACOM has four component commands today: U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC); U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), including U.S. Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific (FMFPAC); U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (MARFORPAC); and U.S. Pacific Air Forces

(PACAF). In addition, PACOM has four sub-unified commands: U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ), Alaskan Command (ALCOM), and Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCAPAC); it also has two standing joint task forces (JTFs): Joint Interagency Task Force West (formerly JTF-5), stood up in 1989 to conduct counterdrug operations, and JTF-Full Accounting, formed in 1992 to investigate the missing in Southeast Asia.

In 1972 PACOM took responsibility for U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean, Southern Asia, and Arctic area under a worldwide unified command realignment. To the north, the command also assumed responsibility for a portion of the Arctic Ocean and Aleutian Island chain formerly under Alaskan Command. The Pacific coastline of South America became the responsibility of Atlantic Command which took responsibility for all ocean areas fronting South America.

ALCOM, a sub-unified command formed in 1989, has responsibilities for the land, sea, and air defense of Alaska, including the Aleutians and surrounding waters—less the air defense mission of the Alaskan region of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Moreover, the PACOM area was expanded in 1976 to include the east coast of Africa.

The combined commands in the region are United Nations Command (UNC) and Republic of Korea/U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), both with headquarters collocated with USFK in Seoul. UNC is charged with oversight of the Armistice agreement of 1953 to preserve peace in Korea; CFC was established in 1978 to oversee bilateral military operations.

JFQ




Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force ships.

Japanese Defense Agency



Thai helicopter, Cobra Gold '94.



Australian guarding Rapier missile, Pitch Black '93.



Joint Combat Camera Center (Andy Dunaway)



Russian MI-8 during combined search and rescue exercise.

U.S. Air Force (Val Gempis)

Japan's Emergent Security Policy

By PATRICK M. CRONIN



Tokyo's new outpost.

Japanese Defense Agency

Japan, long regarded as America's bedrock ally in the Asia-Pacific region, is in the midst of the most extensive review of defense policy in more than twenty years. The results of this assessment will likely unfold incrementally rather than in one fell swoop. Nonetheless, by the end of the century we should see a new security relationship between Washington and Tokyo, more autonomous Japanese military capabilities, and increased participation on the part of Japan in multilateral security organizations.

At the core of this rethinking is the likely emergence of a National Defense Program Outline in the coming year. Current Japanese defense planning is based upon guidelines outlined in 1976. A special advisory panel was named in early 1994 to restructure the outline to reflect the emerging

global order. The panel delivered a report on "The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century" to Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in August 1994.¹ The National Defense Program is now under review, with an official version expected by year's end. Even if the advisory report receives a dilatory response, it will survive as a powerful guide for Japanese defense planners. Above all, the report calls for a new comprehensive strategy, arguing that "Japan should extricate itself from its security policy of the past that was, if anything, passive, and henceforth play an active role in shaping a new order." Japan's post-Cold War strategy should rest on heightened multilateral cooperation, continued alliance with America, and well-balanced, ready, and mobile military forces.

While that three-pronged approach is not new, the emphasis placed on the first and third pillars, as opposed to a predominant reliance on the U.S. security umbrella, represents a discernible shift in strategy.

faced with lower defense budgets and downsizing, Japan is likely to put a premium on jointness

Recasting Japanese security priorities has obvious implications for the United States, which has a force of some 47,000 personnel in Japan, including the Seventh Fleet flagship in Yokosuka, the Third Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa, and more than 100 Air Force combat planes. It is therefore significant that the report reaffirms the centrality of the alliance with the United States in the Japanese security calculus. The report touts the present partnership as an alliance for peace. It notes the essential nature of the U.S.-Japan security relations and urges both parties to reassert the alliance's rationale and make systemic improvements to clarify bilateral roles and missions. It encourages building a missile defense system with American collaboration, providing host nation support, and improving combined operations. In addition, it calls for a NATO-style acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, and for bilateral research, development, and production.

Attention to strengthening defense relations with Washington is counterbalanced, however, by an emphasis on multilateral approaches and autonomous capabilities. The agenda is centered on an expanded role in peace operations and regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. The report urges U.S.-centered multilateralism but does not state how alliance roles and missions will be related to the new agenda of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Absent a proximate threat the report consistently refers to the opaque and uncertain environment of the post-Cold War era. Potential dangers are listed as disruption in international maritime traffic, invasion of territorial air space, illegal territorial occupation, limited missile attack, terrorism, and armed refugees.

But none of these dangers is viewed as a major mission for the Japanese military. Instead, peacekeeping is clearly the new SDF *raison d'être*. Peacekeeping has been a growing mission ever since the Gulf War tainted Japan's international standing. Despite the fact that Tokyo contributed \$13 billion to the coalition effort to counter Iraqi aggression and belatedly sent minesweepers to the Gulf, Japan appeared unwilling to risk lives for the international community. Peacekeeping received a tremendous boost from successful SDF participation in the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia. Japanese peacekeepers arrived in Mozambique and Rwanda in late 1994 as further deployments to the Middle East and Balkans were being actively considered.

Hence, it is not surprising that the advisory panel pegged many of its recommendations for SDF restructuring on peacekeeping, to include organizing ground units for operations other than war and humanitarian assistance; shifting the focus of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) from large, slow-moving platforms to highly mobile systems; emphasizing jointness among the services; enhancing intelligence; building long-range transport aircraft; considering midair refueling assets; acquiring maritime support ships for sustainability; and bolstering research and education in foreign languages and international relations expertise. Reflecting in part concern over the ability to respond quickly to the Gulf War or another potential conflict, such as on the Korean peninsula, the report recommends reorganizing, augmenting, and streamlining the Japanese security apparatus in order to be in a position to make a swift and substantial response in time of crisis.

Faced with the prospect of lower defense budgets and downsizing ground forces, Japan is likely to put a premium on heightened jointness. Large and historic barriers must be negotiated, however, if jointness is to provide synergy on tomorrow's battlefield. Prior to World War II the Imperial Army and Navy reported separately to the Emperor without an intermediary to coordinate planning. Interservice rivalry was intense as the army guarded against Russia, the principal land power in the region, and the navy shadowed the United States, the major maritime competitor. So colossal was the

Patrick M. Cronin is a senior research professor in the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, and Executive Editor of JFQ.



U.S. Air Force (Lenn Robson)

Marine F/A-18,
Japanese F-16, and
Air Force F-16 during
Cope North 94-1.

chasm that the navy never informed the army of its critical defeat at Midway while the army privately set out to construct its own submarines.

After the war Japan took some modest steps toward inculcating its residual defense forces with a common culture. An interservice education system was instituted in 1952 with the creation of the National Defense Academy. A Central Procurement Office managed service acquisition and a Joint Staff Council coordinated service plans. Joint exercises provided basic operational training for the GSDF, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF). But jointness never really developed, not least because of a deliberate policy to constrain military effectiveness. For example, the services face elementary problems in conducting joint operations because of poor or nonexistent means of rapid communication. It is unlikely that Japan will adopt any sweeping reforms such as the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act in the near future.

Peacekeeping deployments to Mozambique and more recently to Rwanda involved both the GSDF and ASDF. Of course, deploying multiservice contingents is far different from employing joint forces in ways that provide added military capabilities. In particular, any future deployment of a theater missile defense system—which is currently only under preliminary joint study with the United States—probably would require intense coordination among GSDF missiles,

MSDF Aegis ships, and the ASDF Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).

Awakened public opinion in Japan and political reform will inevitably require adjustments in U.S.-Japan security relations. Despite increased economic frictions, however, both countries appear to recognize the long-term mutual benefits of close and continued partnership in the post-Cold War era. In the words of a leading Japanese analyst, Takeshi Kondo:

*From the moment that the Japan-U.S. alliance breaks down, Japan will start having enormous difficulties in its relationship with other Asian countries. Nor will these difficulties be limited to Asia. Japan will also have a hard time in its relationships with Russia and the Middle East*²

From an American perspective, a reinvigorated partnership with a more confident Japan is vital for ensuring regional and global stability. Meanwhile, a Japan active in the international arena can bolster other market democracies on a vast range of traditional as well as less traditional security issues. In sum, the demise of the old U.S.-Japan alliance is giving rise to a new, improved partnership built upon constructive interdependence. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ For an English translation of this document, see appendix A to Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, *Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program*, McNair paper 31 (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, November 1994), pp. 21–60.

² Takeshi Kondo, "U.S.-Japan Economic and Security Relations," *Securitarian* [Tokyo], July 1, 1994, p. 14.

The United States and North Korea reached a framework agreement in October 1994 that has profound consequences for the security of the Korean peninsula. Under a reciprocal process of approximately ten years' duration, the accord seeks to change the status of North Korea's nuclear development from a temporary freeze to total abandonment. Graphite-moderated nuclear reactors and related facilities would be frozen within a month and placed under International Atomic Energy Agency supervision, but resolving past suspicions is postponed five years. In addition, America will form and represent an international consortium to replace graphite-moderated with light-water reactors and negotiate a supply contract

with North Korea in six months. Also, alternative energy sources (heavy oil) will be provided until the first light-water reactor is completed. With regard to normalizing relations, Washington and Pyongyang agreed to reduce trade and investment barriers, open liaison offices in their respective capitals, and upgrade bilateral relations to the ambassadorial level based on progress in other areas. Moreover, the accord promotes the implementation of the North-South Korea Joint Declaration for denuclearization and reconvening North-South dialogue.

While a crisis was averted and the Cold War in Northeast Asia is coming to a close, there is widespread dissatisfaction over this agreement. Many consider it as welcome but as leaving much to chance. They object to a five-year postponement before special inspections can be implemented and feel that all provisions of the accord may not be faithfully carried out. Many people in Japan and South Korea are dissatisfied with the funding of the light-water reactor. Other reservations about the agreement fuel this dissatisfaction. One concern already mentioned is the assumption that a *reciprocal* process of ten years—

Assessing the U.S.-North Korea Agreement

By MASAO OKONOGI



On the DMZ.

U.S. Air Force (Scott Stewart)

while a light-water reactor is built—will provide a phased transformation of mistrust into mutual trust.

Criticism aside, North Korea would not have acceded to an accord without a postponement period even if the United States had negotiated more effectively. What Kim Il Sung accepted in his talks with former President Jimmy Carter was to freeze nuclear development, not abandon it. For North Korea

the North Korean leadership is attempting to sell its outmoded baggage of the Cold War

transferring spent fuel overseas and early implementation of special inspections would be tantamount to abandoning its nuclear program. In other words, by the time Washington accepted Carter's mediation, the option of economic sanctions already had been abandoned, and to expect a more advantageous agreement than the one negotiated would have been unrealistic.

Another aspect is that Pyongyang views Washington as its only negotiating counterpart and intends to fully rely on U.S. implementation of the agreement. The objective, one may assume, is to maximize in future overtures to Tokyo and Seoul the shock effect of the fact that the U.S.-North Korea accord was made over the heads of Japan and South Korea. Hereafter, North Korea will adroitly utilize relations with America as diplomatic leverage and to improve its position vis-à-vis Japan and South Korea. Pyongyang may also try to make Tokyo and Seoul compete for an advantageous position.

This bodes well for implementing the agreement. Not only that, North Korean leaders will probably conform to U.S. policy as much as they can and try to gain equal status with the South. Also in this accord the North pledged to make efforts together with the United States to strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Thus, from another perspective, it can be stated that American diplomatic influence has expanded to the northern part of Korea. In this situation, the South should rid itself of the inertia of the Cold War era and reconstruct

its relations with both the United States and Japan.


In sum, the North Korean leadership is attempting to sell, piece by piece and to the highest bidder, its outmoded baggage of the Cold War such as nuclear development and gloomy relations with Japan and South Korea. Then Pyongyang hopes to adjust to and survive in a new era. Time will be needed to form a judgment on which relationship will improve first, Japan-North Korea or North Korea-South Korea. Without doubt, however, the North will move toward the realization of cross-recognition. When it has sold its remnants of the Cold War, a new international political system will emerge on the peninsula.

Leaving aside the health of Kim Jong Il, North Korea's future in the short term will depend on whether he and other leaders can complete the above process smoothly. This is the first hurdle. If they fail, the North will be isolated internationally, economic hardships will mount, the prestige of Kim Jong Il will fall, and the new regime will face collapse in two or three years. This could entail a violent situation which is a worst-case scenario. On the other hand, if the North succeeds, relations with Japan and South Korea will improve and transfers of foreign capital and technology will commence. But improving external relations does not guarantee the long-term stability of the regime. If transfers of foreign capital and technology progress, another kind of contradiction will be evident—between the old regime that Kim Jong Il is endeavoring to inherit and the new policies for implementing an open economy. This is another hurdle.

North Korea faces the same dilemma that the former Soviet Union and China confronted. If the leadership stays firmly committed to the old political system and controls the flow of people, money, goods, and information, economic reconstruction becomes impossible. On the other hand, if liberalized policies prevail, contradictions in the old system will become evident and demands for reform will grow. It is likely that the North Korean leadership, fearing political instability, will try to separate moves toward openness and reform. But the precedents of the Soviet Union and China suggest that economic reform is needed to liberalize

Masao Okonogi is professor of international relations at Keio University and has taught at both the University of Hawaii and The George Washington University. His works include a study of American intervention in the Korean War.

North Korean
propaganda village.



U.S. Air Force (Scott Stewart)


and improve living standards, and systemic economic reform would have to extend to ideological and political reforms under this scenario.

There is a second scenario. If confrontation between conservatives and reformers arises in Pyongyang—which seems inevitable—the consequences would be dramatic. A policy debate can easily turn into a power struggle. In such circumstances contradictions deepen regardless of who triumphs. The triumvirate of leadership, system, and state would collapse and the North would be absorbed by the South and the Korean peninsula unified. It would be desirable if North Korea avoided this scenario by opening up and reforming its society, and by establishing a Chinese-style socialist state. South Korea is wary of the enormous costs that would be involved in any sudden collapse of the North and rapid unification, preferring instead long-term coexistence with an open socialist state to the North. The possibility of this scenario is low, but it is another possible outcome.

The role played by Japan in these circumstances is of some consequence. The transfer of capital and technology that is anticipated once bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea are normalized will help the North reconstruct its economy, if only temporarily, and also contribute to the

coexistence of the two Koreas. Doubt remains over how efficiently North Korea's leadership can use foreign capital and technology given its rigid political and economic systems. But if the infrastructure is strengthened and basic industries rebuilt, it is possible that the North could harness its relatively inexpensive, high-quality labor force to develop labor-intensive enterprises. Japanese capital and technology would do more than open up North Korea's economy and raise its standard of living. It would eventually promote reform of its political system. So, for better or worse, the economic exchange between North Korea and Japan after the normalization of relations could serve as a catalyst for imploding the North Korean regime. Even if that happens, however, a systemic collapse through a process of liberalization and reform is likely to resemble the German rather than the Rumanian model. The agreement reached by the United States and North Korea may well have paved the way for such a process.

JFQ



MH-53J Pave Low II
at Taegu Air Base.

South Korea's Defense Posture

U.S. Air Force (Mike Reinhardt)

By YOUNG-KOO CHA and KANG CHOI

From a South Korean perspective, while the overall security environment improved with the demise of the Soviet empire, there is now greater uncertainty and a growing number of threats with which to contend. Mismanagement and improper handling of emerging issues and lingering problems will be detrimental to South Korean security as well as to stability and peace throughout Northeast Asia. Within this environment, there are two compelling necessities: first, to maintain a strong security alliance between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States, and second, to augment the ROK military on the peninsula and across Northeast Asia. This article examines the uncertainty and threats that face South Korea, the ROK-U.S. alliance, and South Korean defense requirements.

Uncertainty and Threats

Among South Korean security concerns, the foremost threat is presented by North Korea's aggressive intentions and large military establishment. While it has signed important accords with Seoul—the Basic Agreement, the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization, and the Provisions—North Korea has failed to implement the terms. Rather it is committed to communizing the entire Korean peninsula by use of force. For Pyongyang unification calls for integrating the divided territory as well as consolidating *juche* ideology and its ways. The North cannot afford to give up this ultimate goal because it has legitimized the regime and persuaded its people to unite and to make sacrifices. Toward this goal North Korea has adopted a strategy of five besieging offensives: political peace, ideological, external/diplomatic, espionage, and, finally, military.¹ But history has proven the first

The views expressed in this article are the authors' and do not necessarily represent those of either the Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, or the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

four to be unattainable. The North is left with the military offensive in which it has an advantage over the South. In a word, North Korea's aggressive intent can be backed only by military means.

Even with a faltering economy, North Korea has made every effort to modernize its forces and to maintain a military edge over the South.² Not only are the North's forces highly mobile and mechanized; approximately 65 percent are near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and on a high state of readiness. These strengths would permit the North to launch a *blitzkrieg* against the South without reinforcement, redeployment, or massive mobilization. It is believed that North Korea plans either to sweep the entire peninsula before American reinforcements arrive or to partly occupy the Seoul metropolitan area in the early stages of a war. In both cases South Korea, with its capital located only 40 kilometers from the DMZ, would suffer severely.

Arms control may be the most suitable way to reduce military tension along the DMZ. But arms control talks are unlikely to yield success. Though initiatives have been proposed some 280 times since the Korean War, most of them are unrealistic and have served

mainly as propaganda. In fact, in the Basic Agreement and the Provisions, the North agreed to introduce some declaratory arms control measures and to negotiate further. But it has failed to do so. Moreover, it has been trying to weaken the ROK-U.S. combined defense posture by demanding the withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) as a precondition for talks. Thus, North Korea is not committed to creating a stable military situation on the peninsula. Rather it tries to retain a militarily favorable condition for achieving forceful unification. One can therefore expect the military threat to continue.

The North's conventional military threat has been heightened by its possible possession of weapons of mass destruction.

While it is uncertain whether North Korea has nuclear weapons, it definitely has the capability to produce them.³ Strategically, a nuclear-armed North could prevent the United States from using nuclear weapons by holding South Korea and parts of Japan hostage. Pyongyang could thus undermine extended deterrence and confound escalation control in a conflict between the two Koreas.⁴ In other words, by complicating strategic responses and weakening the credibility of deterrence vis-à-vis the South, a nuclear-armed North could gain an active deterrent against the United States while launching a conventional attack. Thus, under any circumstance, North Korea cannot be allowed to acquire such weapons or retain a clandestine nuclear capability.

The focus on nuclear issues has tended to overshadow other weapons of mass destruction, that is, chemical, biological, and toxin weapons. While one should not underestimate the strategic value of biological and toxin weapons, chemical weapons are of particular concern. Although party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Pyongyang eschewed the Chemical Weapons Convention. Perhaps this is because it has developed a reliable chemical weapons capability. It is believed that the North has stockpiled 1,000 tons of such weaponry and can produce 4,500 tons of chemicals annually. It has various chemical agents, including sarin, tabun, phosgene, adamsite, mustard gas, and blood agents (such as hydrogen cyanide).⁵ Furthermore, it has delivery means which include artillery pieces, multiple-launch rocket systems, mortars, and missiles. Rodong and Taepo Dong-2 missiles could threaten South Korea, Japan, and the United States by making most major East Asian cities vulnerable to attack.⁶

In addition to these capabilities, there are sober operational reasons for being alarmed about chemical weapons. Unlike biological and toxin weapons, chemical weapons can yield immediate military effects by softening positions prior to assault, sealing off rear-echelon reserves, blocking lines of retreat, and neutralizing artillery.⁷ These effects fit into North Korean offensive doctrine. Even the threat of chemical weapons is a force multiplier because it makes opponents use special protective

North Korea is not committed to creating a stable military situation on the peninsula

Young-Koo Cha is Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Office in the Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, and Kang Choi is an associate research fellow in the Arms Control Research Center at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

equipment which reduces combat effectiveness.⁸ Together with conventional superiority North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and a diehard intent to unify the peninsula by force present an ominous threat that will likely remain the most serious security concern for Seoul in the foreseeable future.

Another, related uncertainty that confronts South Korea stems from the instability of North Korea. While Kim Il Sung was alive the regime was regarded as being stable. His death last year has led to an artificially imposed stability. His son and apparent successor, Kim Jong Il, does not have the charisma to consolidate power, but he may attempt to legitimize his rule through economic reform. However, history reveals that such revision is likely to undermine the regime's stability. This is Kim Jong Il's dilemma. The real danger is that the leadership of North Korea will mobilize the populace to slow the breakdown of the regime. Even if the North does not wage a "scapegoat war" against the South, any sudden collapse of its government for economic and political reasons would be detrimental to South Korean security. How should we handle the inevitable chaos and upheaval in North Korea?

Should we help restore order? Or should we facilitate the collapse of the regime? What kind of military preparedness and actions will be needed to

manage a transitional period before peaceful unification? We should think now about ways to cope with such a collapse.

The third and last South Korean security concern is the arms buildup in neighboring states. In spite of a regional relaxation of superpower tensions, or perhaps because of it, the countries of Northeast Asia are spending more on defense and have announced force improvements, especially in naval and air capabilities. China has significantly beefed up its air force in recent years and is on a shopping spree for advanced aircraft. The publicized purchase of 72 Su-27 Flanker fighters from Russia will enhance the power projection capability of the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). Despite the defensive role of the original design, the Su-27 can be converted to a multi-role combat/attack version. Its combat radius of 1,500 kilometers

and fuel capacity of more than 4,000 kilometers would greatly enhance air cover. PLAAF has also acquired an airborne refueling system, and some A-5s and F-8s are allegedly equipped with such kits. This in-flight capability will substantially increase China's operational flexibility and allow for "positioning the launch site farther from the source of a potential counterstrike."⁹

The virtual dissipation of a land force requirement on the Sino-Russian border has allowed China to divert resources to secure its maritime interests. In 1992 the navy added several classes of ships to the fleet. Its continuing efforts to acquire an aircraft carrier are known. With Russian naval versions of the Su-27 Flanker or the MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter, a carrier would significantly augment China's power projection capability and upset the naval balance in Asia.

China's shopping spree for advanced weapons has caused Taiwan to launch its own arms buildup. Taipei is not likely to lag behind Beijing's military growth and modernization program.¹⁰ Sino-Taiwanese rearmament, left unchecked, could touch off a spiraling arms buildup throughout Northeast Asia. A resurgent Taiwan could arouse China to embark on a more intensified weapons procurement binge with help from Russia and Ukraine. In turn, this could goad the Japanese into an arms race. Tokyo is becoming wary of Beijing's increasing military power and the dangers of competition between the two countries. Accordingly, Japan is likely to match the Chinese buildup. Due to the size and maturity of its economy, Japan has formidable purchasing power and the ability to develop a threatening arsenal at relatively short notice.¹¹

Such buildups and modernization in the region may not pose an immediate threat to South Korea, but they are likely to increase instability as well as the South's defense burden in the long run. Furthermore, this trend will confuse ROK strategic calculations and predictions by presenting an ever-shifting balance of power. In sum, South Korea faces North Korea's aggressive military, uncertainty about the stability of the Pyongyang regime, and a regional arms race. None of these security issues can be effectively managed by the

Tokyo is becoming wary of Beijing's increasing military power and the dangers of competition

South alone and require close cooperation with the United States.

The ROK-U.S. Security Alliance

The alliance between South Korea and the United States, which began with the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953, has been the backbone of South Korean defense. It has provided a secure environment for the South's economic miracle and democratization and contributed greatly to peace and stability in Northeast Asia by deterring communist expansion. The ROK-U.S. security arrangement has changed with the environment. It started with a patron-client relationship and evolved into a genuine alliance with the establishment of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) in 1978. With the birth of CFC, the alliance entered a partnership like no other, departing from the notion that it was merely a by-product of the Korean War. South Korea, based on its sustained economic development and defense modernization, took on more responsibility for its defense during the 1980s, efforts that helped consolidate the Korean-U.S. security partnership.

With the end of the Cold War, many debate the nature of the security order that should take its place. We must recognize, however, that despite the diminished status of the old international order, a new order has not yet settled on Northeast Asia. While the threat of global communist expansion is virtually gone, the threat from the North lingers on the Korean peninsula. This means that the rationale of the traditional ROK-U.S. security alliance is still valid. The compact needs to look to its long-term structure and purpose—to a time when the military threat from the North is insignificant—while grounded in the near- to mid-term requirement to maintain a credible deterrent. This transformation should not be driven by a time constraint but by a realistic assessment of the situation. In the meantime, both countries should identify common security interests and present a clear security vision, which could contribute to peace and stability in Northeast Asia as well as to the prosperity of both countries.

In this regard, mutual security interests can be identified as: preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon, maintaining

the leading American role in managing regional security, deterring North Korean aggression, providing the United States a forward base, and maintaining free trade and markets by protecting strategic resources and sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Based on common interests, we can divide responsibilities and design a framework for security cooperation.

So long as the South-North confrontation continues, U.S. forces can provide a balance on the peninsula, compensating for the insufficiency of ROK forces. If peaceful coexistence between the North and South takes root, the Korean-U.S. security arrangement can be adjusted. When the North Korean threat is gone, for instance, the alliance should be refocused from a peninsular to a regional perspective. South Korea would then assume the lead in crises on the peninsula while the United States would take the lead in regional and global crises with its partner playing a supporting role. This implies that South Korea and the United States should continue to nurture the alliance through mutually supporting security cooperation, and also gradually transforming the relationship from cost-sharing to responsibility-sharing. To maintain this kind of alliance, Seoul should strive for a more balanced force. Such a structure will enable the South to assume a greater regional role and ease the American burden.

On the American side, it is essential to maintain a reliable and clear naval and air presence in the region, despite inevitable troop reductions. The U.S. presence has not only stayed a spiraling arms race but has prevented other regional actors from developing military capabilities. Of course, the United States can reduce forces on the peninsula after unification or a substantial reduction in tension, while it maintains the force level of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ). If we take into account the size of USFJ, we may doubt whether the United States can fulfill the role of security guarantor in East Asia. Thus, even after unification, it would be desirable for the United States to retain substantial forces in South Korea as a signal of its long-term resolve.

The Republic of Korea and the United States should expand their partnership beyond the military sphere to tackle other challenges. Such a comprehensive security

The Two Koreas

	North Korea	South Korea
Total Armed Forces	1,128,000	633,000
Land Forces		
Tanks	3,700	1,900
Armored Personnel Carriers	2,500	2,000
Artillery	2,300	3,500
Self-Propelled Artillery	4,500	900
Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems	2,280	140
Surface-to-Surface Missiles	84	12
Surface-to-Air Missiles	10,000	1,020
Helicopters	340	622
Air Forces		
Combat Aircraft	770	447
Naval Forces		
Submarines	25	5
Destroyers	0	8
Frigates	3	32
Patrol Craft	390	122
Amphibious Craft	231	14

Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1994–1995* (London: Brassey's for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994.)

relationship would include the political, economic, social, and environmental as well as military dimensions of security. Then we should clearly identify how our alliance of free market democracies serves those dimensions. For example, we can enhance our mutual competitiveness by expanded technological cooperation. Moreover, we can work together to secure resources and safeguard SLOCs. In sum, a comprehensive ROK–U.S. security alliance could better serve the interests of both countries well beyond the Korean peninsula. Finally, we should focus on the linkage in the Korean-U.S. alliance and a multilateral security order in Northeast Asia. Most agree on the desirability of a subregional mechanism. The main problems in creating such an organ could be overcome by using our present bilateral alliance as the basis for a multilateral arrangement and making them mutually reinforcing.

The current ROK–U.S. security alliance should be retained and its framework strengthened until the North Korean threat decreases or disappears. In the meantime, we should think about the modification of our traditional alliance to cope with a changing security environment. It should be transformed into a region-wide compact based on

shared responsibility that is comprehensive and driven by profit and common interests, not a threat. The speed of this structural transformation will depend on trends in the security environment on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Policy changes that might affect ROK–U.S. security relations should be made in a gradual manner while the combined deterrent capability of the two countries is maintained.

ROK Defense Requirements

Under that framework South Korea would have to assume greater responsibilities which would require augmenting its overall defense capability. But given the force level outlined in the Bottom-Up Review to cope with two major regional conflicts simultaneously, as few as four Army divisions, eight Air Force wings, and three aircraft carriers would be sent to the peninsula if war broke out there. That would represent a force level far below that required to repel North Korea.¹² In order to compensate for a deficient force level, ease the U.S. burden, maintain a reliable combined defense posture, and assume a greater responsibility on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia, South Korea must maximize the integrated combat capabilities of its armed forces through a balanced improvement of each service and functional area. Considering the North's *blitzkrieg* planning and the destructive power of its modern weapons, priority must be given to improving technologically-advanced assets like early-warning and battlefield surveillance, air-ground-sea mobile warfare, and precision weaponry.

ROK land forces should focus on improving mobility and fire support with lighter forces and a streamlined organizational structure.¹³ To prepare for offensive mobile war the army should reorganize corps, infantry divisions, and brigades into mechanized forces. Reserve forces should also be organized into infantry divisions and supplied with firepower and equipment to strengthen unit capability and reduce manpower. To establish a balanced force structure, however, switching from the predominantly army-based defense posture against massive land attack to one that would secure

national air defenses and maritime interests, South Korea must invest more in naval and air capabilities than in the past.

Naval improvement must be focused on securing a qualitative superiority to counterbalance the North's numerical edge and changes in the security environment. The ROK navy should have a balanced, three-dimensional combat capability comprising surface, underwater, and aviation. To prevent North Korean submarines from cutting off SLOCs, the navy especially needs submarines,

South Korea should enhance C³I to augment combined forces

helicopters, and surface patrol planes (P-3Cs). In addition, there should be more exercises held by the ROK and U.S. navies designed to supplement the multinational Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise conducted biennially since 1971 under U.S. Pacific Fleet Command.

With regard to airpower, it is imperative to secure assets that can meet the requirements of future warfare and that are appropriate to the geography of the Korean peninsula. Currently, the ROK government is proceeding with the Korean Fighter Program (KFP) to secure next-generation combat aircraft. This program includes the gradual introduction of 120 F-16s.¹⁴ But the air force also needs an enhanced electronic warfare capability to increase the survivability of tactical aircraft and to counter electronic warfare as well as strengthened defense of core Korean and U.S. combat facilities. Finally, South Korea should enhance its C³I system to augment the interoperability of combined forces and link its land and air forces. The fact that peacetime operational control passed to South Korea at the end of 1994 makes this even more important. Washington should encourage Seoul to acquire C³I technologies.

In the meantime, we should also focus on training to operate these systems and structures. The formation of CFC in 1978 enhanced combined operations by enabling South Koreans and Americans to work together. Through Exercise Team Spirit both countries have been provided with valuable opportunities to conduct a combined mission at peninsula-level. We should expand combined exercises to the regional level to cope with the new security environment. Depending on the nature of potential crises, we should think about forming combined

rapid deployment forces. Such a balanced force structure would enable South Korea to take responsibility for countering a low-intensity North Korean provocation and to provide greater support to the United States in the region. This would strengthen our alliance in the long term, making it a true partnership. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, *Defense White Paper 1993-1994* (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1994).

² *Ibid.*, p. 55.

³ There is a controversy over whether North Korea has a nuclear capability. But most South Koreans think that they have at least the wherewithal to produce some nuclear weapons. Some people also believe they have already made a crude nuclear device.

⁴ Young-Koo Cha, "Security Threat Perceptions: A Korean View," a paper presented at a workshop on "Real Threat Perceptions in Asian States" cosponsored by the East-West Center, the Center for Naval Analyses, and the Research Institute for Peace and Security in Honolulu on August 24-25, 1992, p. 4.

⁵ Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Chemical and Biological Warfare Arsenal," *Jane's Intelligence Review(Asia)* (May 1993), p. 228.

⁶ "Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," in *Proceedings of RINSA International Symposium '94 on Capabilities and Prospect of Special Weapon System of North Korean Military*, September 1, 1994, pp. 26-31.

⁷ Michael Sheehan, "North Korea's Chemical, Biological and Toxin Warfare Capabilities: Implications and Options," in *Proceedings of RINSA International Symposium '94*, September 1, 1994, p. 70.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

⁹ James G. Roche, "Tactical Aircraft, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Proliferation in the Developing World," a paper presented at the conference on the Project on Advanced Weaponry in the Developing World sponsored by the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Washington on June 11-14, 1992, p. 12.


¹⁰ Young-Koo Cha and Kang Choi, "Land-Based Confidence-Building Measures in Northeast Asia: A South Korean Perspective," a paper presented at a conference on Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue cosponsored by the Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation and the National Institute for Research Advancement in Tokyo on May 16-17, 1994, p. 16.

¹¹ Buzen and Segal, "Rethinking East Asian Security," pp. 9-10.

¹² Heritage Foundation, "The Folly of Clinton's Defense Plans for Korea," *Backgrounder*, no. 228 (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, June 28, 1994), p. 2.

¹³ *Defense White Paper 1993-1994*, pp. 100-02.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 104-06.



Joint Combat Camera Center (Robert Shanks)

Asian Multilateralism: Dialogue on Two Tracks

U.S. and Thai officers
planning amphibious
operations.

By RALPH A. COSSA

It was not that long ago that most U.S. policymakers and their Asian counterparts viewed multilateralism with suspicion. When the Japanese foreign minister suggested establishing a forum to discuss regional security issues at the 1991 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) his motion was not well received. The United States, for one, was cool to such a proposal. Over the last few years, however, there have been decided shifts in American and regional attitudes toward, as well as support for, multilateral security initiatives. On the U.S. side, the first clear signal came in 1993 during Senate confirmation hearings for the post of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs when the nominee, Winston Lord, identified an enhanced multilateral security dialogue as one of ten administration priorities for Asia.

Previously support had arisen in ASEAN, and particularly on the part of the Philippines, for introducing security issues into PMC deliberations. The way was eventually cleared at the 1992 PMC in Manila when a joint statement was issued on the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes involving the Spratly Islands which are claimed in their entirety by both China and Taiwan and partially by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

Regional nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), many of which have close government affiliations, were also calling for greater multilateral security dialogue at official and NGO levels. Moreover, in 1991-92, a consortium of institutes that focus on security and international affairs in the ASEAN region collaborated with similar organizations in the United States, Japan, and Korea to promote official and nongovernmental security dialogue which set the stage for

both the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

Given this groundswell of support, the Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa called for a meeting similar to that proposed in 1991 when he visited Bangkok two years later. President Bill Clinton iced the cake when he embraced the idea of multilateral security dialogue in Asia, referring to it as a pillar of his vision for a new Pacific community

the time is right to seize the opportunities that multilateral security initiatives hold

during a trip to Japan and South Korea. This change in attitude was solidified at the 1993 PMC when participants met informally with the representatives of China, Russia, Vietnam, and other PMC observers. The group decided that they would reconvene the following year in the precedent-setting ARF.

It is important to note that the President, among others, has stressed that Asian multilateral security initiatives must build on, and remain compatible with, the enduring bilateral relationships that continue to serve Asian peace and stability. There seems to be a clear consensus not only in Washington but among officials across Asia that to be effective multilateral initiatives should build on and not seek to replace existing relationships. Nonetheless, there is growing sentiment that the time is right to seize the opportunities that complementary, multilateral security initiatives hold.

Military/Security Initiatives

This is not to imply that multilateral security arrangements are totally new to Asia. Many have been attempted, a significant number under American sponsorship. Some, like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), could not stand the test of time. The failure of these pacts may have heightened skepticism of multilateral security alliances in South and Southeast Asia. The backing of Asian multilateral initiatives by the Kremlin during the Cold War—seen as thinly-veiled attempts to weaken American influence and gain Soviet footholds in

Asia—also added to earlier cautious approaches to multilateral security initiatives both in Washington and in the capitals of the region.

On a positive note, however, other less ambitious multinational efforts have been silently making headway for decades. The Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), for instance, which links Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom, has been in effect for more than twenty years and helps promote understanding, trust, and complementarity among Asian and Western nations. In addition, it offers indirect linkages, via the Australian connection, between the United States and the ASEAN members of FPDA.

Regional militaries have often taken the lead in multinational efforts thanks to the success of programs promoted by our Armed Forces. The Pacific Armies Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS), for instance, created by the U.S. Army in 1971, annually brings together officers from more than twenty countries to discuss common logistics matters as well as combined operations and training. Similarly, the Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS), begun in 1978, is a forum for senior officers from more than thirty nations to discuss military management problems. Recent agendas of PASOLS and PAMS meetings have focused on international peacekeeping and disaster relief, operational areas apropos to multinational efforts.

These initiatives have also provided a comfortable venue for officers from China, Russia, Japan, and India, among others, to interact with counterparts from other countries that they would find it politically difficult, if not impossible, to meet on a bilateral basis. Such confidence-building measures have also enabled proposals emanating from the ASEAN PMC, ARF, and several NGOs for a more structured multilateral forum for talks among defense officials and military officers.

Political/Economic Activities

Multilateral mechanisms can serve as building blocks for more ambitious Asian multilateral initiatives. While security-oriented endeavors have proliferated since 1991, they are complemented by a wide range of multilateral economic activities that also continue to flourish in the region.

Colonel Ralph A. Cossa, USAF (Ret.), is Executive Director of Pacific Forum CSIS. Previously he served as a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University and as a regional intelligence analyst.

Osan Air Base, Korea.



Combat Camera Imagery (Mark A. Borosch)



U.S. Navy

Japanese destroyer
Sawakaze underway
in Pearl Harbor.

Of particular importance is the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum that links 18 regional economies. While aimed at managing the ramifications of growing interdependence, it also has significant political and security consequences. While few support adding security topics to the APEC agenda, the fact that the 1993 and 1994 APEC meetings were conducted by heads-of-state gave a political-security dimension to the organization. The most important outcome of these meetings, like other dialogues, may be the process itself since exchanges promote understanding that often results in reducing the risk of conflict.

Another multinational organization with economic foundations has also assumed important political and security dimensions. ASEAN, formed in 1967, is one of

the most successful practical examples of Asian multilateral cooperation. Through its various mechanisms and close affiliation with think tanks in the region, ASEAN has helped lay the basis for several of the most promising emerging multilateral activities.

Emerging Security Mechanisms

At the official level ARF convened its inaugural meeting in Bangkok in July 1994 which brought together ministers from all six ASEAN members (namely, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) with their dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the United States, and European Union) and other regional players (China, Russia, and Vietnam, plus Papua New Guinea and Laos). The meeting issued a final communiqué that underscored a commitment "to foster the habit of constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern" in order to make "significant efforts toward confidence building and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region." Ministers agreed to convene annually with the next meeting scheduled for this coming summer in Brunei.

ARF is particularly suited to serve as the consolidating and validating instrument behind the many security initiatives proposed by governmental and NGO sessions in recent years. Its support of ideas such as an arms register, exchanges of unclassified military information, maritime security cooperation, preventive diplomacy, and other confidence-building measures should generate more support for both official and nongovernmental efforts to develop innovative measures for dealing with sensitive security issues.

The most promising mechanism at the NGO level is CSCAP, which links regional security-oriented institutes and, through them, broad-based committees comprised of academics, security specialists, and former and current foreign and defense ministry officials. Committees have been formed in Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States as well as the European Union. North Korea, India, Russia, and Vietnam, among

others, have expressed interest in joining. Given CSCAP's inclusivity—its bylaws encourage membership by any country or territory that supports multilateral dialogue and confidence-building—attempts are being made to bring both China and Taiwan into the organization.

CSCAP, which predates ARF, is now focusing on providing direct support while pursuing other “track-two” diplomatic efforts. Several CSCAP issue-oriented working groups are dedicated to topics found in the ARF communiqué. Of particular note is a multinational working group—led by member committees from the United States, Singapore, and Korea—that is addressing security and confidence-building measures in Asia.

Efforts aimed at dealing directly with Northeast Asia security concerns are also underway. Most are attempts to bring officials from the major Asian powers (viz., the United States, Russia, China, and Japan), together with representatives from North and South Korea, to discuss regional security issues. A few efforts, including one sponsored by CSCAP, include Canada as a central player. NGO sponsorship is seen as key to bringing officials from these countries together since it permits them to participate in a private, as opposed to official, capacity.

The Balance Sheet

Multilateral security dialogue holds promise but has limitations. While multilateralism may better handle nontraditional problems such as refugees, pollution, and the like, bilateralism and ad hoc groups appear better suited for traditional threats. A NATO-style alliance aimed at defeating or containing a specific threat, to the extent that it is relevant, simply does not apply to a post-Cold

War Asia. Broad-based forums like ARF and CSCAP are useful for discussing problems. They are ill-equipped (and not eager) to resolve crises once they have occurred. Institutional forums are particularly valuable as confidence-building measures for avoiding, not reacting to, crises. Ad hoc coalitions as well as focused issue- or problem-oriented groupings appear more useful in solving problems or dealing with Asian crises (as has been the case elsewhere, witness the

coalition assembled to deal with Iraqi aggression during Desert Storm).

Yet despite such limitations, emerging multilateral security mechanisms can be important as vehicles for promoting long-term peace and stability in Asia. Among their applications, they could:

- ▼ assist Japan in becoming a more “normal” nation
- ▼ facilitate greater Chinese integration
- ▼ allow Russia to play a constructive security role
- ▼ help ensure continued U.S. engagement
- ▼ assure that other regional voices are heard
- ▼ provide governments with venues to test new ideas
- ▼ promote regional identity and greater cooperation.

Japan. Multilateral security forums offer a particularly effective means for Japan to become involved in regional security in a way that is nonthreatening to its neighbors. It is unfortunate that a number of countries in the region are uncomfortable about Japan playing an expanded security role. Nonetheless, as Japan strives for normalization, many voices at home and elsewhere call for (and, in some cases, demand) it to become more active internationally. Participation in ARF and similar forums offers Japan a means to exert greater leadership in international security affairs.

This is not to suggest that Japan should remilitarize or chart a course independent from its closest security ally, the United States. Japanese security efforts, to remain nonthreatening to neighbors, must be accomplished within the framework of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. U.N. peace operations provide another useful forum for greater Japanese participation in security affairs.

China. Multilateral mechanisms are also useful vehicles for interaction between China and its neighbors. Beijing is gradually overcoming its reluctance to engage in multilateral dialogue, as demonstrated by its participation in ARF and APEC. China's involvement in a range of security-oriented forums can promote transparency in its capabilities and intentions in ways that contribute to regional stability. Should Beijing be excluded or exempt itself from such fo-

**multilateral security
dialogue holds promise
but has limitations**

rum there would be a tendency to perceive China as part of the problem, that is, as an adversary to be contained, which would be counterproductive. Care should be taken not to make either China or any other nation the reason for multilateral security arrangements. On the other hand, China must demonstrate a desire to cooperate with its neighbors.

Russia. Multilateral forums offer Russia similar opportunities for regional integration. The Kremlin has signaled a desire to become more directly involved in multilateral security dialogue in Asia. For example, during the U.N. Security Council debate over sanctions against North Korea, Russia proposed an international conference of

major Asian states to help defuse the crisis (thereby giving Moscow a seat at the table). Russia's involvement in the Asian security dialogue pro-

motes a degree of familiarity and respectability that also bolsters those in the Kremlin most committed to reform and international cooperation. The Russian foreign ministry has also helped form a broad-based member committee necessary to support the country's entry to CSCAP.

The United States. Organizations such as ARF also provide a framework for continued U.S. involvement in Asian security affairs. It should be noted that America's policy conversion in support of multilateralism has raised concerns among Asian skeptics over Washington's long-term commitment to the region. Even traditional Asian proponents of multilateralism, although pleased with the U.S. change of attitude, express anxiety that multilateral security dialogue and cooperation not be used as a rationale for a reduced military commitment. They are worried that Americans (particularly in Congress) will see multilateral security arrangements as a substitute for a continued military presence by the United States in Asia.

Policymakers in Washington seem to be aware of this concern and stress that support for increased regionalism is built on the premise that multilateral efforts complement, and should not be viewed as a substitute for, enduring bilateral relationships.

President Clinton has indicated that forward military presence in Asia serves as the bedrock for his vision of a new Pacific community. Nonetheless, given lingering regional apprehensions, it remains incumbent on the United States to demonstrate that its multilateral involvement is aimed at providing additional means of engagement and will not serve as a subterfuge or excuse for reduced military presence in Asia.

Multilateral forums also provide avenues for other regional actors to raise security issues of mutual concern. The capability of ASEAN to amplify the voices of its individual members further demonstrates the utility of multinational mechanisms for smaller nations. Track-two organizations such as CSCAP can also provide "benign cover" for governments to vet policies and strategies in an academic setting prior to adopting formal proposals at the official level. Moreover, NGOs can serve as advocates for the interests of nations, territories, and regional groups that may be excluded from official gatherings. In addition, nations that find it politically unacceptable or uncomfortable to engage in bilateral dialogue can interact at the multinational level, particularly in NGO forums. Asian multinational gatherings also contribute to a sense of regional identity and greater cooperation. This will no doubt spill over into the political and economic spheres, just as growing political and economic cooperation has helped advance expanded security dialogue.

The time is opportune for the United States to become more actively involved in emerging multilateral security mechanisms provided they support bilateral relationships. Efforts that build on existing bilateral relationships and multilateral economic, political, and low-key security initiatives in Asia are particularly valuable. ARF at the governmental level and CSCAP at the NGO or track-two level are especially relevant steps. Subregional groupings focused on Northeast Asia could also make a significant contribution.

JFQ

**forward military presence
in Asia serves as the bedrock
for a new Pacific community**



Thai soldiers in
Tandem Thrust '93.

U.S. Air Force (Marvin Krause)

AMERICA and the Asia-Pacific Region

By WILLIAM T. PENDLEY

Japan is grappling with a fundamental identity crisis that it avoided facing in the Cold War

Change is a word heard so often that it has lost its impact. Most of the attention to change in Asia has been focused on dynamic economic growth. It would be almost impossible to miss a shift as dramatic as that in the global economic axis reaching from the Atlantic to the Pacific basin. The world's highest growth rates are in Asia and huge markets are opening throughout the region. One must aggregate the member nations of the European Union to equate Europe with Japan or, increasingly, with greater China which includes both Taiwan and Hong Kong.

No single nation in Europe, not even a reunited Germany, comes close. To Japan and greater China must be added South Korea and member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which have a growing regional economy with more than 300 million people. If the region is expanded to include South Asia, India is added

with almost a billion people and a growing middle class.

Centers of international power and leadership have historically been aligned with the global economic axis. In the age of Greece and Rome that axis centered on the Mediterranean. In the age of European colonial dominance and the rise of America, it moved to the Atlantic. At some point in the late 1980s and without fanfare, the GNP of the Asia-Pacific region exceeded that of Europe. With Japan and America accounting for more than 40 percent of world GNP, the axis shifted again. But economic change is only part of the dynamic. It could be overemphasized while more significant strategic changes are ignored.

Japan is grappling with a fundamental identity crisis that it avoided facing in the Cold War. Can it find an international identity through a global economic leadership role while still tying its political and security

interests to those of the United States? Will it instead seek that international identity in closer relations within Asia?

Regardless of the road Japan takes, its close and largely subordinate relationship with the United States will change. The growing value of global and Asian markets will lessen the relative importance of America to Japan. The protracted conflict and competition in U.S.-Japan economic relations will push Japan in other directions. Technological progress will allow Japan to choose advanced military technologies sufficient to provide for its defense. While Japan's reorientation may be slowed by stumbling efforts at reform and more effective government, it will still evolve into a more independent state. This change has vital strategic implications for the United States.

It is fashionable to focus on China's economic development and uncertain political future. This has resulted in extreme projections on both counts. China's economic growth potential has been overestimated in straight line projections similar to Japan before its economic bubble burst. Some cite growing inflation and an overheated Chinese economy as well as the sluggish transition from state enterprises to a market economy as signs of imminent collapse. Political forecasts run from the return to hard-line conservatism to the breakup of China into provincial power centers.

Economic and political change will probably continue but at an uneven pace. The economic boom will peak and level off as China is forced to deal with nagging economic sectors that it has tried to ignore. The new generation of leadership appears more technocratic and less ideological than its antecedent. Although there may be more democratic progress in the Chinese Communist Party, including internal dissent, there will be opposition to creating rival political movements.

The greatest danger that China will pose over the next decade is neither economic growth nor uncertainty over its leadership,

but rather what has not changed and may not change even with a new generation of leaders. A hundred years of foreign domination followed by the excesses of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution in a period of relative isolation caused China to miss major conceptual changes in the world. It is still stuck in a 19th century mindset represented by territorial great powers with large military forces. It still focuses on national sovereignty issues and rejects interdependence and international cooperation except in narrow, self-serving ways. It pursues ageless border disputes that have led to a variety of limited conflicts since the Korean War.

Probably the most destabilizing factor in the next decade will be modernizing the People's Liberation Army (PLA) with emphasis on its air and naval forces and power projection capabilities. China remains insensitive to the impact that its actions have on other states because it assumes that they operate on the same 19th century conceptual basis. This assumes that the Japanese motivation for rearming will be unaffected by Chinese military modernization since rearmament would happen anyway as a result of national sovereignty and a drive for great power status. Emphasis is thus on taking advantage of Japan's restraint to gain a stronger relative position. Military modernization coupled with territorial disputes and China's perception of what a great power is and how it should act makes for an uncertain and probably dangerous future for both Asia and the United States.

Korea is a powder keg with a short fuse positioned at the point of convergence of Russian, Chinese, Japanese, and American interests. The departure of Kim Il Sung has heralded a new era. The collapse of the Pyongyang regime is underway and only its timing and method remain unknown. Kim Jong Il inherited a failing state that had only been held together by the personality cult of his father. In the face of a rapidly declining economy and growing discontent, he must make changes to improve living conditions without threatening those elites who could depose him. Such changes can only be realized by an economic opening of the North and its integration into the international economy—the so-called China model. Changes needed to prolong a dynastic regime in the short term will unleash forces

Rear Admiral William T. Pendley, USN (Ret.), teaches at the Air War College and was previously Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs. He also served as Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), U.S. Pacific Command.



U.S. Air Force (Val Gempis)

Japanese ASDF
personnel loading
AIM-9 missile.

in North Korean society that will ultimately change or destroy that regime.

This does not mean that North Korea will pass easily from the world scene but only that the regime will be gone by early in the next century. It is extremely difficult for external powers to influence the decline and ultimate end of an isolated regime with strong military forces and a deeply rooted

the passing of North Korea is simply a minor transition in the long history of East Asia

ideology, notwithstanding the October 1994 nuclear framework accord. The challenge to the international community will be to avoid a major conflict or a spillover into South Korea of internal upheavals in the North. This requires continuing to retard Pyongyang's nuclear program but with realistic goals. It also demands an innovative policy for opening the North economically to hasten either positive changes in the regime and its integration into the international community or its peaceful departure from the scene.

The passing of North Korea is simply a minor transition in the long history of East Asia. More important will be the strategic changes resulting from a unified Korea, and they must be the focus of U.S. policy. The foundations for relations with a reunified Korea in the next century will be laid in the next decade. It is critical that America be viewed by Koreans as a positive force in the peaceful reunification of their nation. If U.S.

policy or military presence is seen as an impediment to reunification, Korean nationalists will sever the relationship during the reunification process or shortly thereafter. Fostering a positive long-term relationship requires new thinking on the alliance among Americans and South Koreans. It requires a military reorganization that accurately reflects the roles and contributions of both partners. The principal change in Korea and most of Asia is a vibrant nationalism firmly rooted in pride over the economic progress made during the last three decades. Recognizing that change is essential to U.S. strategic interests in the region.

Southeast Asia is the real frontier of East Asia where the interests of the major powers may clash. Unlike the Vietnam War era when some Americans read every struggle in Southeast Asia as a drive for Chinese hegemony, Beijing's future efforts in the South China Sea may constitute just such a move. While China's aims in the region may be primarily economic, expanding territorial claims and military modernization could be seen as an effort to get a stranglehold on Japan's vital sea lines of communication and hinder access to the Persian Gulf. The one constant in Southeast Asia is its geostrategic position, and that constant has become more important in an industrialized world economy which is increasingly dependent upon free trade and access to energy resources.

Geography is a constant in strategic terms, but there has been dynamic change in Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese threat in the region was a galvanizing force for ASEAN and led to initiatives that went beyond ending Hanoi's occupation of Cambodia. Closer relations were forged among national elites to mitigate old disputes. Dynamic economic growth led by Singapore spilled over frontiers to deepen the regional integration and establish what Robert Scalapino has termed Natural Economic Territories.

While rapid economic growth has reinforced nationalism in Southeast Asia, there has been a determined effort by ASEAN to foster multilateralism through economic, political, and security initiatives. This has been not only a reaction to Vietnamese expansion but also a recognition of the growth in Chinese and Japanese power which no regional state can deal with unilaterally. Through multiple tracks the members of ASEAN

sought direct engagement with China and attempted in the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) and other multilateral forums to integrate China into regional dialogues. Simultaneously, individual ASEAN states tried to maintain American presence and engagement in the region. One result of these efforts has been the launching of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for a multilateral security dialogue and bilateral measures such as the U.S.-Singapore facilities agreement. ASEAN has been a leader in multilateral approaches because of the realities present in relations among its members and Vietnam, China, Japan, and the United States. The same multilateral approaches have the potential to benefit the region as a whole.

American Interests

After more than a century of engagement American interests in East Asia remain relatively consistent. The United States has sought access to resources, markets, and capital, as well as the freedom of navigation in the waters of the region, which has led to opposing the dominance of a single power that could pose a threat to such access or freedom of navigation. In recent years the Nation has promoted market economies as well as human rights and democratic institutions which support its interests. During its engagement in Asia and long before the dramatic

economic growth of recent years, America's political and security interests sprang from its economic interests. Even in the Cold War a major motivation of national security policy was to ensure that Japan's economy would retain a Western tilt. The growth of our domestic economy and maintenance of a healthy international economy will depend in large part on the continued expansion of the Asian economy in the next century. Thus political, economic, and security engagement will only support American interests as it contributes to peace and stability.

While interests remain constant, policies must evolve with regional changes. With Japan it is essential to forge a more balanced alliance with a decreasing reliance on the security component and an increasing emphasis on political aspects. Only under a broader alliance can mutual benefits be balanced; and without such an alliance relations will continue to be defined in narrow security or economic terms with public support on both sides of the Pacific rapidly eroding. Such an alliance requires more frequent high-level American political contacts than in the past.

It will also be important for the United States to consolidate its military bases in Japan and if necessary reduce its force structure. With a change in the Pyongyang regime or reunification on the peninsula, Washington should expect to further reduce its forces in Northeast Asia. Given a reluctance to fight another conflict on the Asian mainland, efforts should be made to maintain U.S. air and naval presence with limited though highly mobile ground forces. This will be easier once the Korean issue is resolved. While changes in the Asian security environment will permit reduced ground forces, America should seek access and support agreements that will guarantee its ability to protect its interests and those of its allies.

The U.S.-Japanese alliance is seen by many in Asia as both an insurance against Japanese militarism and an assurance of continuing U.S. engagement. This makes it vital to balance reduced military presence with strengthening of the alliance in other areas. While Washington and Tokyo will continue to be economic rivals, it is vital that bilateral economic issues are resolved to avoid damaging the alliance by mismanaging economic relations. As change continues to buffet Asia it

Repatriating Chinese refugees from Kwajalein Island.



U.S. Air Force (Val Gempis)

will be increasingly meaningful to subordinate short-term national security and economic interests to broader strategic objectives.

American relations with China have been difficult for half a century. The United States has considered China its real enemy in two Asian wars. Only from 1972 to 1989 was the relationship a loose strategic partnership. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, China turned its attention and anxiety toward the United States. It feared an America that would take advantage of a perceived unipolar world to throw its weight around to seek global dominance. Operation Desert Storm and public discussion of China as a potential enemy only added to this perception while underscoring the technological weakness of the Chinese military. China viewed itself as the possible new object of a more aggressive U.S. containment policy.

On the other hand, the United States was unsure of China's intentions. Missile and nuclear technology exports, aggressive territorial claims, continuing defense budget growth, and a history of support to the Khmer Rouge and Iran made China a challenge to the peaceful global order that the

it is important that our forward presence not be viewed as threatening by Chinese eyes

United States hoped would replace the Cold War. These concerns unfolded against a backdrop of Tiananmen Square and curtailed contacts between the United States and China. A strong lobby in Congress brings together human rights activists and supporters of Taiwan, two groups which oppose normal relations with Beijing. Yet U.S. strategic interests require engagement with China, the center of Asia and the fastest growing economy in the world. China casts a growing shadow over all the subregions of Asia. As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council it has a major voice in that organization's role in crises around the globe. By accepting or rejecting the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chinese will be a major determinant in the pace of global proliferation. Attempts to contain or threaten China could lead to a Cold War that is not in the interest of either China or the United States, which for different mo-



Australians boarding
Marine CH-53D
Sea Stallion.

U.S. Navy (Terry C. Mitchell)

tives share common interests in maintaining peace and stability in Asia.

The decision by the Clinton administration last year to decouple most-favored-nation trading status from human rights and to reengage China in political, economic, and security dialogues was an important step toward broader strategic engagement. Support for multilateral initiatives such as ARF is also important. While direct leverage on China is limited, how Washington manages its security relationship with Tokyo, relations with Taipei, and force structure in Asia has a positive or negative influence on Beijing's actions. It is important to maintain a strong security relationship with Japan and a force structure in Asia which is reassuring in the context of that relationship. It is equally important that our forward force presence not be viewed as threatening by Chinese eyes. It is this delicate balance that may permit a continuation of peace and stability in Asia and discourage a regional arms race over the next decade.

It is also essential to press for an end to the North's nuclear weapons program. But it may be naive to think that this program—which is at the core of Pyongyang's security concerns—will be terminated through diplomatic negotiations. The best that one could probably hope to achieve is to slow the progress of the program while working to peacefully change the regime's international conduct. The objective is not merely to end the North Korean nuclear weapons program but more importantly to change the regime in order to peacefully reunify the Korean peninsula or to integrate



U.S. Air Force (Scott Stewart)

Conference Row,
Panmunjom.

the North as a positive participant in the international community.

While the North Korean transition plays out, it will be vital to maintain a strong deterrent in South Korea and unified positions with South Korea and Japan on policy initiatives toward North Korea. It will be increasingly important also to integrate China into consultations on engagement with North Korea. Concurrently, America must continue moving toward a supporting role in its alliance with the Republic of Korea. The presence of a highly visible American commander forty years after the armistice—in a nation with twice the population and at least ten times the GNP of the North and which provides more than 90 percent of the forces for its own defense—is no longer realistic or in the best interest of the United States. Continuing this arrangement can only foster anti-Americanism and the increasing vulnerability of the United States to charges of prolonging the separation of the two Koreas.

In this transition to a supporting role it is critical that deterrence not be undermined. This means maintaining our forces in the South as well as increasing air and missile defense systems. U.S. efforts should continue to emphasize rapid reinforcement of heavy forces but with priority on air and naval forces. The steps which have been taken to designate the Seventh Fleet Commander as the Combined Forces Command (CFC) naval component commander go in the right direction. The next logical step is to appoint an Air Force officer as commander of U.S. Forces

Korea. This will facilitate transitioning CFC to the Korean general officer who exercises peacetime operational control over all South Korean forces in CFC. While a U.S. Army four-star general should retain the U.N. Command, it is not necessary for him to be located in Korea, and this command should be activated only for major exercises or in the event of a new conflict.

Negotiating access agreements for port, air, and supporting facilities throughout East Asia and the Pacific will be vital in maintaining flexible power projection in an era of decreasing overseas basing. Southeast Asia is a priority area for such agreements. That priority is a result of U.S. withdrawal from Philippine bases and a continuing need to be able to project forces into the Persian Gulf region. This calls for a wide range of old and new policy initiatives. America must revitalize its alliance with Thailand, which has been strained by the Cambodian situation, and also explore alternative access arrangements with the Philippines in the context of the existing security treaty. In addition, the United States must improve relations with Indonesia and Malaysia, finalize an access accord with Brunei, and continue its facilities agreement with Singapore.

Access agreements are not gifts and there will be costs in the form of military assistance, improvements in infrastructure, regional exercises, and political engagement. These costs will be insignificant, however, when measured against maintaining the flexibility and necessary capability to project U.S. forces throughout the Asia-Pacific region and into the Persian Gulf.

JFQ



The Joint Challenge to Interservice Training

By HENRY VICCELLIO, JR.

MH-60/MH-47E air refueling simulation.

U.S. Army

Few deny that the last several years have been a dynamic period for the military, possibly only matched by the period immediately after World War II. It has been a time of downsizing, budget cuts, policy debates, program cancellations, base closures, and an elusive peace dividend. As the Armed Forces grapple with change, the emphasis has been on improving

management and efficiency. Change also offers opportunities to train as a team. Many are working to expand and consolidate interservice training, including members of Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the services. We can no longer afford four independent training overhauls.

Initiatives such as the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act and other actions have genuinely improved Joint Professional Military Education. The new mission of the Armed Forces Staff College—which prepares officers for joint duty at the appropriate

*We train as a team . . .
fight as a team . . .
and win as a team.*

—General Colin L. Powell, USA

Summary

Throughout our history—in World War II, Grenada, Libya, Panama, Operation Desert Storm, and other conflicts—the Armed Forces have proven they can effectively come together in a theater of operation and achieve victory. That is not to say there have not been problems of coordination and communication that have detracted from our past successes. One of the best ways of eliminating these problems is to focus on fundamentals by revamping and expanding interservice initial skills training programs. One example of a highly successful effort is the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System. There is a good deal of consolidated training taking place today and even more planned. Our objective is to teach every soldier, sailor, marine, airman, and coastguardsman the same basic skills. Through joint education and training the Armed Forces will be ready to meet the challenge of future conflicts and protect our national interests.

point in their careers—is one example. Both the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the National War College have long graduated joint-qualified officers. Other educational programs track with this direction, but in the realm of training the services have emphasized organic training since the 1960s. As the services assumed greater autonomy they withdrew from collocated, multiservice, and joint arrangements for training activities. It is time to reverse that trend.

Interservice Review

Over two decades ago as the Vietnam war came to a close the Interservice Training Review Organization (ITRO) was established. Though voluntary, ITRO has facilitated service discussions on course criteria, costs, and shortfalls. Today ITRO members range from action officers to the leaders of education and training commands (the latter constituting the organization's executive board). It gained momentum through a concept of reviewing interservice training arrangements that appears convenient but takes time to implement. Due to a burst of energy in the Senate as well as the Chairman's report on roles and missions, and in the face of budget realities, ITRO activity has accelerated over the last two years. To quicken the review process, the organization looks at broad functional areas and critiques them establishing and examining common links that promote efficient interservice training. This type of review has benefits for the services since the potential for infrastructure divestiture—getting rid of what is unnecessary—increases as we train together.

The reviews look at three basic ways to make single-service courses multiservice. The first involves establishing quotas for courses managed and operated by one service by providing spaces for students from other services. The second is collocation where courses which are managed by two or more services make use of facilities and equipment of a principal host; the training remains separate but resources are shared. The final is consolidation which implies total integration; two or more services combine efforts to

offer courses with instructors and students drawn from more than one service. Today we are going one step further, rotating unit commanders at the squadron level to achieve full consolidation of training activities and to capitalize on the strengths of each service.

Two criteria are key to interservice courses. One is protecting service equities—to ensure that the interests of each service are met under the arrangement. If this criterion is observed service parochialism is usually checked and progress can be remarkable. The other criterion is upholding the standards of each service which shifts the emphasis from the least common denominator to the best solution. By taking such an approach, we can move toward accepting the challenge issued in 1992 by Senator Sam Nunn in his address on roles and missions for the Armed Services on the Senate floor: "The fundamental question is not what is best for the Marine Corps, the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force . . . the question is, 'What is best for America?'" That challenge has become the bedrock of efforts to provide what is best for the Nation by providing the best standards for students of all services.

By proceeding in this manner, we avoid establishing interservice training schools that fail to increase efficiency. For example, the Air Force would be out of its element teaching the Navy sonar or underwater welding just as the Army would have scant interest in instructing the Marines about F/A-18 aircraft radar maintenance.

Initial Training

Reviews indicate that the greatest potential for integration is found in common initial training where individual service requirements are similar. This is foundation training which leads to particular career fields or specialties. The services have taken advantage of such opportunities resulting in a total of nearly 400 joint courses today. Nearly half of all multiservice training occurs on Air Force bases—predominantly because of the quality and availability of facilities, and because as the Air Force downsized it gained excess capacity which benefits all the services. And although the chart shows only 10 percent of training courses, those courses have very high student loads.

From an Air Force perspective, 29 percent of enlisted personnel coming out of boot camp each year at Lackland Air Force

the greatest potential for integration is found in common initial training

General Henry Viccellio, Jr., USAF, is Commander of Air Education and Training Command and formerly served as Director of the Joint Staff.

Base will go into a multiservice environment for initial tech school. Ten years ago, less than 20 percent of Air Force enlisted personnel trained in such an environment. Based on a growing trend in interservice initial skills programs, over half of new Air Force enlisted personnel will soon be trained in a multiservice environment.

A few examples illustrate how interservice training works. As the DOD executive agent the Air Force teaches intelligence at Goodfellow Air Force Base, predominantly in imagery and signals intelligence. The dog handler school at Lackland Air Force Base

trains DOD personnel as well as students from other Federal agencies which use canines. The Air Force also operates a law enforcement school at Lackland for Navy and Air Force "cops." In addition, English—the official language of aviation—is taught at Lackland to more than 4,500 foreign students from nearly 110 countries annually while the Foreign Language School is admin-

istered by the Army at the Presidio of Monterey. Though not the executive agent, the Air Force has a multiservice weather school at Keesler Air Force Base attended by officer and enlisted students from all services. The Army teaches welding at Aberdeen Proving Ground and the Navy teaches metal working in Memphis, and so on. More interservice training goes on today than many realize.

The advantages of interservice initial skills training include lowering costs as redundancies are reduced, downsizing the overall infrastructure, fostering teamwork, and nurturing jointness by exposing students to interservice dialogue early in their careers. Once servicemembers have passed through that window into advanced training and begin working with operational equipment unique to their services, or once they learn to employ equipment as required by their service doctrine and tactics, this potential is diminished.

Specific training is essential to ensure that trainees assume operational assignments with the right skills, attitude, and foundation to do the job. Some think that this training



U.S. Army (Gary Bryant)

Maintaining AH-1 Cobra.

Interservice Training Status

Approved/Implemented

Army

Metals Technology
Welding
Helicopter Maintenance
Vehicle Operator
CE—Equipment Operators, Engineer Technicians
Construction Mechanics (Army/Marine Corps)
HVAC, Refrigeration (Army/Marine Corps)

Navy

Explosive Ordnance
Non-Morse Operations Analyst
Water Survival
Carpenters, Buildings
Construction Mechanics (Navy/Air Force)
Vehicle Mechanics (Navy/Air Force)

Marine Corps

IBM Computer Training

Air Force

Law Enforcement/Corrections
Cryptology
Weather
Calibration
Food Service
Undergraduate Space Training
Power Line Specialist
Utilities Plumbers
Electricians, HVAC, Refrigeration (Air Force/Navy)
Fire Protection (Air Force/Army/Marine Corps)
Survival/Evasion

Nearing Decision

Aircraft Maintenance
Intelligence
Air Traffic Control
Communications Training
Information Technology
Environmental

Under Review

Transportation
Medical Specialties
Supply Logistics
Petroleum

would be enhanced by creating either a Defense Training Agency or appointing a CINC-TRAINING, but the services do not currently support the idea. As one moves beyond initial skills training, it is vital to retain service identities. This is where applications among the services become more distinct and training must build on the cultures and missions of each service. By bringing their unique capabilities together the individual services make joint warfare successful.

as in technical training the services have large flight training infrastructures

Administration and command are also issues. In the past when there were few interservice initial training opportunities, each service could easily afford what might be called an "overseer" organization. These were small bodies of between seven and forty people at the bases of other services where training took place. As we move toward

more interservice programs, such organizations increase manpower costs. A solution might be to create a student squadron which is interservice or joint in nature.

Under that system service-specific support organizations may prove unnecessary. The net result would be lower manpower costs for each service involved.

Flight Training

Climbing skyward from ground training, one increasingly observes a commitment to joint ventures in flight training. General Colin Powell noted that, "The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps each have aviation arms essential to their assigned warfighting roles. Each air arm provides unique but complementary capabilities. They work jointly to protect America's airpower." Projecting power demands joint training to build complementary capabilities which is just what we do in navigator as well as pilot training.

As in technical training the services have large flight training infrastructures. The Navy has closed down Chase Field and the Air Force has shut down Williams and Mather Air Force Bases. The services are also looking at ways to deal with other parts of the infrastructure. In addition, former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin reacted to the *Chairman's Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States* by directing the consolidation of portions of flight training programs. Accordingly, we merged initial fixed-wing aircraft training—primary training—with that of other services and transitioned to a Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS). The Secretary of Defense also ordered the creation of a four-track follow-on training structure. Toward that end students graduating from JPATS will follow the Navy fighter attack and E-2/C-2 path designed for carrier operations, the Air Force bomber/fighter

track, the airlift/tanker/maritime track, or a helicopter track.

The Air Force has been "growing its own" pilots since 1947. Spurred by Senator Nunn's challenge and Secretary Aspin's subsequent guidance, we are changing as we establish interservice training and then consolidate the infrastructure. This began with instructor pilots (IPs) and already Navy IPs are flying T-37s at Reese Air Force Base while Air Force IPs are flying T-34s with the Navy at Whiting Field. These exchanges are the foundation for joint primary training.

We will put a rapidly growing number of students into interservice training annually in the coming years. After an initial adjustment phase we will ramp up quickly and operate two fully consolidated squadrons. The rest will become joint as JPATS arrives on the scene in 1997. Each primary squadron, whether training at an Air Force or Navy base, will eventually have about 200 students equally divided between the two services.

To achieve this end we are well on the way to interservice fixed wing pilot training. Even the squadron leadership will be joint as the commander and second-in-command are rotated. The first two officers involved in interservice command are an Air Force lieutenant colonel (executive officer of Training Squadron 3 at Whiting Field) and a Navy commander (operations officer for the 35th Training Squadron at Reese Air Force Base).

A new approach to training pilots of multi-engine aircraft evolved through a study of flight training in the Navy and Air Force. Naval aviators now train in T-44 twin engine turboprops while the Air Force uses new T-1 twin-engine jets for specialized undergraduate pilot training. The Navy had trained jet pilots in turboprops while the Air Force trained C-130 pilots in jets. The Navy and Air Force are developing a cross-flow system where C-130 pilots from the Air Force, Navy, and elsewhere will fly T-44s, while jet-bound personnel such as E-6 pilots going on to Take Charge and Move Out Aircraft (TACAMO) will go to Reese Air Force Base and fly T-1s. Both instructor and student exchanges began in 1994.

Navigator training has been joint for over twenty years. The student body mix has recently been half Navy/Marines and half Air Force. All Air Force navigator training is now conducted at Randolph Air Force Base



U.S. Air Force

T-1A trainer.

since Mather closed. There is a 22-week basic course and an advanced course for electronic warfare officers and weapons systems officers who are assigned to fighter aircraft or bombers after earning their wings.


The Navy has a somewhat different approach. It gives some T-34 basic flying instruction to navigators at Pensacola Naval Air Station. Two-thirds of the way through the program, those selected for larger aircraft are sent to Randolph Air Force Base for training. The remaining trainees receive more T-34 time, then some T-39 time, after which they go to either E-2s at Norfolk Naval Air Station or stay at Pensacola, where the Navy has specially modified T-39s with fighter-type radars to teach fighter navigators. The Navy also gives navigators basic fighter maneuver training in T-2s. This offers enough of an advantage that Air Force navigators

headed for fighters or B-1s will go to Pensacola for advanced training with Navy radar-intercept operators in T-39s and T-2s.

As General George Patton commented, "Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by people." To echo his remark, properly trained and educated soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen are key to our Nation's defense. Before the Marines hit the beach to provide humanitarian relief in Somalia, before Air Force F-16s or Marine F-18s patrolled the skies over Bosnia, before relief supplies were airlifted to the Midwest during the floods of 1993, and before the first Special Forces soldiers slipped across the border into Iraq during Desert Storm, they received the best training in the world.

In moving toward greater consolidation in initial skills training we have to ensure that the warriors of tomorrow are just as well trained. Recent events, together with initiatives by Congress and DOD, have helped expand the prospect for interservice training. Once seen as a convenience, such training has become an imperative. With our counterparts in other services, the Air Education and Training Command has a full plate in providing the best possible trained and educated soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen. The services must share their unique capabilities in order to foster joint culture. We are going to fight together and we are going to win together.

JFQ



Why Goldwater-Nichols Didn't Go Far Enough

By ROBERT B. ADOLPH, JR.,
CHARLES W. STILES, and
FRANKLIN D. HITT, JR.



DOD (Helene C. Stikkel)

W

hile the statutory role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) was expanded and strengthened by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Congress failed to provide him the wherewithal to do the job in four key areas all relating directly to joint readiness. Congress must address this oversight by amending the current law. Part

of this amendment must clarify the wording of the Chairman's duties to better focus his efforts. This is not a matter of trivial definitions. In fact, the exact meaning of words in Goldwater-Nichols was what set the stage for much of the confusion that has followed. These issues are very complex. This article may well raise more questions than it answers. As established by Goldwater-Nichols, the expanded, interrelated CJCS functions include:

- ▼ developing doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces
- ▼ performing net assessments to determine the capabilities of the Armed Forces
- ▼ formulating policies for joint training
- ▼ establishing and maintaining a uniform system of evaluating preparedness.¹

One knowledgeable observer, William Odom, has suggested that the Chairman should have "unrestricted authority in the joint exercise program."² The result, according to Odom, would be a vastly improved vehicle to develop joint doctrine. His underlying assumption is that better joint doctrine will improve joint readiness, an implied CJCS task. Exercises represent one of the best

Summary

The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act strengthened the role of the Chairman with one hand and weakened it with the other by failing to provide adequate resources in four crucial areas. CJCS is charged with developing joint doctrine but is so understaffed and underfunded that doctrinal development must be passed to the services, which seem unable to handle it. Further, the Chairman must *assess* service capabilities, yet a more rigorous *evaluation* is needed. Joint training also poses a dilemma: the services train forces for joint operations, but no one has responsibility for training CINCs and their staffs to use those forces. Finally, the Joint Staff evaluates *preparedness* (readiness) under a *uniform system* that is not up to the job. Among the answers to such problems are inviting retired CINCs to rate active ones, enhancing exercise evaluations, enacting legislation to bolster the doctrine process, and lifting the manpower cap on the Joint Staff.

means to improve readiness. While the Joint Chiefs have a large exercise budget, most of their funding underwrites the costs of moving personnel and equipment.

The Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) is chartered to be the focal point for joint doctrine, assessment, and training issues. JWFC works for the Chairman through the Director, Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), Joint Staff. Unfortunately its vast mission must be accomplished with extremely limited resources. The JWFC mission reads:

*Assist the CJCS, CINCs, and service chiefs in their preparation for joint and multinational operations in the conceptualization, development, and assessment of current and future joint doctrine and in the accomplishment of joint and multinational training and exercises.*³

The key term is *assist*. What JWFC does is neither authoritative nor evaluative in nature. The staff routinely observes joint exercises as well as real-world crises. In turn, they recommend actions on doctrine and training which may be ignored. Perhaps the circum-spect mission statement with its focus on assistance reflects the fact that, although strengthened by Goldwater-Nichols, the Chairman is still not in the chain of command.

According to a member of JWFC:

*We generally don't write doctrine. Currently, the services write most of it and sometimes I think they are the greatest impediment to a genuine joint doctrine development process. If the services don't like a particular piece of joint doctrine they can and do make it die.*⁴

Is this what Congress intended in enacting Goldwater-Nichols, or did they want CJCS to exercise a greater role? As one observer stated: "The requirement to write joint doctrine was superimposed over existing institutions that previously had little

emphasis on joint doctrine."⁵ Those institutions, the services, are not suited to write joint doctrine.

JWFC is working with a contractor to develop a command post exercise (CPX) program to assess CINCs' staffs. According to one player:

*The CINC will assign standards to the task and conditions identified. When the CINC wants his staff exercised and assessed he will select his areas of focus. The JWFC will provide the CINC feedback by way of an after action review.*⁶

JWFC foresees CINCs funding the deployment of JWFC personnel to conduct CPXs for CINCs' staffs and joint task force (JTF) commanders and their staffs. The JWFC program model under development uses the Army's Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). Although JWFC finds the model laudable, it lacks an evaluation; thus their method of implementation would be radically different. Moreover, no opportunities exist for training and evaluating CINCs with their staffs. Nor is a program to accomplish this goal envisioned, though one is needed. Aside from the reasons already stated, evaluations provide better input to doctrinal development.

Developing Doctrine

Among the plethora of problems confronting the Chairman, developing joint doctrine is one of the thorniest. Joint Pub 1-02 defines joint doctrine as "Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more services in coordinated action toward a common objective."⁷ Joint doctrine is the foundation for effective joint training and therefore the basis of joint readiness. But Goldwater-Nichols made CJCS responsible for joint doctrinal development without providing the resources. This compelled the Chairman to subcontract the writing of most joint doctrine to the services—not a good idea. Not only does this prolong the time needed to publish doctrine, it is unlikely that a service can write high quality joint doctrine. Service parochialism is often too powerful, and the service agencies charged with preparing joint doctrine may lack joint experience. "The assignment of joint doctrine writing responsibilities, which often become an additional duty, is based on personnel availability instead of experience and ability.

Goldwater-Nichols made CJCS responsible for joint doctrinal development without providing the resources

Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Adolph, Jr., USA, is with the Joint Special Operations Command; Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Stiles, USAF, serves at the headquarters of Combined Forces Command in Korea; and Lieutenant Commander Franklin D. Hitt, Jr., USN, is assigned to U.S. Strategic Command. They collaborated on this article while attending the Armed Forces Staff College.

Rangers aboard *USS George Washington*.

The poor quality of many of the initial drafts produced so far reflects this situation.”⁸

Writing joint doctrine is too important to be relegated to the services. The overwhelming success of Operation Desert Storm has been credited in part to provisions of Goldwater-Nichols. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, was able to integrate his joint and combined forces and synchronize their activities to devastating effect against the forces of Saddam Hussein. This was no accident. Joint warfare works and its basis is joint doctrine. CJCS needs dedicated personnel and funding for the critical task of writing and evaluating this doctrine.

Given the necessary wherewithal, how does one develop and improve joint doctrine? An excellent source would be a data base developed from evaluations of actual joint CPXs.

Net Assessment

Congress tasked the Chairman to perform net assessments of military capabilities. This is no small matter. Congress may use such findings to determine future service roles and missions, fund weapons programs, or decide what personnel programs to support. The assessments would also influence joint doctrinal development. But what exactly is net assessment?

U.S. Navy (Steve Miller)

Assess is synonymous with *estimate*. Why did Congress mandate that CJCS provide just an estimate of capabilities? An assessment is obviously based upon a judgment absent better data. *Net* in this context could be synonymous with *gist*. A net assessment, in other words, merely means providing the gist of an estimate. Was this the actual intent of Congress? By contrast, one definition of *evaluation* is to determine by careful appraisal and study. If more information could be made available through a JCS-funded joint mobile training group (JMTG), one sufficiently manned to provide a genuine evaluation as opposed to a net assessment, why shouldn't we create one? The ultimate result would be to improve joint readiness. This point is significant given the continuing downsizing of the Armed Forces. As the services grow smaller and we attempt to do more, better, with less, improved readiness will be increasingly important.

According to a faculty member at the Armed Forces Staff College, net assessment in this context means “a total estimate of the warfighting capabilities of the services.”⁹ Is this accurate? Clearly there is disagreement on a precise definition of the term.

Regardless, why did Congress direct the Chairman to perform net assessments? It seems unlikely that the services would conduct rigorous evaluations of commanders, staffs, and units, yet CJCS is only tasked to perform net assessments on the most senior joint leaders and their staffs. Perhaps, since Goldwater-Nichols was passed in the Reagan era when defense budgets were large, the focus was on quantity rather than quality. This seeming contradiction might also have resulted from the Chairman being out of the chain of command. Obviously, the Secretary of Defense is in that chain and can conduct evaluations.

Another approach is to have CJCS administer a careful and thoroughgoing analysis (evaluation) *for the Secretary*. The mechanism for providing such an analysis is now unavailable; but creating a team of officers exclusively dedicated to conducting and evaluating CPXs would provide the answer. Obviously, joint readiness is the result of

various factors. The most important is quality training. Unfortunately, there are problems there as well.

Policy for Training

The authors collectively have over fifty years of service and, in our experience, we have never encountered a command that has failed a major joint field training or command post exercise. Are our forces that good? Are exercises that easy? Are assessments overly generous? The last possibility is probably closest to the truth. It is not enough for the Chairman to simply formulate policies as required by Goldwater-Nichols. JCS-run CPXs would make much better vehicles for evaluating joint readiness.

There seems to be no unanimity in arriving at a definition of joint readiness. As one source has stated, "The Joint Staff is currently attempting to define joint readiness."¹⁰ For purposes of this discussion, it is the integration of ready forces and synchronization of

their activities to achieve mission accomplishment. How does one evaluate or assess integration and synchronization? Is mission accomplishment the sole criterion for success in a

field or command post exercise? Joint doctrine certainly must provide a base of knowledge on which to build evaluations. Congressional choice of the word *evaluate* in the context of preparedness suggests more careful study is required. Preparedness and readiness are synonymous.

The problem is substantial. The services train individuals and units for combatant CINCs. But who trains CINCs and their staffs to integrate and synchronize the ready forces provided by the services? Nobody. CINCs are responsible for their commands, but criteria for evaluating joint preparedness are undefined. Each CINC has ideas on what is vital. Currently, the unwritten evaluation criteria seem to be mainly derived from professional estimates by CINCs and CJCS, flag officers who must regularly report to the Secretary of Defense and Congress on prepared-

ness. Many times their reports rely heavily on anecdotal evidence.

The Joint Staff must "accomplish evaluation by monitoring, observing, analyzing, and assessing joint activities."¹¹ The paramount J-7 evaluation vehicles are real-world operations and JCS/CINC-sponsored exercises. By its own admission J-7 only conducts an evaluative sampling. Their staff simply is not large enough to do a thorough job. To carry out this sampling, J-7 sends observers to real-world crises and major joint exercises even though evaluation criteria are undefined. Obviously, more needs to be done in this area, but what?

Other than looking to the newly formed JWFC for answers, the creation of a JMTG warrants further consideration. Such a group, based on the Army's BCTP model, could run CPXs for CINCs. The BCTP staff relies heavily on computer simulation and high quality senior personnel. However, to be valuable a program must be able to be taken to combatant CINCs and JTF commanders. Establishing a JMTG would no doubt require significant staffing and a flag officer to administer the program.

In this regard taking stock of the BCTP's mission statement is instructive:

*Conducts realistic, stressful training for Army corps and division commanders and their battle staffs. Serves as a data source for the improvement of: doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel, and soldiers.*¹²

This is not a circumspect statement. It has teeth. The Army's leadership is genuinely challenged in BCTP by realistic and stressful training that confronts them and their battle staffs with a skilled opposing force commander and a free-play scenario.

**is mission accomplishment
the sole criterion for
success in a field or
command post exercise?**

A-10, FA-18, and F-16
over northern Italy.



Combat Camera Imagery (Jamie Bowman)



USS Lamore County
and a Coast Guard
vessel during Agile
Provider '94



Marines loading
vehicles at Cap Haitien.

U.S. Marine Corps (P.S. Royston)

U.S. Navy (Alexander C. Hicks, Jr.)

These are two elements almost impossible to duplicate in joint exercises involving troops.

There are significant differences between the proposed JMTG approach and JWFC. The former must be JCS-administered, manned, and funded, and provide for evaluations which respond to priorities set by the Secretary of Defense as well as those of CINCs. Evaluation is a better standard than assessment. Again, the current thinking at JWFC is that CINCs can fund future JWFC CPXs on an optional basis. If CINCs fund such JWFC exercises, then assessments results will stay within the domains of the respective CINCs. Nobody likes to air dirty linen in public.

As the primary military advisor to the National Command Authorities, the Chairman must have the most current, objective, and comprehensive information on the warfighting readiness of all CINCs. He will not get this information through JWFC as it is currently tasked, manned, and organized. Congress would have to raise personnel authorization and funding levels for JMTG to become a reality. Potential taskings for this group would include:

- ▼ writing exercise scenarios based on the CINC's OPLANs, CONPLANs, and contingency operations
- ▼ in coordination with CINCs, recommending to CJCS which tasks to evaluate
- ▼ developing criteria based on the Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) for evaluation teams (tasks, conditions, and standards)
- ▼ running exercises for CINCs and JTF commanders and performing evaluations
- ▼ reporting joint doctrine-based evaluation results to CINCs and CJCS.

Obviously, the most important goal of a JMTG would be to improve readiness.

Evaluating Preparedness

The Joint Staff administers a uniform system to evaluate preparedness. Although uniform, the criteria are unfortunately general. In reality the uniform system has no teeth. One definition of preparedness is a state of adequate preparation in case of war. The term *adequate* is important. Is adequate preparation the goal Congress had in mind for the Armed Forces, or should the goal be more demanding? Certainly congressional funding of adequate preparedness would be less costly than a more stringent criterion.

One synonym for adequate is *sufficient*. What is sufficient in terms of joint preparedness is anyone's guess and would appear to be more a result of budget in-fighting between the executive branch and Congress than careful study. Regardless, establishing a JMTG capable of conducting and evaluating joint CPXs is a first logical step in developing more precise criteria for determining the preparedness of CINCs, JTF commanders, and their respective staffs. Without such criteria, determining the proper level of preparedness will remain contentious and largely unresolvable.

only former CINCs possess the credibility to evaluate a current CINC's joint preparedness

To evaluate preparedness the Chairman must create a uniform system. A JMTG would be one way of genuinely achieving that end. But here again there is a problem, one of credibility. Although CJCS has the requisite stature to conduct evaluations, he simply lacks the time. Aside from him only former CINCs possess the credibility to evaluate a current CINC's joint preparedness.

It makes sense to call on retired CINCs to perform this function. While flag officers from any service could administer a JMTG, write scenarios, conduct CPXs, and evaluate elements of a CINC's staff, only former CINCs could be credible chief evaluators of currently serving CINCs. Retired CINCs should have few axes to grind and could be counted on to be objective and candid with CINCs, CJCS, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress. A JMTG also would emulate the BCTP methodology, using retired flag officers to evaluate and mentor division and corps commanders. The same kind of program can work with CINCs as well.

General Carl W. Stiner, USA (Ret.), the former Commander in Chief of Special Operations Command, stated that a JMETL is a logical point of departure for developing criteria to evaluate the readiness of a CINC. But JMETLs must be translated into general joint staff tasks, conditions, and standards, as defined in the Universal Joint Task List (MCM-147-93), to be evaluated—all of which has yet to be accomplished. Establishing a JMTG would be a major step in that direction.

Our analysis suggests that the Chairman cannot fully perform his functions as mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the areas of doctrine, assessments, and preparedness (readiness) due to personnel and funding shortages. Formulating policies for joint training and creating a uniform system to evaluate preparedness is not sufficient. CJCS must conduct and evaluate the training of CINCs and their staffs to offer the best possible advice to the Secretary of Defense, President, and Congress. Funding these programs and raising the personnel cap on the Joint Staff are necessary if Congress is serious about fully

implementing Goldwater-Nichols. The terminology in that act must also be revised. Net assessments are not enough; evaluations set a higher standard. A JMTG composed of officers from all services, under CJCS direction and guidance, would be a far better approach than the one envisioned by JWFC. Using former CINCs as chief evaluators for a JMTG would provide credibility.

Students attending the Armed Forces Staff College are taught that future conflicts will be fought jointly. As the services grow smaller, it is all the more critical to stress joint readiness as a combat multiplier. One of the best means of improving joint readiness would be the creation of a JMTG. It is time to get serious about training and evaluating combatant CINCs, JTF commanders, and their respective staffs as well as writing joint doctrine and developing a rigorous system of determining preparedness. The greatest challenges to shaping the Armed Forces into a true joint warfighting body lie ahead. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ U.S. Congress, Public Law 99-433, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Section 201.

² William E. Odom, *America's Military Revolution* (Washington: The American University Press, 1993), p. 139.

³ Joint Warfighting Center, command briefing, May 1, 1994.

⁴ CDR Kent Kieselbach, USN, Joint Warfighting Center, Norfolk, Virginia, May 9, 1994.

⁵ Robert A. Doughty, "Reforming the Joint Doctrine Process," *Parameters*, vol. 22, no. 3 (Autumn 1992), p. 47.

⁶ Telephonic interview with Lt Col Robert J. Fleming, USAF, Joint Warfighting Center, Norfolk, Virginia, May 11, 1994.

⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991).

⁸ William F. Furr, "Joint Doctrine," *Airpower Journal*, vol. 5, no. 3 (Fall 1991), p. 39.

⁹ Personal interview with Robert H. Clegg, Armed Forces Staff College, May 23, 1994.

¹⁰ Telephonic interview with CDR Michael J. Vitale, USN, Joint Doctrine Division (J-7), Joint Staff, May 11, 1994.

¹¹ Joint Warfighting Center, command briefing, p. 1.

¹² U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Battle Command Training Program Booklet, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., January 13, 1994, p. 1.

Joint Intelligence and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

By THOMAS R. WILSON

On September 18, 1994 U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) set in motion Operation Uphold Democracy, an airborne, amphibious, and special operations invasion of Haiti. A few hours after the invasion started the Carter agree-

ment was signed in Port au Prince, abruptly halting the kick-in-the-door operation and initiating a dramatic transition to a soft-landing option. This was flawlessly executed the next day as the 10th Mountain Division lifted off *USS Dwight D. Eisenhower* and alit at Port

au Prince International Airport. A few days later marines launched an amphibious landing at Cap Haitien from *USS Wasp*. The striking success of this operation was based on joint training, which contributed to the readiness and flexibility of our forces, and

adaptive joint force packaging, which facilitated the overall plan. It was also due to robust joint intelligence support, which dramatically demonstrated the progress of the intelligence community in meeting the needs of joint task force (JTF) commanders and components.

Much will appear in *JFQ* and other journals on joint force packaging for Haiti. This article focuses on lessons from the Persian Gulf War and Somalia, and how those lessons improved intelligence support for the joint warfighter. Specifically, it outlines how ACOM and its Atlantic Intelligence Command used training support, technology, and common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to support four JTF commanders in various Haiti contingencies.

Background

Contingency planning for Haiti started with the ouster of President Jean Bertrand Aristide in September 1991, and accelerated




Combat Camera Imagery (Val Gempis)


Securing the presidential palace, Port Au Prince.

Summary

The success of Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti was due to joint training, which contributed to the readiness of our forces, and adaptive joint force packaging, which facilitated the flexibility of our overall planning. It was also due to joint intelligence, which vividly demonstrated the progress that the intelligence community has made in meeting the needs of joint task force and component commanders in effective and efficient ways. The lessons learned from recent contingencies like the Gulf War and Somalia, and how these lessons have improved joint intelligence support, have made a deep impact on joint warfighting. In particular, the benefits that U.S. Atlantic Command and its Joint Intelligence Center (Atlantic Intelligence Command) have gained from technology, training, and common intelligence tactics, techniques, and procedures yielded the outstanding support which joint task force commanders received during four Haitian contingencies.



Amphibious Assault Ship *USS Wasp* off Haiti.



82nd Airborne Division departing for JTF-180.

DOD (Betty Tsosie)

U.S. Navy (John Sokolowski)



Special Boat Unit and SEALs doing recon off Cap Dame Marie, Haiti.

DOD (Gregory S. Cinelli)

as the de facto government of Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras failed to comply with the terms of the Governors Island accord signed earlier that summer. JTF-120 was stood up on short notice in October 1993 to protect and evacuate American citizens and key Haitian nationals. Initially under Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group Eight, JTF-120 had five commanders over the next year and headquarters on four ships (*USS Nassau*, *Saipan*, *Wasp*, and *Mount Whitney*). Beyond providing protection and evacuation support, it was responsible for directing U.N. maritime embargo operations around Haiti.

The second JTF for the Haiti crisis was JTF-160, formed in June 1994 to handle the flow of Haitian migrants generated by deteriorating conditions on the island and the U.S. Government's suspension of direct repatriation. First activated on the hospital ship *USNS Comfort* in Kingston, Jamaica, JTF-160 quickly moved to Naval Station Guantanamo Bay because of the overwhelming

number of Haitian migrants. Commanded by a brigadier general from Marine Forces Atlantic, JTF-160 ultimately set up safe havens not only for some 15,000 Haitians but also for 30,000 Cubans.

By Summer 1994, as it became apparent that political initiatives would not lead to the return of Aristide, ACOM expedited planning for various military options. Operation plans (OPLANS) for nonpermissive forced entry (kick-in-the-door) and semi-permissive administrative entry (soft-landing) were developed. Both were planned as joint operations with the former, JTF-180, under the commander of XVIII Airborne Corps and the latter, JTF-190, under the commander of the 10th Mountain Division. Plan excursions existed for JTF-180 to be headquartered either afloat on *USS Mount Whitney* or ashore in Port au Prince and for JTF-190 to be shore-based. A combination of these plans was executed involving both commanders with headquarters afloat and ashore.

From an intelligence perspective, the key points are that all the JTFs described above had the same joint intelligence architecture, TTP manual, and interoperable dissemination system and equipment. This highlights the progress that has been made given past interoperability problems that plagued intelligence dissemination and the fact that the four JTF commanders (ranging from one- to three-star rank) represented three services (each with

Rear Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, USN, serves as Vice Director for Intelligence (J-2), Joint Staff; his previous assignments include Director, Fleet Intelligence, for U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and Director of Intelligence for U.S. Atlantic Command.

different-sized staffs and capabilities). Moreover, the commanders conducted planning and operations from varied locations in garrison and deployed, and from land and sea-based facilities.

Challenges and Initiatives

The above accomplishments take on greater significance when examined in the context of contingencies over the last fifteen years and related intelligence shortcomings. From Grenada to Panama, from the Persian Gulf to Somalia, the problems were often similar: service stovepipes and resulting inconsistent support, lack of interoperable equipment and procedures, and evidence that dissemination was consistently the biggest shortcoming. Frequently information

was collected in a timely manner and analyzed correctly only to get bogged down in a dissemination system that failed to serve customers. Desert Storm was characterized by many intel-

ligence successes, not the least of which was capturing valuable lessons for the future. Those lessons included joint intelligence architecture solidified in doctrine and given vitality by a standard TTP; equipment interoperability (vice nine secondary imagery dissemination systems that did not talk to each other); and an improved intelligence dissemination system.

After the Gulf War ACOM pursued a series of initiatives designed to meet intelligence challenges identified during that contingency. The initiatives can be divided into four major categories:

- ▼ theater-level joint TTP development
- ▼ training teams tailored for joint intelligence operations at JTF-level
- ▼ improved, flexible joint intelligence communications connectivity
- ▼ intelligence operations in joint exercises targeted at major failings.

While most of the initiatives had been begun, the shift in roles and missions under ACOM hastened progress. Intelligence operations across service lines became easier as Air Combat Command and Forces Command joined Atlantic Fleet, Marine Forces

Atlantic, and Special Operations Command Atlantic as ACOM components in 1993. Also, changes at the national level complemented ACOM initiatives, allowing quick and steady progress.

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

The intelligence architecture used by unified commands in supporting JTF commanders and component forces supported each of the JTFs discussed earlier. It also provided the flexibility to accommodate JTFs formed around different services in different home base or deployed locations. The publication of "Atlantic Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP)" for joint intelligence support served as the cookbook for successful intelligence organization. Regardless of the size or the type of the JTF staff, ATTP provide JTF J-2s with principles, concept of operations, and information to organize and operate JTF J-2 staffs. Now in a third edition after testing in rugged exercise and contingency environments, ATTP were widely used by eight different J-2s directing intelligence operations in Haiti for JTF-120, -160, -180, and -190. While addressing the entire intelligence spectrum, ATTP emphasize support from theater-level JIC to JTF. This is particularly useful in determining joint and component augmentation requirements, organizing JTF-level JICs, facilitating interoperability, and accessing theater- and national-level data bases. ATTP fully complement national-level JTTP and detailed component TTP being developed. ACOM credits much of the intelligence success for Haiti operations to the fact that JTFs used a common document like the intelligence cookbook.

Training and Augmentation

While the production, distribution, and wide utilization of intelligence TTPs is considered an important contribution to success in Haiti, training assistance and augmentation from the unified command level was even more critical. With the new ACOM missions of joint force packaging and joint training, it was clear in 1993 that the mission of the Atlantic Intelligence Command (AIC) also would change. Accordingly, as a result of internal and external reviews of products and customers, AIC diverted 15 percent of its personnel to establishing a field support directorate. That organization,

intelligence architecture provided flexibility to JTFs formed around different services

with a primary mission of training and exercise support, was formed coincident with the stand-up of ACOM. Personnel manning the new directorate were drawn from within AIC and are experts in areas such as JIC watch standing, collections, targeting, order of battle analysis, automatic data processing (ADP) systems, and communications.

The AIC field support directorate provided nearly fifty intelligence augmentees for the four JTFs involved in the Haiti operations, as well as a few for component and embassy support. This concept had been tested with great success during Agile Provider in early 1994 and built on that foundation for Haiti. For example, a lesson learned during the exercise was that data processing and communications technicians were needed in greater numbers than some traditional specialties. Thus field support teams deployed to Haiti were heavy in those capabilities, especially among the more than thirty personnel who augmented JTF-180 on *USS Mount Whitney* and JTF-190 in Port au Prince. It is clear from exercises and the Haiti experience that theater augmentation for training and exercises pays intelligence dividends and that these training teams are well suited for operations. Even though a training role may detract from a theater JIC's traditional production capabilities, the benefits are worth the cost.

The Haiti JTFs were all supported by National Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs) drawn from the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency. NISTs can be requested by joint force commanders from CJCS and—on approval of the Secretary of Defense—tailored to meet operational requirements based on arrangements between theater J-2s and the Defense Intelligence Agency and J-2, Joint Staff. Teams have their own communications, access to the

Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications Systems (JWICS), and generally have a Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) capability. In conjunction with theater JIC support teams, NISTs give JTF intelligence staffs access to national and theater-level analytical capabilities and data bases as well as their own analytical and col-

lection management capabilities. Designed for deployment in support of contingency operations, NISTs should be a feature of every theater-level joint exercise.

Extended Intelligence Connectivity

Since dissemination is a traditional intelligence weakness, extending improved intelligence connectivity was perhaps the most important new tool used for support of Haiti operations. Such connectivity is built around JWICS and JDISS which empower the intelligence-pull concept by linking consumers to theater and national data bases and capabilities via expanded communications bandwidth (JWICS) and interoperable dissemination equipment (JDISS). These two systems were developed after Desert Storm to address problems with service communications systems in theater which were service-oriented and lacked connectivity with either the other services or national level. JWICS connects the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) with combatant command JICs and a host of intelligence organizations. The system handles all types of data, imagery, and graphics, and allows video broadcasting. In conjunction with JDISS, JWICS extends capabilities to fixed and deployed tactical units as occurred in Haiti. JDISS offers access to data bases as well as voice, basic imagery analysis, and dissemination capabilities, and standard office automation and access to theater and national resources. JWICS and JDISS were combined, expanded, and sent down the chain of command via a video teleconferencing (VTC) and data exchange network which is known as the ACOM Net.

The ACOM Net was developed for and published in the ACOM implementation plan. It provides the theater with expanded, flexible connectivity with all components—Forces Command, Air Combat Command, Atlantic Fleet, and Marine Forces Atlantic—as well as staffs identified for regular training as JTF commands, namely, XVIII Airborne Corps, III Corps, Eighth Air Force, Twelfth Air Force, Second Fleet, and II Marine Expeditionary Force. This grew out of the *USS George Washington* experiment in 1992 and Ocean

improved intelligence connectivity was perhaps the most important new tool used for Haiti

Venture '93, when leased commercial satellite communications gave operational commanders expanded communications bandwidth in a tactical environment. In both cases, sensitive compartmented information (SCI) and general service video teleconferencing and computer-to-computer data exchanges were facilitated. Moreover, deployed customers were able to manage the available bandwidth and JDISS equipment to expand seamless interfaces which that equipment provides. The ACOM Net was being built along those lines as the Haiti contingencies unfolded and JTFs were stood up.

From an intelligence perspective, the ACOM Net is completely interoperable with the SCI JWICS network, providing an extension or "tree-down" of JWICS to tactical commanders. For ACOM Net subscribers, a JWICS hub has been established at ACOM, along with other hubs for collateral video and data connectivity. Key operational com-

commanders participating from their headquarters. The next day the President made the decision to launch Uphold Democracy.

The ACOM Net and JWICS provide the theater JIC and NMJIC with unique, interactive data and video connectivity with key commands farther down the chain of command than before. Intelligence problems and discrepancies are quickly sorted out, collection and analytical tasking is rapid and clear, and volumes of formal message traffic are eliminated as intelligence consumers can easily reach to theater and national capability. ACOM JDISS and intelligence VTC growth, from two and zero respectively in 1990 to 98 and 10 in 1994, permitted this extended connectivity—all significantly enhanced by TTP work and the augmentation capability previously discussed.

Joint Exercises

Annual joint exercises held in the years following Operation Desert Storm were marvelous proving grounds for equipment, procedures, and joint intelligence support concepts used for Haiti. For example, Ocean Venture '92 was the first exercise in which ACOM used the intelligence-pull concept of operations with extensive deployment of JDISS equipment among JTF commanders and components. It was also the command's maiden attempt at using a command-wide request for information (RFI) management system.

The experiment was not as successful as desired since it was manual, but it laid the basis for developing an automated RFI tracking system implemented in Ocean Venture '93. That system—an application of JDISS—was a winner and the backbone for RFI management for JTFs and components in Haiti. It is used across ACOM, providing efficient RFI tracking and response as well as saving thousands of messages annually.

Ocean Venture '93, with a small island campaign scenario, featured other joint intelligence firsts which were routine procedures by the time Uphold Democracy was executed. Among them were implementation of the ACOM on-line imagery bulletin



U.S. Marine Corps (Robert W. Oliver)

Satellite communications center.

manders (such as JTF-180 and TF-185 on *USS Mount Whitney*, JTF-190 in Port au Prince, TF-186 at Pope Air Force Base/Fort Bragg, TG-185.2 on *USS Wasp*, and JTF-160 in Guantanamo Bay), ACOM components, and supporting commands (viz., Transportation Command and the Defense Intelligence Agency/National Military Joint Information Center) were linked via SCI VTC. These networks provided communications for continuous JDISS connectivity. A dramatic demonstration of the JWICS/ACOM Net occurred on September 17, 1994 when the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman conducted a Haiti video teleconference from the NMJIC, together with CINACOM and all operational, component, and supporting

**exercises offer the best way to
“push the envelope” without
fear of failing**

board, the shared imagery repository and dissemination system; successful mating of JDISS and the Army Warrior intelligence system; demonstration of directed imagery exploitation in which JTF targeteers deployed on *USS Mount Whitney* viewed imagery manipulated at AIC; and use of *USS Mount Whitney*

as a joint mobile command platform with afloat JIC serving the JTF commander. In fact, the JTF intelligence package on *USS Mount Whitney* for Ocean Venture '93 was largely duplicated (and enhanced) for JTF-180 on the same command platform. The only difference was that the commander of Second Fleet was replaced as JTF commander by the commander of XVIII Airborne Corps. Similar joint intelligence enhancements were exercised during Agile Provider '94, including the maiden use of AIC field support teams. All three exercises featured continued interactive enhancement of ATP for joint intelligence support. Most importantly, over the three-year period commanders of Second Fleet, XVIII Airborne Corps, and II Marine Expeditionary Force had the opportunity to exercise as the JTF commander. The interaction of J-2 staffs in setting up JTF intelligence architecture and working with the theater JIC were valuable preparation for the Haiti operations.

The lesson to be learned is that exercises offer the best way to “push the envelope” without fear of failing. Joint and component intelligence enhancements should be tried in exercises first, reaching out to technology and advanced ideas that may not work perfectly but lay the groundwork for tremendous improvements when the stakes are high.

Many aspects of Uphold Democracy differed from past contingencies: employing the 10th Mountain Division from *USS Eisenhower*, Special Operations Forces from *USS America*, and the commander of XVIII Airborne Corps as a JTF commander with a command post on board *USS Mount Whitney*. Adaptive force packages offered operational commanders exceptional flexibility. They also facilitated strong C⁴I and intelligence capabilities as well as flexibility and redundancy as operations transitioned from afloat to ashore.

As the situation developed over the course of 1994, most of the early action was afloat. As the commander of JTF-120 rotated among a series of amphibious ships, the JTF J-2 was continually linked with the theater JIC, and ships engaged in embargo support provided the bulk of the collection capability. The afloat C⁴I and intelligence capability was multiplied as both JTF-180 and JTF-190 deployed to the area. Situational awareness by the JTF commanders (supported by the afloat JIC) was equally high on September 18 and 19 as decisions were made to launch the kick-in-the-door operation, then to halt the invasion, and finally to switch to the soft landing. Vigorous joint C⁴I and intelligence capabilities were maintained afloat as forces, intelligence personnel, and equipment flowed to Haiti from CONUS. As capabilities ashore were built up and the JTF-190 JIC became fully operational, the bulk of intelligence support responsibility gradually shifted ashore. The JTF intelligence backbone (built around Navy C⁴I equipment with joint and component personnel and augmented by joint equipment) was replaced by an intelligence backbone built around Army C⁴I equipment (also staffed by joint and component personnel and augmented by joint capability).

It is a tribute to the strides in joint intelligence that these transitions were made with relative ease. The training, dedication, and skill of intelligence professionals were responsible for success. Unlike contingencies in the past, intelligence personnel had the benefit of documentation on joint tactics, techniques, and procedures, and were very familiar with service intelligence organizations. Moreover, when called to serve on joint intelligence staffs, they could rely on joint training support and joint personnel and equipment augmentation. In addition, improved equipment interoperability and a dynamic, flexible intelligence data and video network should tremendously encourage operational commanders on the great potential for continued improvement in joint intelligence support.

JFQ

JFACC NEXT STEP

Taking the

By MARCUS HURLEY

The services accept and joint doctrine codifies the fact that a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) represents the best way to command and control airpower in support of a joint force commander's (JFC's) campaign plan. While there may be differences among the services on the degree of command or control, all acknowledge the importance of, and support, centralized planning and decentralized application of air assets to implement a JFC's concept of operations. The inherent flexibility of airpower makes it a powerful but not infinite theater asset. It would be a grave error to squander this valuable tool by using it in the wrong place or at the wrong time.

Desert Storm was a true test of the JFACC concept. In contrast to the fragmented application of airpower in Vietnam, Desert Storm showed the benefits of centrally controlled airpower. Since the Gulf War we have seen continual improvements in the concept. But we can do better. This article examines these improvements and discusses where we should go with JFACC.

The JFACC Role

Once a theater CINC or JFC develops a concept of operations and designates a JFACC, the air component staff translates it into a cohesive joint air operations plan. In coordination with planners from other assigned functional components (land, sea, space, and special operations), air component planners design a comprehensive master attack plan to meet the overall objectives of the campaign plan. Air operations (which might include deep-strike helicopter missions, Tomahawk cruise missiles, and Army tactical missile strikes beyond the fire support coordination line) are then phased and sequenced in an overall campaign plan to affect enemy operational and strategic centers of gravity. As with all operational-level planning and execution mechanisms, a JFACC provides the linkage between strategic objectives and the tactical application of combat power.

General William Momyer, commander of 7th Air Force during the Vietnam War, noted that airpower can decide battles or win campaigns. The commander's dilemma, he said, is determining the proper balance among competing demands, strategic attack, interdiction, and close air support. All are necessary elements and it is a JFC, with advice from a JFACC and functional commanders, who decides the level of effort he wants

Summary

Designating a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) has rapidly become the customary procedure for exercising command and control of airpower in support of joint force commanders. This approach enables JFACCs and air component staffs to develop joint operations plans together with staffs from other assigned components. Though limited resources preclude maintaining large standing air component staff for every contingency, it makes sense to have a small, trained cadre augmented by liaison officers from each component as well as trained personnel seconded in times of crisis. Such a mix can foster mutual trust, ensure the correct blend of capabilities, and furnish air assets to implement myriad requirements of the joint force commander's concept of operations. A review of the improvements made in the JFACC concept since the Persian Gulf War points the way to a new age of centrally controlled airpower.

a JFACC and his staff plan and execute the air operations necessary to achieve campaign objectives

to dedicate to each element by phase of the campaign plan. This apportionment of air assets tells a JFACC what to plan and tells other functional commanders what sort of air support they can expect.

After a JFC's apportionment decision is made, a JFACC and his staff plan and execute the air operations necessary to achieve campaign objectives. The air component staff is made up of trained and ready men and women who develop and execute a JFACC's strategic and operational-level plans. Being an effective JFACC or air component staff member, however, requires theater-wide vision and rigorous study and practice. The Air Force has taken the lead in developing the training, education, and exercise programs that airmen from all services need to become JFACCs and effective air component staff members.

JFACC Training

Training people is as important as giving them the proper tools. General Colin L. Powell, USA, indicated in Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*, that training the team as they will fight helps build the bonds of trust which are absolutely critical in joint operations. Each functional component (land, sea, air, space, and special operations) must understand and believe that airpower will be used where and when it is needed to achieve a CINC's or JFC's objectives. That is the promise which we airmen, regardless of our service, must keep. We begin by training to a common standard and then maximizing airpower during contingencies and exercises.

The Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course (JDACC) taught by Air University is a specialized course in air operations planning for company and field grade officers from all services who serve on theater and service air component staffs. JDACC addresses the supporting and supported roles of a JFACC and integrating airpower into a CINC's or JFC's campaign plan. It teaches officers to develop

and sequence the different operations which make up theater campaign plans, maximizing the potential of airpower to achieve campaign objectives. Students learn and practice fundamental concepts, principles, and procedures needed to plan and execute joint and multinational theater air operations. The course stresses center-of-gravity analysis, air objectives, and force apportionment.

Officers attending the Air Command and Staff College receive a more in-depth education in campaign planning and execution. They use the air campaign planning tool to build comprehensive theater air operations plans and, by wargaming tactical and operational-level scenarios, they design and phase independent and supporting air operations to achieve a JFC's objectives. The students must try to resolve the dilemma General Mommyer posed. In an academic setting these officers deal with the tough apportionment issues that bedevil JFACCs who they will serve after graduation.

After spending a year at Air Command and Staff College, a small group of officers is then selected to spend another year at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS). The students (including 25 Air Force officers and one Army officer in academic year 1994–95) take an intensive course on the operational-strategic levels of war. SAAS combines theory, history, and wargaming to train and exercise a cadre of air strategists who can develop effective theater air operations plans. These officers will become air planners for theater CINCs and air component commanders.

The Air Warfare Center conducts battlestaff exercises for numbered Air Force commanders and their assembled joint staffs in the command, control, and intelligence procedures of JFACCs. The computer-based exercises, known as Blue Flag, replicate theater conditions by using friendly and enemy orders of battle, war plans, and theater operating procedures. Participants regularly include members of other services and allied nations to provide a realistic employment experience. State-of-the-art computer technology allows ground, enemy air defense, and maritime simulations to run simultaneously with offensive and defensive air operations. Distributed wargaming makes it possible to direct exercises from other sites and include geographically separated units as

Major General Marcus Hurley, USAF, is Director of Plans and Policy at Air Combat Command.

A fighter pilot who has commanded an F-4 squadron and an F-16 wing, he also has served as the commander of Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia.

players. Blue Flag is a world class opportunity for joint and combined air forces to train as they will fight.

The crown jewel in JFACC training will be the JFACC Theater Air Strategy Symposium, a week-long event that will introduce general and flag officers who serve or may serve as JFACCs to the available air operations planning tools. It will prepare participants to seek and exploit synergism through centralized planning and decentralized execution of joint air operations. They will study service-unique capabilities and the means of integrating them to maximize available combat power. This course will be JFACCing from a warfighter's perspective.

Air Tasking Order

The central tenet of airpower is that planning (control) must be centralized and execution decentralized. Centralized planning is key to coordinating efforts among all available air forces. Decentralized execution makes it possible to generate the tempo of operations required and to cope with the uncertainty and disorder of air combat in battle. Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, who commanded Allied ground forces at Normandy, noted: "Airpower is indivisible. If you split it up into compartments, you merely pull it to pieces and destroy its greatest asset—its flexibility." Airpower's speed, range, and flexibility give it the ability to mass combat power throughout a theater of operations. Massing combat power is the goal of all commanders. Compartmentalizing or dividing command and control responsibilities for airpower degrades the ability to mass.

One difficulty in achieving centralized control of theater-wide air operations arises from the fact that command and control structure has not been responsive enough for centralized planning and rapid execution. In Desert Storm advanced technology offered this ability. Linking computers with theater planning, communications, intelligence, reconnaissance, and targeting systems gave the air component commander the ability to use the intent of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (CINCCENT) to produce a comprehensive air operations plan, adjust the air tasking order (ATO) if retargeting was necessary, and execute the plan via the ATO.

In the Gulf War, U.S. Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) used the 72-hour planning and 48-hour tasking cycles outlined in Joint Pub 3-56.1, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*. While air operations were driven by the JFC's intent, mission guidance, and combat assessment, the critics of the ATO process viewed the air operations plan as too inflexible. They claimed the ATO could not adjust to changes based on reported battle damage assessments (BDA), in-flight reports, or the ground commander's requirements. But every night during Desert Storm CINCCENT personally reviewed and revised the next day's air operations plan to address changes in the enemy order of battle. Moreover, he adjusted the next two days' targeting priorities as well as apportionment totals to meet new threat assessments and revised target lists.

It is understandable how one might perceive an ATO as being too rigid. The document is a theater-wide tasker to strike as many targets as possible in a 24-hour period and achieve a CINC's or JFC's campaign objectives. Air component staffs usually work three ATOs simultaneously: one being executed (today's), one in production (tomorrow's), and one in planning (for the day after tomorrow). Differences in intelligence and post-mission reporting which are available to functional components and subunified commands mean that many targets nominated by one component may not be serviced when requested since they have been hit previously or are no longer viable targets (though the component's intelligence organization does not know it). With hundreds of targets and thousands of sorties to schedule, deconflict, recover, regenerate, and relaunch, the ATO is large, comprehensive, and imposing. Today, with the command, control, and communications systems fielded since the Gulf War, the current ATO process allows greater flexibility. We have worked on the training, now we need to give our people better tools.

Contingency Planning

As in Desert Storm ATOs can and will be changed during daily targeting reviews conducted prior to their execution. A new command and control tool, the Contingency

F-14 being launched in the Adriatic during Deny Flight.



AH-64 Apache at Saudi port.

U.S. Army (G1 High)

Combat Camera Imagery (Raymond T. Conway)

Theater Automated Planning System (CTAPS), replaces the automated system used in the Gulf War. CTAPS makes it easier for a JFACC to redirect sorties and missions even after the ATO is

published and distributed since it allows real-time communications among operations staffs, including naval aviation aboard carriers. Additionally, by assigning primary and secondary taskings in the ATO, sorties can be redirected to hit assigned secondary targets or diverted to address unexpected battlefield situations. Procedural and systemic changes allow a JFC to add or shift combat airpower to main or supporting efforts and afford unprecedented flexibility to meet sudden changes on the modern, dynamic battlefield.

Air Force computer systems used to plan and execute air operations in the

Gulf War were incompatible with those of other services and coalition air forces. The systems were not intended to address unique requirements of joint and multinational air operations in a contingency theater. To overcome the systemic obstacles to a single integrated air operation, paper copies of the ATO being executed were hand delivered to ships and certain coalition forces. This was a great source of frustration for planners, operations controllers on the CENTAF staff, and squadrons tasked with flying missions.

The Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have expended tremendous efforts to ensure that CTAPS meets the needs of theater air component commanders—regardless of a JFACC's service. The system has been designated the joint standard for ATO generation and dissemination by the Joint Staff. In addition, the software used to develop, transmit, and execute the ATO meets DOD common user standards. While the hardware may be different, both ATO inputs and the products available will be the same among all forces participating in theater air operations.

Initial versions of CTAPS hardware and software have been fielded. The services use the system for exercises and actual deployments. Interoperability and system connectivity simplifies the job of air component staffs and intensifies the effectiveness of airpower. CTAPS represents a great leap forward in technology, ease of operation, communications flow, and customer support. Modern technology has enhanced the ability of a JFACC to support a theater campaign strategy. These tools will undergo refinement as technology and combat change.

Standing Organization

CENTAF planning and execution staffs during the Gulf War were augmented by hundreds of Air Force planners and liaison officers from other services. Since then, CINCs and JFCs have used ad hoc *joint* staffs to plan and execute air operations in contingency and exercise scenarios. This puts a tremendous training burden on air component commanders who are assigned JFACC responsibilities. In a crisis training time may be unavailable or inappropriate because of operational security concerns. An even tougher problem occurs if a CINC requires a JFACC to execute initial air operations and plan others while the staff is deploying. This is extremely difficult for a trained and ready air component staff and nearly impossible for an ad hoc group.

We can overcome such problems by assigning members of all services to a theater CINC's air component staff full time. This joint staff would live together and work as a team every day, most likely at the air component commander's headquarters. The staff would then be a trained and ready core

CTAPS allows real-time communications among operations staffs, including naval aviation aboard carriers

around which a full JFACC staff could be formed in crises. This requires training more people from all services to act as members of air component staffs. Even if they are not actively serving on a joint air component staff, they will be available to augment the assigned staff.

Numbered Air Forces (NAFs) have several hundred people assigned to form an Air Force core around which a theater air component staff can be built. NAF commanders train and exercise assigned Air Force people to build an air operations plan, coordinate plans and operations between service components, and execute initial and subsequent ATOs in the event of crisis. This capability has been tested successfully in real-world contingencies, theater exercises, and at Blue Flag with liaison personnel from other services and some allies. What is missing is full-time representatives from other service components who will provide airpower in response to a regional contingency. JFACCs need this full-time service expertise to wage the joint warfare which General Powell said is essential to victory. It is up to the services to recognize the need and assign the right people.

In the ongoing commitment to Southwest Asia, Operation Southern Watch, 150 Air Force and Navy officers augment CENTCOM and CENTAF staffs. Personnel on temporary duty with the joint task force staff plan and execute air operations in support of U.N. Resolutions 687 and 688. In return, they are practicing their skills in an operational setting.

The JFACC for Southern Watch is also the Joint Task

Force-Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA) commander, the Area Air Defense commander, and the Airspace Control Authority. Operational control over Navy and Air Force flying units as well as Army Patriot missile batteries in the theater is retained by the respective service component commanders. The JTF-SWA commander exercises tactical control over Navy and Air Force sorties made available for planning through Commander, U.S. Naval Forces

Central Command, and Commander, U.S. Central Command Air Forces. This arrangement gives the JTF-SWA commander local direction and control of sorties. In addition, he ensures airspace is laid out in a coordinated, disciplined manner. By articulating the level of effort required and focusing all players on the mission requirements, the JTF-SWA commander is able to execute the air operations required to achieve CINCCENT objectives.

While it may be desirable, fiscal reality prevents us from forming large, new air component staffs in each theater. The JTF-SWA experience has shown that a small, trained, and ready cadre, augmented by quality liaison officers from each component and trained augmentees, can transform the commander's objectives into a comprehensive air operations plan and an executable ATO.

Effective airpower, capable of meeting the strategic needs of a JFC and addressing direct air support requirements of land and maritime component commanders, depends on a solid foundation of communications and trust. When a JFACC clearly articulates his goals and focuses components and his joint staff to achieve them, we can be successful. As seen in Southern Watch and other contingencies, properly trained, equipped, and motivated personnel (assigned or augmenting) can become a formidable JFACC team when trust is established and communications are maintained.

The Future

While the nature of future conflict is uncertain, U.S. participation in it and the need for responsive and flexible airpower is not. Operations other than war (OOTW) constitute a growth industry in which the Nation will be involved. Thus airpower will also be involved in some form. Ongoing operations in Bosnia, Southwest Asia, the Horn of Africa, Haiti, and other regions are becoming the norm rather than the exception. Experiences in these and other crises are helping us transform the lessons of Desert Storm into experience for present and future air commanders.

We are witnessing the first steps towards controlling all theater air operations via the ATO. The Chairman recently changed Joint Pub 3-56.1, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*, to require positive control of all

FA-18s taking off from Aviano Air Base.



Combat Camera Imagery (Steve Thuroff)



F-16 returning from
Cope North 94-1
mission off Japan.

U.S. Air Force (Andy Dunaway)

air operations in a theater, including Army helicopters, on the ATO or a flight plan. Special Operations Forces have demonstrated that they can make significant contributions to the deep battle. We have the ability to regularly include special operations missions on the ATO. During OOTW, the consequences of not exercising positive control over all air operations could be disastrous. Positive control helps avoid fratricide by giving all team members a copy of the game plan. The contention that doing so

makes a cumbersome document even more unwieldy fails to take into account CTAPS and future command and control systems.

We should also expect to encounter and exercise more frequently with JFACCs who are not Air Force officers or who have a mobility rather than a combat background. A primary reason for such joint training programs is to prepare for scenarios when a non-Air Force service will have the preponderance of air assets and the command and control mechanisms to plan and execute theater air operations. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario when a Navy admiral is the initial

JFACC in a contingency and then passes his responsibility to an Air Force or a Marine general as operations move ashore. As the commitment to a particular contingency matures, the JFACC may again be

an admiral or general responsible for planning and executing mobility and sustainment activities. This would be difficult to accomplish in a large operation today, but standardized planning and execution tools and joint training programs will make the hand-off easier in the future. Now we need practice.

It is possible and advisable to test this concept. Under different funding and sponsorship Blue Flag could be run with a non-Air Force JFACC and his principle staff. Air Force

personnel could serve as deputy JFACC and in liaison functions, providing expertise in areas such as space warfare, airlift, and strategic attack. Another possibility is to structure theater exercises to provide for an Air Force JFACC afloat with a predominantly Navy staff. Linking and sequencing service training simulations such as the Navy's Fleetex and the Army's Battle Training Program with Blue Flag to accomplish a CINC's joint training objectives is yet another area with tremendous potential. Phased simulations, keeping key players in their respective roles, more closely approximates the real execution of a campaign plan. With other innovations like the distributed wargaming system, we can and will do more to simulate and exercise joint procedures that will be in use should we go to war.

The future of airpower is optimistic for both airmen and other functional components. The new tools and training we are giving to JFACCs and their staffs will make airpower more capable and flexible. Shortcomings identified during and after the Gulf War are being addressed and initial results are very promising. As new systems and training programs mature we will see better and more responsive air operations to support a JFC's concept of operations.

With newly acquired capabilities, however, come responsibilities to act as an equal partner beside both land and maritime components as a supporting as well as supported component. This means seeking innovative ways to sequence and phase air operations to achieve theater objectives. It also means massing airpower to delay, disrupt, and destroy enemy combat forces before they close with ground and naval forces. And finally, it means being available to put steel on target when a JFC needs to add or shift weight to a main or supporting effort.

Future JFACCs will wield more control and provide better airpower capability to JFCs and other components of a joint force. In the past centrally planning the execution of limited air assets has been a difficulty, but enhanced training and enhanced command, control, and planning systems will help us realize the theater-wide benefits of flexible, responsive, and lethal airpower.

JFQ

**new tools we are giving
JFACCs will make air-
power more capable and
flexible**

UNAMIR

Mission to Rwanda

By R. A. DALLAIRE and B. POULIN

In early 1993, the U.N. Secretary General drew attention to the tragedy befalling Rwanda. In June the Security Council passed resolution 846 authorizing a U.N. Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) which began operations in July with approximately a hundred military and civilian personnel. Its primary task was to ensure that no military assistance reached the Rwandan rebels—the Front Patriotique Rwandais—across the Uganda border. In August, the belligerents signed the Arusha peace agreement which, it was hoped, would bring peace. Its goals included installing a broad-based transitional government (BBTG); establishing transitional institutions; deploying a neutral international force; withdrawing all foreign troops; integrating the gendarmerie; disengaging, disarming, and demobilizing both parties; and protecting the expatriate community. The

goals were intended to culminate in elections some twenty-two months later.


Unfortunately, the UNOMUR mandate to prevent weapons from entering the country did little to abate human suffering. In fact, the situation continued to deteriorate because of the massive displaced population, drought, famine, poor public health, and declining national revenues. Large refugee influxes from Rwanda into neighboring Burundi were also a chief concern. Accordingly, the Security Council adopted resolution 872 in October 1993 authorizing a contingent consisting of some 2,500 military personnel known as the U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).¹

UNAMIR had a multifaceted mandate and a concept of operations with four phases. The first phase (October 5, 1993–January 4, 1994) promoted the installation and opera-

Summary

Efforts by the United Nations to intervene in Rwanda illustrate how hesitancy and impotence on the part of some sovereign nations leave victims of many humanitarian disasters contemptuous of the international community. The U.N. Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) braved a disintegrating political situation that generated masses of refugees and fueled deep ethnic tensions compounded by drought and famine. A new mandate established the U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) which achieved some of its goals, especially in coordinating humanitarian aid with civilian agencies. But the late arrival of personnel, scant resources, and a lack of international resolve led to a view of the United Nations as a paper tiger and contributed to the death of a half million people. While withdrawal would have been tantamount to endorsing genocide, the lesson of Rwanda is too-little-too-late from a world organization with serious faults.

The views expressed in this article are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Canadian Department of National Defence, the Canadian Government, or any agency of the United Nations.



**the mission and the
Rwandans fell victim to
inflated expectations that
the United Nations could
not fulfill**

**Maj Gen Dallaire
(right) with fellow
peacekeepers and
friends.**

The Globe and Mail, Toronto (Corrine Dutta)

Major General R. A. Dallaire is Deputy Commander of the Canadian Army; he was chief military observer for UNOMUR and commanded UNAMIR; Captain B. Poulin serves as African regional officer in the Directorate of International Policy, Canadian Department of National Defence.


tion of a BBTG. Specifically, it assisted in ensuring the security of Kigali as well as demilitarizing the area in and around the city, helping in mine clearance, providing security for repatriation of Rwandan refugees and displaced persons, coordinating humanitarian assistance in conjunction with relief operations, investigating alleged noncompliance with provisions of the peace accord, and monitoring security leading to democratic elections. The second phase (January 5–April 4, 1994) involved preparations to disengage, demobilize, and integrate government and rebel

forces. The third phase (January 5–April 4, 1995) was to be characterized by the actual disengagement, demobilization, and integration of both parties. The last phase (January 5–November 4, 1995) called for providing security in the run up to elections. Interestingly, the operation also saw an unprecedented degree of cooperation with civilian agencies that had the front-line job of providing humanitarian aid which resulted in an attractive and cost-effective way of facilitating the operation and advancing the spirit of Arusha.

The Mission

At first glance the UNAMIR mandate seemed feasible, and the force did acquit itself well, all things considered. Several constraints made it clear, however, that the mandate and timetable jeopardized the ability of UNAMIR to fulfil its mission as originally en-

M-113A2 rolling onto ramp at Entebbe, Uganda.



The Chairman visiting U.N. contingent.

Combat Camera Imagery (Lemuel Cassilas)



Combat Camera Imagery (Marvin Krause)

Canadians arriving via Air National Guard C-5 Galaxy.

visaged. For example, the October 4 resolution called for some 2,500 U.N. personnel, yet the force did not completely arrive until late February. To further complicate matters, some arrived without minimum equipment.


This problem was partly due to the overall pressure under which the United Nations had to respond to a number of international crises during 1992-93 without a commensurate expansion of resources from member states, and also due to the limited field operations staff in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at the United Nations. In the case of Rwanda, this resulted in problems over deployment time and budget, not to mention the paucity of air transport (both fixed-wing and rotary). Such deficiencies weakened the effectiveness of UNAMIR

in mediating as well as reconciling differences among the two parties and also precluded developing and implementing a structured peace process. In other words, the mission and the Rwandans which the operation was intended to secure fell victim to inflated expectations that the United Nations could not fulfil. This explains in part how a classical peacekeeping mission degenerated into a resumption of the conflict and how new human rights abuses based on political decapitation degenerated into genocide.

Raising the Stakes

The first signs of this crisis surfaced in April 1994 when the Rwandan president died under mysterious circumstances in a plane crash. Fighting broke out among government forces followed by murders as the situation rapidly gave way to increasing lawlessness, violence, and mass killing across most of the country. The hands of the United Nations were also tied; and since it possessed no power akin to that of a sovereign state, it could only act with the consent of the international community under the auspices of

Rwanda: The Rebel Advance



Source: Canadian National Defence Headquarters

Refugee/Displaced Persons Camps



Source: Canadian National Defence Headquarters

the Security Council. As long as the individual members of this body procrastinated and pursued national agendas, the organization remained relatively powerless. Consequently, little could be done to deter fighting from spreading throughout the country given that some 60,000 government and rebel soldiers

were engaged in a civil war and UNAMIR had only 2,500 poorly trained troops. At best, U.N. presence provided local security for the roughly 20,000 Rwandans caught between the lines, helped preserve truces and cease-fires, assisted both civilian agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), held ground, and prepared the way for a new force and an increased humanitarian effort.

The situation was also exacerbated by decisions on the part of some contributing countries to either withdraw military personnel from UNAMIR unilaterally or not amend the mandate under what were significantly changed circumstances, namely a state of war instead of peace. Thus as the United Nations debated a new mandate and increases in personnel, the UNAMIR force—with little or no ammunition and barely a third of the minimum operational equipment needed in theater, hardly any defense stores, and one of its major contingents (Belgians) deliberately being targeted by one of the warring factions—actually decreased from 2,500 to 450 troops through a decision by the Security Council which reinforced the impression of the United Nations as a paper tiger.

Despite these setbacks, a complete withdrawal from Rwanda was out of the question since the belligerents would have perceived it as a green light for a more deliberate, intolerable escalation of hostilities. It became clear that the term *international community* had become a pejorative for both sides. Ironically, while U.N. credibility was being eroded daily by its ineffectiveness in the face of massacres and ongoing fighting, it remained the only conduit for the two sides to communicate and for an objective projection of the Rwandan situation around the world. Also, unlike other international organizations, the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross held firm.


The Response

The international community finally responded to the request by the Secretary General and approved expansion of the U.N. mandate and operations in Rwanda. The Security Council passed resolution 918 in May followed by resolution 955 in June which authorized a UNAMIR force of 5,500 troops with

a more proactive humanitarian protection and support mandate. In fact, the mandate provided for creating secure areas to protect refugees and displaced persons, supporting and securing the distribution of relief supplies, and imposing an arms embargo against Rwanda. It also called for an immediate cease-fire and end to violence.

But once again the required personnel and equipment were not forthcoming. For instance, the United Nations was not given assets to counter the inflammatory broadcasts from the nominally independent Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines which was controlled by the so-called interim government. These broadcasts were largely responsible for spreading panic that, in turn, drove large numbers of people to refugee camps in neighboring states, thereby spreading instability throughout the region. The broadcasts also excited the Hutu population to take up arms against Tutsis and Hutu moderates to exterminate them and, also, regularly targeted UNAMIR in general and its senior officials in particular. This last development raised tensions between U.N. personnel and the large Hutu population, which complicated the mediation process. It also should be pointed out that the broadcasts discouraged survivors from returning to their homes in Rwanda and should have been jammed. The United Nations should have aired counter-broadcasts to give the population a clear account of what was actually happening as it did in Cambodia. Yet, unlike Cambodia, no country came forward to offer jamming or broadcasting assets.

Another example of the lack of resources was the refugee camps. There was no concerted effort by the international community to disarm refugees or segregate extremists from the general population which moved across the border into the camps. It was clear that aside from refugees in and around Goma, most refugees and certainly a majority of displaced persons in the southwest were victims of world apathy. This benign neglect was caused by the media which as a whole opted to dispatch their reporters to Goma, which helped alleviate the misery there at the expense of the rest of the country. Second, with only aid to Goma being publicized, protagonists interested in destabi-



French soldiers watching materiel being unloaded.

Combat Camera Imagery (Andy Dunaway)

lizing Rwanda spread the word that one must flee the country to obtain the means to survive, from food to medical care.

Ironically, the net effect of providing aid to this area was a continual increase in the already large numbers of refugees arriving there and considerable tension in the southwest that could have resulted in another exodus of more than a million Rwandans towards Bukavu. Needless to say, these developments further strained the already scant resources. Finally, this concentration of aid hampered the U.N. effort to convince the same refugees to go home and displaced persons to stay.

French-led coalition forces did stabilize the southwest; but that temporary intervention must be compared with the lack of support which the U.N. mission received in attempting to get the revised UNAMIR operation off the ground for a second time. It would have been preferable to see these efforts channelled differently, say towards the UNAMIR mission itself. If this had occurred, the entire operation would have been shorter and more effective.

In hindsight the international community reacted too late to the burgeoning refugee situation and too late to stop genocide. Moreover, the refugee camps, concentrated in extremely precarious locations and replete with extremists, will play a key role in Rwanda's future. They will hinder the Rwandan government from re-establishing itself to the point where it can deal with the challenges of the present, let alone those of the future.

In August 1994 a cease-fire was declared, albeit unilaterally by the rebel side. Continued reluctance by the international community, however, either to help or to direct the United Nations to be more proactive in areas surrounding Rwanda will be disastrous. The inability of various commissions (for example,

the international community must be capable of responding to humanitarian crises rapidly and effectively

genocide and human rights) to safely conduct a balanced investigation of the camps akin to that inside Rwanda, and a lack of technical and financial support for the new government to cre-

ate a semblance of a judicial process, gendarmerie, civil service, and schools, will only increase the chances of failure and suffering. The major difference this time, however, is that if the situation is not rectified the whole region will be affected as opposed to only Rwanda.

The international community must be capable of responding operationally, administratively, and logistically to humanitarian crises like Rwanda rapidly and effectively. Organizing a plans and policy branch within the United Nations to conduct forward planning and providing the staff for contingency planning would be useful. One should bear in mind that an embryonic cell exists in DPKO with many similar features, and it might fit the bill if expanded. Along with these measures, the United Nations needs greater access to resources for field operations, possibly through something similar to a NATO mobile force to which member countries contribute troops on a rotational basis for one or two years. A small permanent headquarters staff could be deployed to the field with standard operating procedures and contingency planning, together with

earmarked forces that have undergone combined exercises with integrated communications equipment.

U.N. headquarters, for its part, needs authority to rapidly respond to crises with a mission-specific implementation plan developed by an adroit, reconstituted political staff. The bottom line is that sovereign nations must adapt to the new world by allowing the United Nations to do things that they do not or cannot do individually for various geopolitical reasons. This would facilitate a response to an unfolding crisis in weeks rather than months. By the same token, this approach would help preclude repeating the lesson of Rwanda, where a terrible price was extracted because the response had to be improvised.

JFQ

NOTES

¹ UNOMUR was administratively integrated into UNAMIR at that time; it was disbanded in September 1994 with most of its personnel and equipment transferred to UNAMIR.

Joint Education for the



U.S. Navy (Paul J. Sales)

Naval War College,
Newport.

21st Century

By ROBERT B. KUPISZEWSKI

The Armed Forces must educate officers in the same way that they plan to fight—jointly. This calls for an educational structure that is more economical but that continues to produce leaders who are able to perform on an increasingly complex battlefield. With the exception of the National Defense University (NDU), military education is conducted by the individual services. There is no DOD or joint agency charged with integrating resources, manpower, and academic programs for the efficient and cost-effective operation of the educational system. Though this system has served the military well, it may not be suited for the tremendous changes that education will face in the next century. Technological advances, budgetary constraints, and enhanced jointness will call for new ways of doing business. We require a vision

of education based upon unity of command, a joint learning environment, and consolidated assets. Education, like other aspects of preparing for war, should be accomplished in a joint setting.

The services are reviewing how to meet future education requirements. Their emphasis is on developing the classroom of the 21st century and curtailing redundant programs. Consideration is also being given to consolidating programs to conserve resources, but these efforts are largely focused on unilateral needs. There is no effort underway to consolidate service programs. A joint command is needed to oversee and integrate doctrine as well as education. In essence, education—like operations—should be a joint rather than a service responsibility. While it is impossible to offer a detailed plan on making education more efficient and cost-effective, this article includes a concept to stimulate thinking on the development and implementation of a better educational system.

The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act upheld the relevance of service education but stressed joint education.

Robert B. Kupiszewski is Chief of the Curriculum Affairs Division at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. His article entitled "Joint Education: Where Do We Go From Here?" (with William M. Steele) appeared in issue 3 of JFQ.

the Armed Forces are gradually accepting a more unified notion of PME

Through the efforts of the House Panel on Military Education, Joint Staff, and services a new approach has emerged on how to train and educate the total force for the future. Goldwater-Nichols brought about innovations that hint at a structure for military education. The Chairman, for example, is responsible for formulating policy on military education.¹ As part of that responsibility, he formed a Military Education Division (J-7)

on the Joint Staff and released CM-1618-93, *Military Education Policy Document*, which provides a comprehensive framework for Professional Military Education (PME). Placing responsibility for PME under the Chairman is a major step toward unity of command over a complex, diverse, and somewhat redundant system.

The Armed Forces are gradually accepting a more unified notion of PME. Service colleges are conducting joint wargames and planning to link their library systems and automated networks. The trend since Goldwater-Nichols has been toward joint educational planning and greater sharing of resources by the services. Much credit for these initiatives must go to the Military Education Coordination Conference (MECC) which is chaired by the Director of the Joint Staff. Recently the MECC has recommended significant improvements. But despite this progress more must be done. Congress advocates more consolidation of service educational functions, resources, and facilities. One member of the House, for instance, called for a study on collocating the service colleges with service academies.² Similarly, the Senate directed DOD to report on "potential cost savings from consolidation of military command and staff and war colleges, and their administration."³ It seems that Congress is clearly proposing a more efficient and cost-effective educational system.

Some Assumptions

My proposal for a joint education command visualizes a system comprised of universities that provide a joint environment for developing doctrine and teaching while offering service-unique curricula. This university system would be interconnected,

leaner, and adaptable to change. When introducing a concept, one must postulate a point of departure. These then are the assumptions on which I base this proposal:

- ▼ all services must move toward greater jointness in education
- ▼ Congress will continue to drive consolidations across all services
- ▼ limited resources will force radical changes in the DOD infrastructure resulting in multipurpose, efficient installations
- ▼ joint doctrine will eventually replace most service doctrine
- ▼ the classroom will remain the focal point of training and education
- ▼ technology will reduce classroom instruction time and expand opportunities for self-development and operational assignments
- ▼ technology will foster greater interaction among industry, government, and educational institutions
- ▼ learning through resident faculty-student interaction will remain important.

Some of my assumptions are controversial and speculative. While many may find it hard to accept the idea that joint doctrine will replace service doctrine, doctrinal development does seem to be moving in that direction. And as joint doctrine takes the place of service doctrine it requires an educational system that fosters a joint learning environment. That the classroom will remain the focus of education, with learning relying on faculty-student interaction, is debatable. Many feel that interactive learning utilizing computers will replace classrooms as we know them. In that case continued need for universities with multi-purpose facilities would diminish. But such a proposal envisions a requirement for the classroom—with faculty members and students engaged in face-to-face dialogue—which sustains the need for multipurpose facilities.

An Organizational Approach

As stated above, I propose forming a joint command to oversee every aspect of education under a four-star general or flag officer who is nominated on a rotational basis from the services and reports to the Secretary of Defense. Oversight for education policy, however, would still rest with the Chairman. Universities would serve as the operating elements of this command. Separate universities would be formed at each distinct level of military education. For

example, universities would be created for initial entry-level training as well as intermediate- and senior-level education. Additionally, functional universities could be formed to conduct instruction in specialized areas like integrating battlefield transportation from the tactical to strategic level. In carrying out its mission, the university system would offer individual training and education from accession to retirement. Even service academies, Reserve officer training programs, and officer candidate schools would come under a university.

Each university would teach a joint core curriculum as well as service specific instruction. In the case of intermediate-level education I envision a university with a single campus but separate Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force colleges. Like the current system, residency would be about a year; students would be majors or lieutenant commanders as well as equivalent rank civilians. Curricula could be configured in various ways. One model would devote the initial phase of the course to service-specific

instruction followed by joint instruction similar to that offered in the Program for Joint Education (PJE) at the Armed Forces Staff College (four months of

hands-on application in a joint learning environment). Devoting the first eight months of the course to service-unique instruction would enable students to bring that expertise to the joint learning experience during the latter part of the course.

More than 2,250 officers currently attend the four service intermediate-level colleges which is approximately the enrollment at a small liberal arts college. Given that total, the students eligible to attend an intermediate university could be situated in one complex with common areas for joint instruction and individual Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force faculties and halls for individual service instruction. The university might include the Coast Guard which in the next century may have missions closely aligned to those of the other services. Since the number of resident intermediate-level

students is partially based on seating capacity, the size of the student body would have to be resolved before creating an intermediate university. The Air Force, for example, sends only about 20 percent of its officers to intermediate college in residence. Given a larger facility, it and the other services may increase enrollment levels. Student capacities and service needs must drive the design, composition, and operation of an intermediate university.

Some advantages of a single intermediate university are obvious. Foremost, it would allow both service and truly joint learning to be carried out in one place. Students would no longer have to go on temporary duty for joint instruction as they do under the PJE phase I and phase II system. Also, all students could undergo advanced joint education, not just a small number like those who now attend phase II at the Armed Forces Staff College. Another advantage is a joint faculty on one campus that teaches comprehensive service and joint curricula. This would rapidly lead to faculties highly talented in service and joint matters. And finally, a single location would have a tremendous impact on resources and costs by consolidating facilities and support required to operate the present system of five joint and service intermediate-level colleges.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness sent a report to Congress in March 1994 which discussed various consolidation initiatives including relocation of all intermediate-level education to Fort Leavenworth.⁴ The report concluded that consolidation would not be cost-effective. While that may be the case today, will it be true twenty years from now? Probably not. The answer is to develop an educational plan and system that would make it cost-effective to move intermediate-level education to Fort Leavenworth by the year 2015.

Forming universities to consolidate educational activities is a natural development and has a number of precedents. NDU consolidated several colleges in the late 1970s under one president. Likewise, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force collocated their senior and intermediate colleges at Newport, Quantico, and Maxwell, respectively. The Army recently formed the Combined Arms Support Command at Fort Lee to consolidate

forming universities to consolidate educational activities is a natural development



Armed Forces Staff
College, Norfolk.

education related to battlefield support. But what is required for the 21st century is to take these initiatives to another stage—across service lines—with a dual aim of realizing greater economies through consolidation and enriching the learning process by offering education in a joint environment which corresponds to the way we will fight.

Key Decisions

One critical planning consideration is that a joint education command and university system should be designed to maintain the same level of excellence for all members of the Armed Forces. It must ensure that the Reserve force and DOD civilians are afforded educational opportunities that are comparable to those of the active force. This is important since the Reserve, National Guard, and civilian work force are likely to have enhanced roles within DOD in the 21st century. Likewise, because of the increased emphasis on coalition warfare, the system must afford allies and partners greater opportunities to share in our educational facilities. Too often, the services have not had a coherent policy on integrating the total force and international community into the learning process. This educational structure must change that by having a combined as well as joint perspective.

The new system must also be devoid of bureaucratic layers. It should eliminate unneeded headquarters and staffs that duplicate functions or merely coordinate activities. A joint education command should be

small and mission-focused. The worst approach would be to establish a large headquarters that stifles the innovation and initiative needed at the university level.

The principal focus of the universities must be on warfighting and operations other than war. DOD and the services will not be able to expend resources on programs that only marginally relate to military operations. Courses that teach such subjects as executive skills should be offered outside the university system, possibly in partnership with civilian institutions or industry.

The system must be structured to nurture joint attitudes and perspectives from initial entry training through senior-level education. As farfetched as it may seem, the day could come when all accessions to the Armed Forces undergo basic instruction on warfighting at one location. Planning for that should occur as part of the transition to a joint command.

Educational resources will become more scarce in the next century. Therefore the planning for and use of facilities will be critical. DOD must use installations wisely to take advantage of the superb facilities at places like Carlisle, Newport, Quantico, and Maxwell. However, those that are no longer cost-effective must be closed and new ones constructed when needed. The goal must be to create an education system that is second to none at all levels.

Planners must thoroughly address the issue of resident versus nonresident education before changing the current system. Based on technology alone, it is highly likely that nonresident and distant learning will increase considerably in the 21st century. Since this impacts on the number and size of facilities, careful planning must ensure balanced resident to nonresident student ratios.

Such a university system will not succeed unless it has “world class” faculties selected by rigorous screening processes to acquire the operational, technical, and educational skills needed for the 21st century classroom. Once recruited, faculties must undergo intensive preparation followed by professional development to ensure sustained performance. Carefully selected and well trained faculties would be the most important aspect of a new university system and the services should equate faculty positions to key operational assignments in

terms of promotion potential and other forms of advancement. Teaching in such a university system must be a premier assignment for military personnel of all specialties, grades, and services.

Blueprint for Change

Creating an education command requires deliberate planning to transfer responsibility from the individual services to joint universities and could take as long as twenty years. A hypothetical phased plan to execute such a decision might unfold as follows:

▼ *Phase I—Planning* (1995–2000). The services consolidate educational assets to achieve greater economies and efficiencies. As internal reorganizations occur, DOD establishes criteria for designating installations for multi-purpose, cross-service applications. The key event is tasking the Joint Staff to develop a campaign plan for a joint education command and a university system for DOD approval.

▼ *Phase II—Transition* (2000–10). A joint education command replaces service-unique activities under a campaign plan developed by the Joint Staff. DOD begins construction projects, upgrades facilities, and creates a command and control system. During this phase the colleges are initially reconfigured into consortia. For example, senior-level colleges form a consortium to share overhead costs and conduct joint curriculum planning (as found in the Defense Acquisition University). Converting to the new system requires an extraordinary effort by all services and takes a full ten years.

▼ *Phase III—Execution* (2010–15). A joint education command assumes command and control of all doctrinal development and education activities. The result is a single organization dedicated to integrating joint doctrine and educational programs, resources, and facilities.

This proposal for a new organizational structure for education in the 21st century is based on the premise that the services must train and educate in the same way they will

fight. Trends in jointness indicate significant movement in that direction. The services are consolidating training facilities and collaborating in projects of

mutual benefit to realize economies of scale and operating efficiencies, developments that will continue. But we must accelerate the process by rejecting the status quo and outlining a vision for education to meet the

demands of warfare in the next century. That vision should include a joint command and university system which comprises every level of education. If the Armed Forces fail to seize the initiative and create a more efficient, cost-effective system, Congress is likely to step into the picture and legislate one.

JFQ

NOTES


¹ Chapter 5, paragraph 153, Public Law 99–433, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, October 1, 1986.

² U.S. General Accounting Office, “Military Education: Information on Service Academies and Schools,” September 1993.

³ Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “Consolidation of War and Staff Colleges Study,” March 1994.

⁴ Ibid.

the services must train and educate in the same way they will fight



When Waves Collide: Future Conflict

By RICHARD SZAFRANSKI

... we may eventually come to agree that a threat to national security means anything on the globe which challenges a people's health, economic well-being, social stability, and political peace.

—Paul Kennedy¹

Anyone who has witnessed a fist fight, attended a hockey game, or read history knows that mankind will never attain peace and unity. On the contrary, rivalry, confrontation, and conflict are constants of the human state. Even advocates of information war, cyberwar, and psychological warfare admit that friendly data, controllers, and minds must be protected by the use of force.

Future events are unknown and unknowable, predictions merely guesswork,

and forecasts often nothing more than coherent fiction masquerading as fact.² Trends and megatrends, which are linear extrapolations, defy the reality of a world characterized by nonlinearity and exponential change. No one knows with certainty what surprises may lurk in the waves of the future.³ Yet, domestic and international interests compel us to stretch, look ahead, try to thwart surprise, and be prepared. This article dares to think aloud about conflict in the next millennium.

Visions of the Future

After decades of confrontation with the Soviet Union, each service announced its vision of the post-Cold War world.⁴ Moreover, stirred by a speech that Sam Nunn delivered

Summary

What eventualities await the Armed Forces now that myriad dangers have replaced a monolithic threat are unknown. While old habits die hard, the weapons systems of the Gulf War will be relegated to the Reserve components. Naval forces will assume center stage, calling on enhanced airpower and spacepower. Ground forces will be smaller but highly mobile. The Air Force will turn to space or run the risk of extinction. New weapons will be smarter, but some ancient varieties will survive. The United Nations will succeed because it must, and the military may be earmarked for exclusive duty as peacekeepers. Special Operations Forces will bear the brunt of the Nation's violent encounters, but precisely how will remain a mystery. Conflict will be keyed on the behavior that we attempt to ensure or expunge, the precise conditions of combat cessation, and the attributes that we want to prevail in a post-conflict world when waves collide.

on the Senate floor about military redundancy and waste—impelled by rapidly declining budgets and in the wake of the Chairman's assessment of roles, missions, and functions—Secretary of Defense Les Aspin ordered a bottom-to-top evaluation.⁵ The resulting *Report on the Bottom-Up Review: New Forces for a New Era* described the forces required by the services until the end of the century.⁶ If there is a unifying thread running through these visionary documents, it is the incredible notion that even in an era of exponential change the future will closely resemble the present or recent past. In other words, it appears that the dinosaur that we know as the Armed Forces hopes to escape extinction or radical alteration by becoming a minidinosaur.⁷ It is unlikely that this approach will succeed.

Things *will* change. The Armed Forces are likely to destroy, sell, retire, or slowly give the Reserve components much of their Desert Storm-vintage weapons and equipment. The Reserve and National Guard will preserve and train with them in peacetime employing antiquated tactics to the extent

that obsolete materiel, reduced funding, and piecemeal formations permit. Adversaries, sometimes-friends, and sometimes-allies will take stock of this

situation and factor it into scenarios and defense budgets. The *threat* is gone. We now face only *dangers*.⁸

Will the United States maintain large forces if there is no urgent threat to national survival? It is likely that the American people will eventually think otherwise. Congress may even pass laws limiting the President's authority as Commander in Chief.⁹ The Nation may complement armed members of the military with unarmed ones such as teachers, trainers, technicians, and technocrats plus young people either repaying college loans by national service or striving to be all they can

be. Some unarmed personnel may be trained in martial arts. They would exercise choice, an essential part of recruiting in a segmented society. All forces deployed outside the United States would be guests and their hosts would fully grasp the consequences of acting inhospitably. For the Nation, *access* will be global and electronic while *presence* will be virtual in every major market or forum and real when America so chooses.

Forces of the Future


Naval forces may well become the centerpiece of the military. Extraterritorial and mobile, they will remain relatively large as a hedge against congressional limits on executive power. This body, the Nation's foundation force, will necessarily rely more on air-power and spacepower than it does today. The introduction of stealthy aircraft as well as long-range remotely-piloted and self-defensive atmospheric and stratospheric assets for reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and ground attack join new long-range, precision-guided, beyond-visual-range, ship-to-air and ship-to-ground hypersonic missiles that could capitalize on tactical satellites and tracking and targeting capabilities available to carrier battle groups and flotillas of the future. Embarked Fleet Marine Forces likely will be the instrument of choice for threatening to open and close many, but not all, of the very few public fights. The threat that, when pressed, the United States will "send in the Marines" will still be as compelling in 2020 as it was in 1820 and 1920. The *Semper Fi* force will always be faithful, always hanging on the wall, always ready to face "the barbarians at the gate."

Other ground forces, a small standing army,¹⁰ will be built around the mobility and relative ease of movement of light infantry to facilitate foreign and domestic missions. Even tomorrow's organic artillery and tanks will be light enough to be air-deliverable. Artillery will be largely smart rockets or smarter missiles. Tanks will be small, low, compact, autonomated,¹¹ unmanned mobile gun platforms. Air defense weapons organic at the division level will include antitactical ballistic missile defensive systems and counter-battery engagement systems. Ground defenses will offer defensive counter-air, and air superiority will be organic to ground forces. Smart weapons, launched from the ground or

the Nation may complement armed members of the military with unarmed trainers and technocrats

Colonel Richard Szafranski, USAF, is professor of national security studies at the Air War College and research director for Spacecast 2020, an Air University study on future military space requirements. His former assignments include command of a bomb wing.

Stealth fighter.



U.S. Air Force



The Secretary being briefed at SIMNET Warfighting Complex.

DOD (R.D. Ward)

standoff Army aircraft, will provide what today is understood as close air support, with anti-aircraft defenses rendering the air nearly

too lethal or confusing for pilots. The Army will draw on generations of mind-nimble (not necessarily literate), fingertip-quick youth and their years of experience as heroes and killers in violent, virtually real interactive videos. The multifunctional squad will be a production unit of lethality on the ground. All-weather day and night multi-spectral sensors and precision-guided rounds will replace the iron gunsight and mass-produced rifle of the old paradigm. Nothing will replace the knife, wielded by a cohort of young, hot-blooded killers.

As forces shrink so will the number of bases. Loss of housing, commissaries, exchanges, hospitals, etc., is likely. The bases that survive closure and realignment will evolve. Conversion and consolidation will cause functions like administration, finance, law, education, maintenance, transport, etc., to be automated, privatized, or done by prison labor. Out-sourcing and downsizing will be the buzzwords of the day. The force

that survives will meet itself going and coming from deployments that keep the United States engaged in the world.

Some of our best forces—though not the very best—may serve with the United Nations as there will be no alternative to making the current ineffective unifying architecture effective. If there is large-scale conflict, it will almost certainly involve coalition warfare. Day-to-day experience in smaller, less violent coalition operations will help insure the success of larger, more violent ones. Member nations will charge multinational, multifunctional U.N. forces with counterproliferation, transportation, on-site inspection, and environmental cleanup—including radiological, chemical, and biological—as well as enforcement of the peacekeeping dictates of the family of nations. Their existence will evolve as America comes to understand and accept the big needs for the management of collective security on a small planet.

What of the Air Force? Airpower and spacepower are at the heart of the roles, missions, and functions debate.¹² Some observers warn that the Air Force as the only service without any pre-Cold War experience may not survive.¹³ It was founded to help contain Soviet expansion by threatening long-range nuclear bombardment.¹⁴ The Soviet Union is gone. Containment by threat of nuclear weapons is also gone. What perhaps has gone as well is the *raison d'être* for a separate air force. Small aircraft with a tactical function and bombers designed to deliver nuclear weapons may be reorganized into non-nuclear composite wings that mimic smaller air wings of carrier battle groups. But it is no longer apparent that the Air Force—with its unshakable dependence on and preference for human fighter pilots and jet-delivered air supremacy—has irreplaceable utility. The transport and aerial refueling functions must and will survive, but it is arguable whether these alone can provide sufficient justification for preserving a separate air force. Long-range naval airpower can protect air-delivered forces in transit. Unless the Air Force becomes *the* space force, it may not survive beyond 2010. Since a better organized space force is required, the window of opportunity for the survival of the Air Force may be fleeting. Will it grasp the opportunity?

military, civil, and commercial space assets will be combined to command the electromagnetic spectrum

Performance may be a good—though not flawless—indicator of future prospects. Aircraft acquisition has a checkered record since the development of the F-16. Procurement problems with the C-17 program, the cost of the B-2, the always-under-modification B-1B, depots that compete with a private aerospace industry at a time of defense conversion, and the beyond-air-supremacy

F-22 have drawn much attention. None of it seems favorable. The Army wants more predictable, better coordinated close air support.

Some Navy and Marine aviators have their own views on the Joint Force Air Component Commander. The success of the Desert Storm air campaign threatens to become a liability to the Air Force as brilliant but seemingly thoughtless “air alone” airpower advocates take up their pens or speak out. Their arguments sound increasingly desperate. To the other services, perhaps only the Air Force Air Mobility Command has lasting value.

Critics also portray military spacecraft acquisition and launch functions as disappointing. Parochial blue ribbon panels and special studies have done little beyond adding more arrows to the quivers of skeptics. Wonderful satellites have not been complemented by equally wonderful data distribution systems. Military space customers in an era of quality cannot all be called satisfied. Moreover, they do not even know to which command to register complaints. Do they take them, they wonder, to the Air Force space command in Los Angeles that does acquisition, the one in Dayton that does procurement, or perhaps the one in Colorado Springs that does planning and some (by no means all) operations? It depends, they learn, on the specific spacecraft or problem. This is not just an Air Force issue. It appears there are as many space forces as there are air arms. Yet the time to abandon much of the air and contentious “aerospace” for space may be now for the Air Force.

The Air Force may, for whatever reason, let this opportunity get away. Then what? Since the Army has the longest association with rockets and missiles, it can together with NASA and the private sector place large satellites in orbit on schedule. This would

not appear to be disagreeable to the Navy, as *Sonata*—the service’s space and electronic warfare vision for the future—seems to indicate.¹⁵ Both the Army and Navy could launch smaller “tactical” satellites on demand. It is unlikely that Congress or the international community will assent to building, let alone deploying, space-to-earth strike weapons. Armaments may leave the earth and *transit* space, but the United States will probably never find the resolve to station arms *in* space. Navigation, communications, and surveillance activities will likely remain the limits of space-based capabilities. Even though we are nowhere near the limits of those capabilities, the boundaries are not being pushed by the Air Force or any of the military space commands, but instead by industry. There is money to be made by providing communications, navigational information, and products of space-based surveillance. The private sector, with its ability to satisfy customer demands and turn a profit, may ultimately provide most of the “space command” the United States needs.

The most likely course is that military, civil, and commercial space assets will be combined to command the electromagnetic spectrum. Such a partnership would create a



virtual, interactive space-to-earth and earth-to-space data- or infosphere.¹⁶ Micro-miniaturization, nano-technology, advances in super-computing, artificial intelligence, future lasers and fiber optics, and computer-graphic integration would make cyberwar and information war the distinguishing features of future conflict.¹⁷ It would be possible to construct an alternative truth from the infinite combinations that zeroes, ones, and pixels allow. Knowing the real truth would require access to, and verification by, multiple phenomena. Targeteers and combatants would both need topsight to confirm that a tank or building is neither a hologram nor visual consequence of an adversary's insertion into our data stream. That technologies and discoveries fail to come together before the realization that our guess about major regional contingencies was wrong (albeit politically necessary) does not mean that they will not follow apace. We may have to fight before they come together.

The jewel in the military's crown will be U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). It will perform international housekeeping and wet-work. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are the first truly joint and combined forces and the most elite in the Nation, perhaps the world. Capable of precisely applying technologically superior weapons and novel

tactics, SOF still will be able to effectively conduct the age-old tradition of hand-to-hand combat. Suitable for nonlethal use against a high-tech foe, SOF will also employ tremendous violence to deal with terrorists, brigands, drug-traffickers, and pirates. They will be compensated generously for the ability to kill reliably and the repeated willingness to take calculated risks. They will form an indistinct image of terror looming just below the level of consciousness of a political adversary. The United States will use them to solve small problems rapidly and bring bigger ones to closure suddenly. SOCOM will continue to have its small, highly specialized, and forever-out-of-the-mainstream air force. What SOF do and how they do it will remain a mystery to many Americans including members of the Armed Forces.

Beyond the Horizon or Over the Edge?

If you are a military realist it should not seem odd to define forces and discuss them *before* determining the conflicts which they will face. If you are not a realist, however, consider the facts. America usually defines the functions of forces *after* fixing their size and form. Strategy—or what passes for it—also follows the budget determinations on the size of forces which the services then try to shape separately. It is illusory to expect anything else. But in the future the United States must better rationalize its forces because of the different kinds of conflict that will arise.

What forces will affect nations? There will be a wider gap between rich and comfortable, on the one hand, and poor and miserable, on the other. Acquisitiveness will drive the world, the rich seeking a constantly improving quality of life and the less-rich seeking the means for greater wealth. Theft will be a problem. The biomass will move toward depletion as more and more people crowd the planet. We will not leave earth for life elsewhere. We dwell on a rather comfortable and certainly habitable rock spinning in deep space. Unless there is the promise of acquiring greater wealth on another rock, we will stay on this one.¹⁸ As we become more crowded and compete for resources and the means of production, we

Air Force SWAT Team.



U.S. Air Force (Robert Wickley)

will continue to affect the weather and pollute the air and water. Failed nuclear reactors, episodes of serious cross-border environmental pollution, and squabbles over water rights in the Indus Valley and along the Tigris and Euphrates will fuel some fights. Extremist factions will have many opportunities to do battle. If cold fusion replaces fossil and nuclear fuels, many will covet the discovery, and the definition of "have not" could change overnight. What will the Gulf Cooperation Council find to cooperate about if oil is less valuable or nearly worthless? When that possibility dawns on them, will they more actively pursue the celebrity status that acquisition of nuclear weapons allows? Will they seek big—maybe even too big to tolerate—oil profits in the near term, expecting devastating losses later? Are there not already some sources of conflict in that region?

If one believes, as Martin van Creveld does, that the era of trinitarian warfare has ended, or that hyperwar, parallel war, or the revolution in military affairs will deter large-scale warfare, it is wise to anticipate different kinds of conflict.¹⁹ In addition to war on the mind, future conflict is likely to be more homeopathic or antidotal. This means that a small, standing, hyperprofessional force will in actuality be the Nation's *first* and *last* line of defense. A militia is a fine tradition, but the cost of training and technology along with difficulties in mobilizing and mainstreaming such a politically-potent force will insure their obsolescence for extraterritorial combat.²⁰ Consequently, U.S. forces must fight earlier, more covertly, and more often than in the past. Moreover, combat may be, as van Creveld implies, more against non-state groups than with states. As the world gets smaller and more crowded, armed elements of both the United Nations and SOCOM may intervene more quickly to prevent catalytic conflict. (Hence, the terms homeopathic and antidotal.) Many, perhaps most, engagements will be small and aimed at group leaders and elite guards surrounding them. These engagements will be risky and ferocious. They will be won or lost in darkness or bad weather. If the United States, alone or with partners, is unable to use less violent political and economic instruments to compel good behavior, the next action will come from the sea, even if air and space

are the enabling media. SOF are expert at "getting in, getting done." If, however, they are frustrated and we are unwilling to let them die in place or be tried in foreign lands as criminals (before the eyes of CNN), it will take heavier regular forces to bail them out. SOF very likely will have to learn to bail themselves out.

There are three paramount questions about future conflict: What is the *specific* behavior we want to compel or prevent? What are the *specific* criteria for conflict termination? What *specific* characteristics do we desire a post-conflict environment to have? While the answers determine the targets, reversibility of means employed, and limits of force needed, they are not posed in national military strategy. Unless these political questions are answered for the military leadership, killing and destruction are likely to do more harm than good. That it would be foolhardy to undertake any combat without clear objectives and an unclouded vision of the post-conflict environment does not suggest that the United States will suddenly become immune to episodes of stupidity. It suggests, however, that indiscreet behavior could be catastrophic. Whatever we give up or fail to acquire, our forces must maintain and enhance the capability for coordinated action inside an adversary's "decision loop."²¹ Some military actions in the future may be as difficult as they are chilling.

It is especially difficult to ponder actions that are anti-traditional. Might not Americans harden their hearts further if they are convinced that *their* wealth or *their* quality of life are at risk?²² Will they be hardened to the point of sealing borders to keep out the starving, confine cannibalism or internecine warfare to hungry or warring states, or violate another nation's sovereignty, maybe even seizing nuclear weapons or the means of producing weapons of mass destruction as part of a counterproliferation strategy? Many would probably decline to participate in such actions while some would take part. Given *lawful* orders, members of the Armed Forces must do as ordered. Even so, this might not be work for amateurs or citizen-soldiers who are much more citizen than soldier. It might be more suited to mercenaries

or hyper-professionals. Given a choice between those two terms, citizens probably will call such forces hyper-professionals. Comforting as the term sounds, it may epitomize a distinction without much difference. But since the Nation could command the future's datasphere, it could also portray unsavory realities any way it likes.

Arthur Clarke takes a rather more optimistic view. Proliferation of global information and communications, the sub-meter resolution in Peacesat pictures of the earth, and awareness that conflict is self-destructive could enlighten the minds

America will not need vast forces to protect the Nation or police planet Earth

of the world.²³ If so, America will not need vast forces to protect the Nation or police planet Earth. But even though the future may transform war, it will not likely eliminate it.²⁴ People are not moving toward enlightenment in lockstep. While the United States may be alert to the danger of environmental pollution, for example, slash-and-burn developing nations appear to have few such concerns. Thus this country will face others who are, or who are trying to be, the mirror-image of the Nation ten, twenty, thirty, or more years ago. America developed nuclear weapons and then used them in combat. It became a great power. Even though the linkage is coincidental and not causal, might not others see arms as paving the way to greatness, or at least to greater self-determination? When these waves collide, what will be the consequences?²⁵

Wild cards fill the deck. America appears to lack the political will to name the trump suit. Indeed, it is doubtful that it could any longer even if it did have the will. Demographic shifts and changes in the United States will make the House of Representatives in the year 2020 far different from the group of middle-aged Caucasian males that formerly governed or sought to govern. How these yet-to-be-elected members will vote on North-South or East-West issues makes the course of policymaking and lawmaking difficult to predict from the vantage point of 1995. How these future representatives of the people will constitute or employ the Armed Forces may differ in ways no one can anticipate. This is not to lament change, merely to note that it is likely to affect the military.

What are the limits of optimism? It is restricted by awareness that though humans may be, in Shakespeare's words, the paragon of animals, they do have an animal side nonetheless. What are the limits of cynicism? At the extreme are three thoughts. First, the Nation will not intentionally render itself militarily impotent. Plato's observation that only the dead have seen the end of war is no doubt true. Second is the awareness that the United States is more often smart than stupid. Lastly, we can possess the certain knowledge that nothing is ever as good as it seems or as bad as it might be. Things could turn out fine. No one knows. But waves *will* collide and we will be transformed in the process. Thinking about how to cope now is preferable to being surprised later. In the end, the biggest conflict in the next century is likely to be the one within ourselves. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Random House, 1993), pp. 129–30.

² Charles W. Taylor, *A World 2010: A New Order of Nations* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992). The documentation on pages 79–90 suggests that such unanalytical forecasting is guesswork.

³ Alvin Toffler, *The Third Wave* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1980). The idea of waves or ripples emanating from different societies is quite descriptive and has great diagnostic value. See also Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993).

⁴ These were *Land Warfare in the 21st Century* for the Army, . . . *From the Sea* for the Navy, and *Global Reach-Global Power* for the Air Force. See also Tom Donnelly, "Services Outline Their Futures in High-Stakes Era," *Army Times*, April 26, 1993, p. 25.

⁵ Sam Nunn, "The Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul the Services' Roles and Missions," *Vital Speeches*, vol. 20 (August 1, 1992), pp. 717–24. See also Barton Gellman, "Senator Nunn Questions Military Duplication," *The Washington Post*, July 3, 1993; "Aspin Gently Criticizes Powell Report," *The Washington Post*, March 30, 1993, p. 6; and Les Aspin, "Chairman's Report: A First Step," *Defense* 93, issue no. 2 (July 1993), pp. 24–25.

⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era* (Washington: Department of Defense, September 1, 1993).

Internet users who want to share their thoughts on "When Waves Collide" with the author can forward them to: rsz@au.af.mil

⁷ This description of inappropriate responses to change demanded at "the bifurcation point" is used by Alvin and Heidi Toffler. See also Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, *Order Out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature* (Boulder, Colo.: New Science Library, 1984), pp. 171–76, 297–313.

⁸ *Bottom-Up Review*. See also Les Aspin, "Four Challenges to the New World Order," *Defense Issues*, vol. 8 (February 1, 1993), p. 2. *Dangers* have now replaced *threats*; and *peace operations*, *engagement*, and *enlargement* must be added to the strategic lexicon.

⁹ Carroll J. Doherty, "Clinton Calms Rebellion on Hill by Retooling Somalia Mission," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, vol. 40 (October 9, 1993), pp. 2750–51; Pat Towell, "Behind Solid Vote on Somalia: A Hollow Victory for Clinton," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, vol. 41 (October 16, 1993), pp. 2823–27; and "Clinton's Policy Is Battered, But His Powers Are Intact," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, vol. 42 (October 23, 1993), pp. 2896, 98. For a discussion of the War Powers Act, see Gary M. Stern and Morton H. Halperin, editors, *The U.S. Constitution and the Power To Go to War: Historical and Current Perspectives* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994).

¹⁰ In a dinner speech at the Air War College Class of 1994 Dining Out on October 22, 1993, General Ronald A. Fogleman, then Commander in Chief of U.S. Transportation Command, pointed out that large standing forces are an anomaly in America.

¹¹ Taiichi Ohno, *Toyota Production System: Beyond Large-Scale Production* (Cambridge, Mass.: Productivity Press, 1988). Automated machines are both automated and semi-autonomous, with some level of artificial intelligence built in.

¹² Richard Szafranski, "Annulling Marriages: Reframing the Roles, Missions, and Functions Debate," *Airpower Journal*, vol. 7, no. 4 (Winter 1993), pp. 55–67.

¹³ Lowell Wood, "The U.S. Air Force in 2020," written address, October 27, 1993, pp. 16–25.

¹⁴ Mark Clodfelter, *The Limits of Air Power* (New York: The Free Press, 1989), pp. 7, 11–25, 35–37.

¹⁵ Jerry O. Tuttle, *Sonata* (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1993), p. 1. The author proclaims the arrival of a new kind of warfare called space and electronic warfare (SEW). *Sonata* assumes the availability of space lift to enable its vision of SEW.

¹⁶ Martin C. Libicki and James A. Hazlett, "Do We Need an Information Corps?" *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 2 (Autumn 1993), pp. 88–97. This corps may be an attempt to inflict a new idea on force-structuring. Information war may ultimately prove to have more dire consequences than nuclear weapons.

¹⁷ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "Cyberwar Is Coming!" *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 12, no. 2 (April–June 1993), pp. 141–65. The great threat of strategic cyberwar is its dependence on successfully creating and sustaining lies. If a democracy uses cyber-weapons and information warriors, its citizens may never again be confident in their relationship with the government. See Gregory Bateson, "The Cybernetics of 'Self': A Theory of Alcoholism," *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* (New York: Random House, Ballantine Books, 1972), pp. 314–20. See also Eric Voegelin, "Necessary Moral Bases for Communication in a Democracy," *Problems of Communication in a Pluralistic Society* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1956), pp. 53–68.

¹⁸ Bill Wisher, the screenwriter for *Terminator 2*, shared this insight: unless this planet becomes uninhabitable or space offers sources of wealth unavailable on earth, there is no reason to abandon our home.

¹⁹ Both Martin van Creveld, *Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), and the Tofflers, *War and Anti-War*, see conflict with non-state groups as an emerging threat or danger. Trinitarian warfare is based on Clausewitz's notion of the "remarkable trinity" of government, military, and people.

²⁰ To be effective the Reserve components must be organized, trained, and equipped with the same rigor as the active components.

²¹ John R. Boyd, "A Discourse on Winning and Losing," August 1987. This analysis of strategy, tactics, and the operational art led to the so-called OODA loop—a cycle of observation, orientation, decision, and action.

²² Linda Kleindienst and Bill Gibson, "Chiles Plans to Sue U.S. Over Immigrants' Impact," *The Orlando Sentinel*, December 29, 1993, pp. A–1, 4.

²³ Arthur C. Clarke, *How the World Was One: Beyond the Global Village* (New York: Bantam Books, 1992).

²⁴ Desmond Morris, *The Naked Ape: A Zoologist's Study of the Human Animal* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967). See also Will and Ariel Durant, *The Lessons of History* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), and Robert L. O'Connell, *Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons, and Aggression* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

²⁵ Richard Eckersley, "The West's Deepening Cultural Crisis," *The Futurist*, vol. 6 (November–December 1993), pp. 8–12. See also Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War*, pp. 248–52.

Joint Force Quarterly

ESSAY CONTEST ON THE Revolution in Military Affairs

To encourage innovative thinking on how the Armed Forces can remain at the forefront in the conduct of war, *JFQ* is pleased to announce the first annual "Essay Contest on the Revolution in Military Affairs" sponsored by the National Defense University Foundation, Inc.

The contest solicits innovative concepts for operational doctrine and organizations by which the Armed Forces can exploit existing and emerging technologies. Entries that most rigorously address one or more of the following questions will be considered for a cash award:

▼ The essence of an RMA is found in the magnitude of change compared with preexisting warfighting capabilities. How might emerging technologies—and the integration of such technologies—result in a *revolution* in conducting warfare in the coming decades? What will be the key measures of that change?

▼ Exploiting new and emerging technologies is dependent on the development of innovative operational concepts and organizational structures. What specific doctrinal concepts and organizations will be required to fully realize the revolutionary potential of critical military technologies?

▼ How might an adversary use emerging technologies in innovative ways to gain significant military leverage against U.S. systems and doctrine?

Contest Prizes

Winners will be awarded prizes of \$2,000, \$1,000, and \$500 for the three best essays. In addition, a special prize of \$500 will be awarded for the best essay submitted by either an officer candidate or a commissioned officer in the rank of major/lieutenant commander or below (or equivalent grades). A selection of academic and scholarly books dealing with various aspects of military affairs and innovation will also be presented to each winner.

JFQ

Contest Rules

1. Entrants may be military personnel or civilians (from the public or the private sector) and of any nationality. Essays written by individual authors or groups of authors are eligible.
2. Entries must be original and not previously published (nor under consideration for publication elsewhere). Essays that originate from work carried out at intermediate and senior colleges (staff and war colleges), service schools, civilian universities, and other educational institutions are eligible.
3. Entries must not exceed 5,000 words in length and must be submitted typewritten, double-spaced, and in triplicate. They should include a wordcount at the end. Documentation may follow any standard academic form of citation, but endnotes rather than footnotes are preferred.
4. Entries must be submitted with (1) a letter clearly indicating that the essay is a contest entry together with the author's name, social security account number (or passport number in the case of non-U.S. entrants), mailing address, telephone number, and FAX number (if available); (2) a cover sheet containing the contestant's full name and essay title; (3) a summary of the essay which is no more than 200 words; and (4) a brief biographical sketch of the author.
5. Entries must be mailed to the following address (facsimile copies will not be accepted): RMA Essay Contest, *Joint Force Quarterly*, ATTN: NDU-NSS-JFQ, Washington, D.C. 20319-6000
6. Entries must be postmarked no later than August 31, 1995 to be considered in the 1994-95 contest.
7. *JFQ* will hold first rights to the publication of all entries. The prize-winning as well as other essays entered in the contest may be published in *JFQ*.
8. Winners' names will appear in *JFQ* and the prizes will be presented by the President of the National Defense University at an appropriate ceremony in Washington, D.C.

Struggle for the Marianas

By BERNARD D. COLE

Summary

In June 1944 the Armed Forces executed Operation Forager—the capture of the Marianas (namely, the islands of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam)—and destroyed Japanese airpower in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. The Marianas were secured by both marines and soldiers backed by naval gunfire and close air support from all services. American success in the battle on and around these islands doomed the fortunes of the Japanese empire by severing its sea lines of communication over which the resources of Southeast Asia transitted and by establishing B-29 bases within striking distance of Japan's home islands. This victory was executed by Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army Air Force units who set the pattern for the further development of joint operations.

USS Lexington launching F-6F Hellcat with USS North Carolina, USS Enterprise, and other ships in the distance.

U.S. Navy



Last year witnessed a wide range of ceremonies to commemorate the 50th anniversary of Allied landings at Normandy, and rightly so: June 6th has great significance in the history of this century and defined America's post-war role. But little attention was paid on this anniversary to the fact that fifty years earlier on the same date and half a world away, U.S. task groups had made their way toward an objective in the western Pacific almost as important to the Nation as Normandy.

Operation Forager, the assault on the Marianas, was very similar in two ways to Operation Neptune, the assault landings on the Normandy coast. Both had been two years in the making and were starting points for even greater efforts. Just as Neptune opened the campaign in northwest Europe, so the campaign to secure Saipan, Tinian, and Guam set the stage for a strategic bombing campaign against Japan's home islands and further amphibious operations in the western Pacific. Both operations also had been plagued by issues of operational concept, available resources, and



the war in the Pacific represented a failure to adopt joint warfare at the strategic and theater level

organization; but Forager, in contrast to Neptune, raises a relevant issue given the current stress on joint warfighting. The war in the Pacific represented a failure to adopt joint warfare at the strategic and theater level. At the operational and tactical levels, however, the cooperative efforts of the Army, Navy-Marine team, and Army Air Force yielded results which epitomize the benefit of joint warfare.

The concept of jointness suggests an equality of service effort and a common plan, but our endeavor in the Pacific was marked by the lack of these joint attributes. Interservice strife assured that the principle of unity of command was set aside, and for the Army and Navy in their separate areas of responsibility offensive operations guaranteed the primacy of separate efforts, either by evading joint warfare or ensuring that it was conducted on their own terms. Moreover, even at the time of Forager the high command was deeply divided over an essential aspect of the war, namely, whether Japan would be blockaded and bombarded or invaded, and correlatively, which senior officer—and hence which service—would command as the war was carried to Japan's shores. Along the way the claims of the Central and Southwest Pacific offensives were never defined.

The resources available in the Pacific during 1944 and 1945 allowed the United States to prosecute both offensives simultaneously. This aspect of the conduct of operations is significant: American success in Forager and fleet action provoked by landings on Saipan were results of overwhelming force. As in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, supremacy in numbers, quality, and technique over the enemy provided victory at relatively low cost.

American Blitzkrieg

Forager was a brainchild of Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations. King was the principal architect of the strategic plan that emerged after the Quadrant conference

held at Quebec in August 1943: the Pacific Fleet under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz would strike Japan's empire through the Central Pacific, while the Southwest Pacific Command under General Douglas A. MacArthur continued its Army-orientated campaign along the northern coast of New Guinea. This basic plan, which involved building airfields in the Marianas for the strategic bombing of Japan, was reaffirmed at the Sextant conference at Cairo in November–December 1943. But in the wake of the Gilberts campaign, and as a result of the shock received at Tarawa, Nimitz in January 1944 backed MacArthur's claim for primacy for a campaign across the Pacific to the Philippines.

This unusual accord between the two Pacific commands was promptly rejected by an angry King. He understood that the Carolines and the Marianas had to be taken to eliminate the Japanese threat to the flank of an offensive from the Southwest Pacific and that there could be no advance to the Philippines while Japanese power in the Central Pacific archipelagos remained unreduced. Moreover, King realized that possession of the southern Marianas would place a thumb on Japan's windpipe and give the Navy's Central Pacific drive priority over MacArthur's campaign in the Southwest Pacific. For sound strategic and institutional reasons, King was not prepared to agree to a Southwest Pacific priority that effectively subordinated the Navy to MacArthur's command, especially just when the Navy had come into possession of the means to dominate in the Pacific: American shipyards had by January 1944 produced a carrier force of unprecedented strength and capability. For the first 21 months of the Pacific war American carrier operations had been both small in number and short in duration, but by January 1944 the Pacific Fleet possessed the means of overwhelming not just a single enemy base or number of bases within a single island group, but a number of groups of bases simultaneously. The depth of American power allowed a campaign across a broad strategic front—to launch masses of naval forces against the enemy, a series of attacks that may be thought of as *blitzkrieg* against the Japanese *Maginot Line* of fortified islands.

At Guadalcanal in 1942, the Navy had been barely able to land and support marines and Army troops on the beach. By

Captain Bernard D. Cole, USN, is professor of strategy at the National War College. A surface warfare officer, he has commanded a frigate and a destroyer squadron.

**losses inflicted by
submarines and bombers
illustrated the effectiveness
of interservice cooperation**

June 1944—less than two years after Guadalcanal—the fleet had achieved overwhelming strength in numbers and power. In 1943 alone, the United States commissioned enough warship tonnage to almost equal the Japanese navy at its strongest. Massive carrier and amphibious forces were supported by large numbers of battleships and cruisers; destroyers provided efficient anti-submarine defense; our submarines were isolating Japan and sinking many crucial fleet units, especially oilers and destroyers (by mid-1944 the enemy was unable to defend their surface forces against our submarines).

Our Navy in 1944 was a modern war-time force, while Japanese naval forces were products of the 1930s. American carriers were bigger, more durable, and able to operate for longer periods of time than those of the enemy. American naval aviation produced more and better trained pilots. The Japanese were unable to modernize and increase their navy to maintain even their 1941 status in relative terms; nor were they able to train the pilots needed to replace veteran flyers of the 1930s. The fleet would go to the Marianas, as the suitably chastened Nimitz, who could no more than any other naval officer of his day stand up to King, quickly agreed.

The war in the Central Pacific was marked by successes in the Gilberts (Operation Galvanic, November 1943) and the Marshalls (Operations Flintlock and Catchpole, January–February 1944), both won by the Fifth Fleet under Vice Admiral Raymond Spruance. The campaign was complex, however, with anti-shiping operations by submarines and vast Army Air Force bombing strikes.

By late spring 1944, submarines had gone a fair way toward sweeping Japanese shipping from the high seas. They later wreaked similar havoc on coastal trade, even penetrating Japanese harbors. The effectiveness of the submarine effort is supported by the fact that whereas between March and October 1943 the Japanese lost 354 ships (over one million tons) to all causes and in all theaters, between November 1943 and May 1944 they lost 642 ships (over two million tons).

Moreover, the attacks of American medium and heavy bombers flying from islands taken by marines and Army troops—


regular, Reserve, and National Guard—were potent. The Battle of the Bismarck Sea in March 1943 was the first occasion when shore-based Army bombers made a strategically significant contribution to the war in the Pacific, but thereafter it was a major factor. Losses inflicted by submarines and bombers illustrated the effectiveness of interservice cooperation and jeopardized the enemy's plan to fight on the Saipan-Palaus-western New Guinea defense line.

Theory into Application

The Central Pacific campaign was made possible by tactics and equipment conceived during the 1920s and 1930s, when the Marine Corps developed amphibious warfare doctrine and the Army Air Corps refined the principles of bombing and air interdiction. The Marines were searching for a role after World War I; seizing advanced bases would support War Plan Orange, the central Navy war plan of the day. Commandant John A. Lejeune and other Marine leaders correctly saw this mission, which would guarantee a major role in the war against Japan as the way to ensure the Corps' existence. Hence, in the 1920s the Marines defined amphibious assault in the context of ongoing defense planning and began seeking ways to carry it out. By the late 1930s they had made extensive progress in doctrine and equipment, testing them in exercises in the Atlantic and Caribbean. Most significantly, attention had been directed to the islands of the Central Pacific as the most likely area for amphibious warfare.

The Air Force worked hard at this time to refine the theories of visionaries like Douhet and Mitchell. Many Army Air Force leaders of the war, including Kenney, Hansell, Whitehead, and LeMay, had cut their teeth in those years in both the classroom and the air, developing tactics and systems to translate theory into application. The doctrine and performance of marines and airmen matured in Pacific campaigns as the hesitancy and missteps of Guadalcanal, New Guinea, and Tarawa were heeded. Coordinated amphibious assault and air warfare became irrepressible.

Nimitz ordered the Fifth Fleet to carry out the amphibious assault on the Marianas in June 1944. Spruance, now a four-star, still



The Marianas

(Distances from Saipan shown in nautical miles)

Guadalcanal	1,720
Guam	101
Kwajalein	1,355
Manila	1,500
Midway	2,210
Palau	840
Rabaul	1,230
Tarawa	1,810
Tinian	3
Yokohama	1,285

Source: Carl W. Hoffman, *Saipan: The Beginning of the End* (Washington: Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1950).

commanded. The fleet's aircraft carriers, Task Force 58, were led by Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher and its amphibious forces by Vice Admiral R.K. Turner. If challenged by the Japanese, Spruance would engage in what the Americans hoped would be the decisive Central Pacific fleet battle so often wargamed at the Naval War College in the 1920s and 1930s. The plan was ambitious: the late Japanese fleet commander, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, had tried to follow the same scheme at Midway in 1942 by having amphibious forces capture the island while he destroyed the U.S. fleet when it deployed in defense of the island. Yamamoto had failed (much as Halsey would fail in this difficult dual mission in October 1944 at Leyte Gulf), his plan being too complex and his intentions being compromised by our ability to read the Japanese codes.

Hence, Spruance had a difficult task. And while he hoped that Operation Forager would result in a double stroke against the enemy—capture of the islands and destruction of the Japanese fleet—his priorities were firmly established on the former. Loss of the Marianas would completely expose enemy

lines of supply to Southeast Asia. These islands—Saipan, Tinian, and Guam—lay 1,200 miles southeast of Japan and stretched along a northeast-southwest axis for 425 miles. They had a significant Japanese civilian population and were heavily garrisoned. Saipan was seventy square miles in area, with geography more like that of New Guinea than the small coral and sand atolls of the Gilberts and Marshalls. While Tinian offered the best terrain for the large bomber airfields that were the chief reason for the islands' capture, Saipan had to be secured first since it allowed Japanese artillery to cover Tinian; hence, its capture would allow American artillery to support the assault on that island. Guam was less valuable in military terms than either Saipan or Tinian, but as capital of the Marianas and an American territory before the war, it was politically important and would be the object of a separate amphibious task force.

Opposing Spruance was a still formidable enemy but one whose strategic position and purpose was marked by weakness and over-commitment. As the Japanese situation

worsened in 1943, plans were recast and ambitions checked by the inauguration of the New Operational Policy on September 1943. By writing off eastern New Guinea and the Solomons the Japanese sought to concentrate future attention on the defense of the Kuriles, Bonins, Marianas, Carolines, and East Indies, a line extending through Saipan, Truk, and central New Guinea that enclosed the positions on which the Japanese intended to meet further offensives. The de-

feats of early 1944, however, forced the Japanese high command to further limit its defensive liabilities to western New Guinea. This yielded Plan Z, an operation plan with which Admiral Koga Mineichi, Commander

in Chief Combined Fleet, proposed to give battle. An American move against western New Guinea would be countered by Japanese carrier forces supported by land-based aircraft, but a move against the Marianas would be opposed by shore-based aircraft supported by the carriers. With this attempt at joint warfare, Koga hoped to minimize the weaknesses of both his land-based and carrier air forces and to offer battle on equal terms to a superior enemy carrier force.

Plan Z was probably the best plan available to the Japanese in early 1944 but was flawed on three counts. First, it called for a coordinated joint employment of land-based and carrier air power that had proven far beyond Japanese capability to date. Second, success would depend on timing and concentration, specifically in terms of feeding land-based airpower into the battle; but by definition a defensive battle could not be fought with the assurance of either or both. Third, by June 1944 the basic Japanese strategic intention depended on a carrier force no longer capable of registering even the partial successes that had come its way in the second half of 1942. Its pilots were inexperienced and inadequately trained, its aircraft were no longer a match for American planes, and its carrier air groups were smaller and weaker than their enemy counterparts.

Koga died in a plane crash on March 31, 1944. His successor, Toyoda Soemu, revised Plan Z, issuing it as A-Go Plan on May 3. Toyoda intended to concentrate all his strength against the U.S. fleet. He transferred

control of the battleships to his carrier commander, Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo, and appointed him Mobile Fleet Commander, urged surprise attack, and wanted to lure the American fleet into a position where it could be attacked both by carrier- and land-based aircraft—preferably in the American Southwest Pacific theater, near the Japanese sources of fuel in the East Indies. This plan was further flawed by depending on the enemy's cooperation.

Japan's Fatal Predicament

In June 1944 the United States deployed a massive joint force with both a coherent plan and an integrated strategy against a weakened Japanese defense operating with an inexecutable plan and confused strategy. The individual campaigns in the Southwest and Central Pacific had placed our forces in position for a major advance against the Japanese: MacArthur was pushing towards the Philippines while the Marianas were the logical next step for Nimitz.

Carrier planes first bombed the Marianas on February 23, 1944, destroying 168 Japanese aircraft at a cost of just five U.S. planes. Further carrier strikes were conducted during the month preceding the invasion to soften up the islands, while Army Air Force B-24s bombed Guam five times in late April through June. These Army and Navy air attacks were only marginally effective against Saipan's beach defenses but did neutralize Japan's land-based airpower. Although the 32,000 Japanese on Saipan were twice the American estimate, submarine and air interdiction had prevented the arrival of most of the heavy weapons and supplies planned for the island's defense.

MacArthur's victories in western New Guinea in April and May 1944 did not immediately elicit a major challenge from the Japanese navy since the enemy was waiting for the U.S. fleet to move closer to the Southwest Pacific area. And when a significant move was made toward New Guinea in early June, it was quickly diverted toward the Marianas. Once Toyoda was certain that Spruance was headed for those islands, he ordered Ozawa to attack in the Marianas area and annihilate the invasion force, to activate Operation A-Go for decisive battle.

the United States deployed a massive joint force with both a coherent plan and an integrated strategy

Toyoda's rudder swing from the American Southwest to Central Pacific theaters accentuated Japan's fatal predicament. The dual campaigns by MacArthur and Nimitz left the Imperial Fleet between a rock and a hard place: it had to resist both American thrusts at the same time and hence could successfully counter neither. Ozawa got underway from his fleet anchorage at Tawi Tawi in the southern Philippines on June 13, hoping to destroy Spruance with long range attacks by land-based airpower from airfields in the Marianas and the Bonins, supported by naval aircraft. He also expected to use the Mariana airfields as staging points: his aircraft would launch from their carriers, attack the U.S. fleet, land ashore to rearm and refuel, then attack again as American planes returned to their ships. Ozawa's force included nine carriers and six battleships. Moreover, about 540 land-based aircraft were positioned to support the fleet.

Ozawa's intentions were compromised on at least three counts. First, we could read coded Japanese messages. Second, our submarines had success finding and tracking the Japanese fleet, sinking two of Ozawa's oilers and four destroyers before he even left Tawi Tawi. Third, American airpower destroyed so many Japanese shore-based planes that by mid-June the enemy fleet was left pretty much on its own. Ozawa never understood this last factor; indeed, he was misled by deliberately false claims of successes by land-based aircraft.

American forces in Operation Forager included 128,000 troops—five Marine and Army divisions—and a fleet of no fewer than 26 aircraft carriers and 14 battleships. The Japanese were seriously outnumbered in every category of warship, and more importantly they trailed two-to-one in the number of carrier aircraft. Some 20,000 marines were ashore on Saipan by the end of D-Day, June 15. Their initial surge carried them across the landing beaches, but only half of the planned beachhead was secured. In conjunction with the tanks and artillery that had been landed, however, this was enough to ensure that the armor-led Japanese counterattack on that first night was repelled with the key support of naval gunfire from ships stationed just off shore. Supplies and more troops poured ashore during the following days. Spruance

ordered the reserve force, the Army's 27th Division, to land at once. The stiff Japanese resistance on Saipan and the approach of the enemy fleet led Spruance to postpone the assault against Guam from June 18 to 21.

At the outset, Spruance positioned the bulk of the fleet just west of the islands to maximize defense of the assault force. He intended to let his commanders fight the battle. His order to Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher, commander of carriers and battleships, and to Vice Admiral R.K. Turner, commander of the amphibious force, was simple: "Desire you proceed at your discretion selecting dispositions and movements best calculated to meet the enemy under the most advantageous conditions. I shall issue general directives when necessary and leave details to you."

In fact Spruance kept a firm hand on Mitscher's movements. He was very conservative by disposition and hesitant to let Mitscher move westward away from the amphibious area. Spruance was determined to protect the Saipan assault force and perhaps overly fearful that the enemy would make an end run around the fleet to attack amphibious and support forces off Saipan. He knew of the approach thanks to submarines which located the enemy departing Tawi Tawi anchorage in the Philippines on June 13 and made further reports on elements of Ozawa's forces on June 15–19, but on June 17–18 he rejected Mitscher's suggestion to move westward to meet the enemy. And neither Spruance nor Mitscher ordered an aggressive search policy to fix the Japanese position.

As a result, the Japanese made the first contact, spotting American carriers at about 1530 on June 18. But Ozawa did not want to attack late in the day when darkness would further challenge his inexperienced airmen. He launched an initial strike at first light on June 19, at a range of about 300 miles from the American flagship, the carrier *USS Lexington*, which was 90 miles northwest of Guam and 110 miles southwest of Saipan. Even when he was certain of the Japanese position, Mitscher was hindered in closing with the enemy because the wind was from the east, forcing his carriers to steam in that direction, away from the Japanese, to launch and recover planes. This was an interesting

change from the days of sail, when the windward position was the more desirable as it allowed a fleet to choose the moment of engaging as enemy. But with an aircraft carrier force, the windward position meant that Spruance had to yield the initiative to Ozawa. This did not mean that the Americans simply waited to be attacked: on June 17 the fleet commander coolly allowed a pre-planned air strike against Iwo Jima which claimed 63 Japanese planes. On June 19, he ordered a strike at Guam which destroyed another 35. These strikes put a fatal crimp in Ozawa's plans: lacking the support of their land-based brethren, Japanese carrier pilots were doomed to failure.

A Gamble Pays Off

The nine Japanese carriers launched four strikes at the 15 U.S. flattops which formed Task Force 58. The first was spotted when it was 160 miles away, at about 0900—when *USS Albacore* torpedoed the newest and largest enemy carrier, *Taiho*, which sank six hours later. *Shokaku*, one of the carriers that had launched the attack on Pearl Harbor, was sunk by another submarine, *USS Cavalla*. The first Japanese strike was intercepted by fighters from at least four U.S. carriers and 45 of the 69 Japanese planes were shot down. The second strike cost the enemy 98 of 130 aircraft; the third got lost and returned to their carriers without engaging American planes; and of the fourth, an 82-plane strike, only nine survived. This slaughter—Japan lost two carriers and 346 planes as compared to 30 American losses—was justifiably dubbed the “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.”

Ozawa began withdrawing to the northwest after June 19, not because he thought he had lost the fight, but to reposition and recover the carrier aircraft he assumed had landed on Guam to refuel and rearm. Mitscher's patrols did not locate the Japanese carriers until 1540 on the 20th. Despite approaching darkness, he boldly decided to launch at long range, 300 miles. This gamble paid off, as American strikes found the Japanese force, sank two oilers and a carrier, and downed 65 of Ozawa's remaining 100 planes, with a loss of 17 U.S. aircraft. Because of the

long range and nightfall, American flyers had difficulty finding their carriers. In a dramatic event of the war, Mitscher had his ships turn on their lights—despite the danger of enemy submarines—to guide the pilots home. Although 82 planes ran out of fuel and ditched, almost all air crews were rescued.

Once he realized he could not catch the retreating Japanese, Spruance called off the pursuit and returned to a defensive position near the Marianas. Although bitterly criticized by Mitscher and others then and since for not more aggressively seeking out and attacking the Japanese, Spruance had accomplished not only his main goal of safeguarding forces attacking Saipan, but by winning the Battle of the Philippine Sea on June 19–20 he had defeated the Japanese in a major fleet action. The failure to sink more Japanese ships was relatively unimportant in light of the devastating destruction of Japanese planes and the irreplaceable loss of pilots: Ozawa finished the fight with only 35 of his original 430 carrier aircraft. Severe losses were also suffered by Japanese air forces based in the Marianas and the Bonins.

The overwhelming American superiority in the Marianas contributed to victory at relatively moderate cost, when the number of casualties is compared to those suffered in the European theater (especially on the Eastern Front). The fight on Saipan was one of slow advances by marines and Army troops supported by naval gunfire, Marine and Navy aviators flying from escort carriers, and Army Air Force flyers launching from the first rudimentary fields on Saipan itself. It was an exhausting battle against well dug in enemy forces resolved not to surrender—a facet of Japanese character underlined at the end of the campaign, when thousands of Japanese civilians committed suicide by throwing themselves and their children from cliffs at the northern end of the island.

Over 15,000 marines landed on Tinian on the 24th, moved rapidly, and cleared the island by August 1. Engineers began construction of airfields capable of handling B-29s even before the island was captured. Tinian, strategically the most important of the islands because it was suitable for large airfields, was also the easiest seized: casualties included 290 Marine dead against 6,050 Japanese—one of the more skillful victories of the war. Saipan was finally secured on July 21, the same day

the fight on Saipan was one of slow advances by marines and Army troops supported by naval gunfire

Guam was assaulted. In view of the toughness of the fight for Saipan, Spruance wanted to increase the number of divisions assaulting Guam. Hence, the Army's 77th Division was lifted from Hawaii to join the attack. The delay in landing to the July 21 gave the 77th time to arrive and allowed the assault force to conduct an extended prelanding bombardment by naval gunfire and by Army, Navy, and Marine aircraft.

The landings on Guam went smoothly—the island having been prepped by gunfire and air strikes since July 8—and Marine and Army troops made steady progress against well-entrenched Japanese resistance. Casualties were only half those of Saipan—7,081 Americans (1,435 dead) against 18,500 Japanese (most of whom died). Ground operations benefitted from an extensive, centrally controlled joint air support operation, as Army Air Force, Navy, and Marine planes flew close air support for the infantry.

A total of 5,000 Americans and over 50,000 Japanese died in the Marianas in the summer of 1944. These islands provided forward fleet, submarine, and logistics bases; the 20th Air Force launched B-29 raids against Japan from airfields built on Tinian and Guam; and Nimitz moved his headquarters to the latter island in early 1945. The entire American effort against Japan thereafter moved to a higher pitch. The Central Pacific campaign, highlighted by victory in the Marianas, was the mainspring of the victory over Japan.

An important political result of the capture of the Marianas was the fall of the government then ruling Japan. Under General Hidecki Tojo, this government dominated the military that had led Japan into war, including the attack on Pearl Harbor and the accompanying assaults across the Pacific. On July 18, 1944 the Japanese supreme military headquarters took the almost unprecedented step of announcing a major defeat—the fall of Saipan—all the more unusual since the island was often described as a “home island” despite its 1,200-mile distance from Japan proper. Tojo apologized for the loss and resigned as prime minister. The defeat in and around the Marianas and Tojo's resignation brought home to many senior Japanese civilian and military leaders the hopelessness of their position. Unfortunately, they were


more than matched by other officials determined to fight on.

The victory in the Central Pacific campaign was a major strategic step: it enabled massive bomber raids, which in conjunction with the submarine campaign would isolate Japan and destroy its industry and infrastructure. Although the Pacific was the scene of much hard fighting after the Marianas were secured, Japan had lost the war by the end of July 1944.

Was victory in the Marianas and the Philippine Sea really joint? It certainly involved all the services, but it was part of the Navy-dominated Central Pacific campaign. The Battle of the Philippine Sea was strictly a Navy affair, while Saipan was marked by Army-Marine disharmony of epic proportions, with the ground commander, Lieutenant General H.M. Smith, USMC, firing the 27th Division commander, Major General Ralph Smith, USA, because the latter's troops were not moving as quickly as marines. This incident caused a debate that rages to this day. On Guam, however, the Army (77th Division) and the Marines (3rd Division and 1st Provisional Brigade) operated together remarkably well. Throughout the Marianas, Army, Navy, and Marine aircraft flew coordinated strikes in support of land forces.

The battles in the Central Pacific during June–July 1944 were not joint in terms of strategic formulation or command arrangements. The victory did demonstrate, however, the effectiveness of the services operating together and fighting tactically as a unified force. The Navy provided the strategic plan and bases from which land- and shore-based air forces secured success. The Pacific campaigns of 1944 were joint in a nascent sense—effective in warfighting and setting a pattern that has finally been realized today. Victory was the outcome of many efforts: logistic resources and acumen, inspired leadership in a joint environment, and above all the fighting ability—intelligence and bravery—of soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen who fought their way up Mount Topatchu, vanquished the enemy's fleet in the Philippine Sea, and cleared the skies overhead.

JFQ



C-130 (top) with
C-141 transport.

U.S. Air Force

Special: The Air Force White Paper

Global Presence

By SHEILA E. WIDNALL and RONALD R. FOGLEMAN

EDITOR'S NOTE: *This white paper was released by the Air Force in late February. Global Presence follows an established custom whereby the services routinely issue papers that outline a conceptual framework for rationalizing missions, developing doctrine, etc. Such strategic documents have appeared with some frequency since the end of the Cold War and in the wake of the Persian Gulf War. The Army brought out Land Warfare in the 21st Century while the strategic vision of the Navy-Marine Corps team was presented in a 1992 paper entitled . . . From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century and has recently been reformulated in Forward . . . From the Sea. Now an earlier Air Force paper, Global Reach-Global Power, is being superseded by Global Presence.*

As America approaches the next century, we face both an uncertain world and a promising future. Our challenge, as a service and as a Nation, is to sustain that promise and secure the future.

In the years to come, America's military will continue to play a pivotal role. That role will be a stabilizing one, founded on the shared principles and traditions of all the services. Increased cooperation is the cornerstone for success.

The primary responsibility of America's military is to deter potential adversaries or fight and win wars decisively. To improve the way we do business, we must reconsider this

core responsibility in terms of how America's military forces actually project power.

At the foundation of this approach is *power projection*. Power projection is a means to influence actors or affect situations or events in America's national interest. It has two components: *warfighting* and *presence*. Warfighting is the direct application of military force to compel an adversary. Presence is the posturing of military capability, including nonbelligerent applications, and/or the leveraging of information to deter or compel an actor or affect a situation. A sound national military strategy depends on coherent warfighting and presence strategies.

Changes in the international security environment, advances in technology, and reductions in America's military force structure require a fresh consideration of America's presence strategy.

This document provides a reconceptualization of presence. It expands traditional notions of presence to correspond with the emerging international security picture and to match current and future applications.

A New Approach

America's approach to evolving national security concerns has changed over the years to meet the needs of a shifting geopolitical environment.

During the Cold War, America's vital national interests seemed to be more easily defined. Our Nation faced a monolithic threat to its national security and our political and military leaders were able to contain and counter that threat with effective strategies for ensuring America's security. *Forward defense* was a key component of our containment strategy and amounted to what today is called presence.

The thrust of forward defense was to deter potential aggressors, and if that failed, to engage those aggressors' forces close to their borders, halting and repelling the aggression. As such, presence equated to and was assured by bipolar alliances, heavy overseas troop commitments, frequent political and military-to-military interaction with America's allies, and the continual courting of "on-the-fence" nations. In short, part of America's Cold War strategy was "being there." It was a strategy most Americans understood.

As the 1980s ended and the Cold War subsided, the basis for the traditional definition of presence began to dissolve. America moved from the Cold War's bipolar arrangement toward what was perceived to be a new, less threatening political environment. As forward defense lost its rationale, *forward presence* and *overseas presence* emerged. The goal of each was to assure America's allies of

our Nation's continued commitment to their security while responding to the reality of the decreasing threat to America's national existence.

Today, the global international system has become a more diverse panorama of political, military, and economic concerns confronting the United States. Consequently, it is more difficult to achieve consensus on what Americans consider "vital" national interests. Despite this, America's military forces are involved in more operations of greater duration than at any time in the past 20 years; and these operations have been conducted with 25 percent of the total force and 40 percent fewer forward deployed forces than the services possessed in 1989.

In the face of increasing demands on U.S. military forces, smaller force structures, and shrinking defense budgets, we can no longer afford to physically deploy forces in every region of concern.

Concurrent with changes in the international security environment are significant advances in technology, most notably information technologies. The ability to create, disseminate, access, and manipulate information for one's own ends and to control information available to competitors or adversaries produces a potential for decisive advantage. Much as the introduction of the airplane moved us into the three-dimensional battlefield, information technologies lead us to consider the potential of operations in a four-dimensional, virtual battlespace. This battlespace is not defined in terms of traditional, centralized, geopolitical boundaries, but in terms of a decentralized, global web of networks. As a result, we must examine new methods of characterizing the threat—including the use of technology-based analysis—and determine appropriate responses.

To use an analogy, during the Cold War, America was like a cop permanently guarding the door of every bank around the globe. Changes in the security environment coupled with technological improvements and force reductions altered America's need to continue in this role. Hence, America replaced "the cop on the beat" with "video monitoring and alarm systems" linked to joint military capabilities that can be brought to bear wherever and whenever necessary. This monitoring and alarm network consists

The Honorable Sheila E. Widnall is Secretary of the Air Force and formerly was Associate Provost at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; General Ronald R. Fogleman is Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, and previously served as Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command.

of space-based and air-breathing platform sensors and other information gathering systems. In most instances, information, combined with forces that can rapidly respond with the right mix of capabilities, can achieve U.S. goals. On occasion, information alone may be enough to attain U.S. objectives. Of course, in some regions of the world a physical presence is imperative; however, there may be circumstances when such a presence is counterproductive. In instances where a physical presence is not preferred, information capabilities provide America the option to visit the "bank" as often as it wishes to check the integrity of the system.

In an environment influenced by so many variables, how should America best pursue the continuing need for presence? One way is through *global presence*.

Global presence expands the definition of presence to include the advantages of physical and virtual means. Global presence considers the full range of potential activities from the physical interaction of military forces to the virtual interaction achieved with America's information-based capabilities.

Fundamentals

Three tenets are key to moving beyond traditional conceptions of presence:

- ▼ all military forces can exert presence
- ▼ forces have unique attributes that affect the scope and quality of the presence they exert and complement each other when appropriately applied
- ▼ technological advances are enhancing the contributions of military forces to presence missions.

All Forces Can Exert Presence

The suitability of forces to exert presence is conditional. The task is to match the right combination of capabilities to achieve the desired objective. For forces to exert presence, the actors we wish to influence must understand that we:

- ▼ have national interests involved
- ▼ have the political will to support or defend those interests
- ▼ can monitor and assess their actions accordingly
- ▼ have sufficient force to achieve our objectives.

Without fulfilling these conditions, military forces are likely not to influence an actor.

U.S. efforts to persuade Israel not to respond to Iraqi Scud attacks during the Persian Gulf War can help illustrate these conditions. America's objective was to preserve the political and military coalition opposing Iraq. To accomplish this objective, the United States had to satisfy the four conditions mentioned above.

First, to ensure Israel understood and appreciated American interests, which included Israeli security, the Deputy Secretary of State and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy delivered personal assurances from the President of the United States to the Israeli Prime Minister. Thereafter, the Department of Defense established a secure communication link with the Israeli Ministry of Defense to enable immediate and frequent contact between U.S. and Israeli officials.

Second, to ensure Israel understood America intended to support those interests, the President ordered the immediate transfer of two Patriot air defense missile batteries to Israel and the training of Israeli crews for their operation.

Third, to assure Israel that America could monitor and assess activities throughout the region, the United States provided near-real-time warning of Iraqi Scud missile attacks on Israel. Near-real-time warning offered the Israeli populace as much as five minutes to take shelter before missile impact.

Fourth, to assure the Israeli leadership that America had sufficient force to achieve its objectives, the President offered four additional Patriot batteries to be operated by U.S. troops. Likewise, U.S. Central Command devoted a substantial amount of its air, space, and special operations assets to combat the Scud threat.

In this instance, America succeeded by ensuring U.S. objectives were clearly understood, by demonstrating U.S. commitment to Israel's security, and by coordinating a common response to the crisis. Space-based assets aided this response. These space-based assets were part of the process that included all four conditions for exerting presence. These four conditions are enduring requirements, guiding America's political and military leaders when considering presence operations. Because every operation is fundamentally different, political

Air Force B-2 Stealth,
B-52, and B-1
bombers.



U.S. Air Force



U.S. Air Force

C-5A transport.

and military leaders should choose forces with the attributes each case warrants.

Forces Emphasize Different Attributes

America's military forces emphasize different qualities based on the medium in which they operate. These attributes magnify a theater commander's ability to exert presence in accordance with the principles of war. They also enable theater commanders to develop alternative joint force packages. These attributes include:

- ▼ responsiveness—the ability to arrive quickly where needed
- ▼ persistence—the ability to maintain or adjust operational tempos over an extended period of time
- ▼ flexibility (versatility)—the ability to configure forces for a particular set of conditions
- ▼ survivability—the ability to limit risks when employing forces
- ▼ economy—the ability to efficiently allocate resources required to deploy and employ capabilities.

Employing the proper alternative joint force package depends on numerous factors, beginning with an assessment of national security objectives. An example of this can be drawn from the situation in Kuwait in 1994.

The possibility of a resurgent Iraqi threat posed a serious danger to the region's stability and America's interests in the Persian Gulf. This required more than just a physical presence, it required a global presence, combined with diplomatic initiatives, to contain Iraqi adventurism. When Iraq mobilized a significant ground force near Kuwait's border, the United States quickly responded with Operation Vigilant Warrior. On short notice, air and ground forces deployed from the United States to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to deter incursions into these territories. Likewise, naval forces moved from the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean into the Persian Gulf. Space forces and other information-based capabilities enabled air, ground, and naval force operations and provided American, coalition, and other world leaders a window through which they could monitor, assess, and, with a variety of means, attempt to manipulate behaviors. Concurrently, global media coverage of America's military mobilization and deployment presented Saddam Hussein and the world with an unmistakable statement of U.S. intentions and resolve. In this case, U.S. efforts capitalized upon the complementary attributes of air, ground, sea, and space

F-15s and F-16s
in formation.



U.S. Air Force

forces to successfully secure U.S. objectives. In the future, when demonstrating similar resolve, our Nation's leaders will benefit from forces increasingly influenced by technological innovations.

Technological Innovations

Technological advances enhance the role of all military forces in exerting presence. Improvements in three specific areas enable forces to influence with less political and military risk.

▼ *Situational Awareness.* Advances in information-based technologies allow military forces to monitor and assess most global conditions rapidly and efficiently.

▼ *Strategic Agility.* Improvements in transport technologies enable rapid responses with a variety of military forces to distant locations.

▼ *Lethality.* Enhancements in weapon system technologies make it possible to achieve desired effects more quickly and at less cost.

Situational awareness results from advances in information-based technologies that allow military forces to monitor and assess global conditions rapidly and efficiently. This is more than hitching a ride on the information highway. Political and military leaders have come to depend upon advances

in space-based and air-breathing platform sensors and other information-based systems deployed around the globe. These forces are an increasingly vital component of national policy implementation. For example, these capabilities were critically important during 1994, when determining and executing appropriate responses to events in Korea, Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti.

Situational awareness gives America an ability to anticipate crises and prepare appropriate responses to them. Improvements in space-based and air-breathing platform sensors and information-based systems in the coming years will steadily increase the situational awareness of military leaders and military forces at all echelons. Today, situational awareness improves our ability to generate military options before crises erupt. Once the use of military capabilities is necessary, the full range of recent technological advances comes into play.

Improvements in transport technologies enable the United States to respond rapidly to national security concerns anywhere in the world with a variety of military capabilities. This is strategic agility. With strategic

agility, U.S. military forces can operate unconstrained by geographic barriers and can reach 100 percent of the world's population. We gain strategic agility with such national assets as our air mobility fleet, that is, our airlift and air refueling forces. When these assets are combined with Army civil affairs units, for instance, air mobility becomes a means for demonstrating U.S. benevolence. When combined with the 82^d Airborne, air mobility becomes a means for demonstrating U.S. resolve.

Strategic agility also gives us the ability to anchor forces in one location and rapidly swing them, if needed, to other locations. This enables military forces, far removed from any target, to deliver aid or combat capabilities within minutes or hours of a national decision to act.

Enhancements in weapon systems and related technologies make it possible to achieve desired effects more quickly and at less cost. For example, *Gulf War Air Power Survey* analysis revealed precision munitions were 12 times more effective than non-precision munitions. As a result, air forces minimized their exposure to enemy defenses and experienced significantly fewer aircraft losses. At the same time, the use of precision weapons significantly decreased collateral damage. When combined with the advantages of stealth technologies, precision munitions become even more potent. Consequently, increased lethality enables America to maintain a credible deterrent threat with a reduced force structure.

The synergistic benefits achieved when combining situational awareness and strategic agility with lethality allow America to consider a wide range of military responses to worldwide circumstances. These capabilities, inherent in our warfighting forces (forces that possess the attributes of responsiveness, persistence, flexibility, survivability, and economy) form the cornerstone of global presence.

Presence Is a Team Effort

America's military services have always fought as a team. Goldwater-Nichols codified this and historical trends clearly signaled this. Today, few would dispute the efficacy of joint warfighting, which Desert Storm clearly validated.

Like warfighting, presence is a team effort. Just as theater commanders define their warfighting requirements, they have the responsibility to determine presence requirements as well. As such, they must retain access to the military means that enable them to obtain the balance of forces and capabilities needed to exert presence. Global presence facilitates that process.

Global presence acknowledges that all military capabilities contribute to presence with physical and virtual means.

Whether forces operate globally or from forward areas, they operate as a team. Together, they offer America's leadership a mechanism for modulating responses to global, regional, or local situations to achieve national objectives while controlling risk. Global presence acknowledges this interdependency. It reconceptualizes presence to correspond with the emerging international security picture and expands presence to match current and future applications.

Today, America's military forces are more mobile, more lethal, and more omnipresent than ever before. These features enhance traditional conceptions of military presence by allowing theater commanders to employ the advantages of all military options, forces, and capabilities.

As we peer into the future, we should view global presence as one route the services can take to achieve our country's ever evolving national security objectives. We in the military possess the means, physical and virtual, to provide America continuous awareness of world events and a force capable of projecting military power worldwide, in minutes or hours, with little or no warning. In so doing, we accomplish our responsibility to our civilian leadership and the American people to deter potential adversaries or fight and win wars decisively. **JFQ**

Fleet Admiral Chester William Nimitz

(1885–1966)

Chief of Naval Operations

VITA

Born in Fredericksburg, Texas; graduated from Naval Academy (1905); on China station (1907); commanded Atlantic submarine flotilla (1912); studied diesels in Germany and Belgium (1913); oversaw construction of first Navy diesel engine; chief of staff to commander of Atlantic Fleet submarine division (1917–19); Naval War College (1922–23); on staff of commander in chief, Battle Fleet (1923–25), and of commander in chief, U.S. Fleet (1925–26); organized Naval Reserve officers training at University of California (1926–29); commanded submarine division 20 and *USS Augusta* (1929–35); assistant chief of Bureau of Navigation (1935–38); led cruiser and battleship divisions (1938–39); chief of Bureau of Navigation (1939); commander in chief, Pacific Fleet (1941); organized defenses of Hawaiian Islands and commanded naval, sea, and air forces in Pacific Ocean Area; defeated Japanese in battles of Coral Sea and Midway (1942); helped

plan strategy for Pacific theater and provided direction for major offensives in Central Pacific; directed campaigns in the Gilberts (1943) and in the Marshalls, Marianas, and Palaus (1944); invaded the Philippines (1944); promoted to fleet admiral (1944); directed capture of Iwo Jima and Okinawa and operations against Japan; present at surrender in Tokyo Bay on board flagship, *USS Missouri* (1945); Chief of Naval Operations (1945–47); special assistant to Secretary of Navy (1948–49); U.S. commissioner for Kashmir (1949–51); died near San Francisco.

Source: Trevor N. Dupuy, Curt Johnson, and David L. Bongard, *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography* (New York: Harper-Collins, 1992), pp. 546–47.

Our people must be shown that a single department will improve upon the record of the past year's operations in the Pacific. For my part, I am convinced that a single department will not work as efficiently as two separate departments have proved they can work in producing the kinds of forces required for modern war. I am also convinced that the merging of the War and Navy Departments into a single department cannot help, and may hinder, the adequate provision and efficient use of our seapower.

—Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN
Testimony before the Senate
Military Affairs Committee
(November 17, 1945)



Portrait of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz by Adrian Lamb.

Naval Historical Center

Letters . . .

Interservice Food Fights

To the Editor—Bravo to Col Whitlow and *Joint Force Quarterly* for publishing “JFACC: Who’s in Charge?” (*JFQ*, Summer 1994). This treatment of a highly volatile issue reveals the interservice food fights which are motivated by parochialism rather than enhancing jointness.

We were snared by this issue during Desert Storm, one of us with CENTAF/Special Plans (Black Hole) in Riyadh and the other with a cavalry squadron in the 24th Infantry Division (Mech). Later, as students at the Armed Forces Staff College, we learned that no effective system exists to communicate requirements and capabilities in a timely way. The target nomination system implies that someone else understands battlefield requirements better than the commander. The tactical air control center desperately tries to grasp what is happening on the battlefield while those in the field desperately try to communicate the situation up the chain of command. The outcome is diminished confidence in the ability to either communicate or fulfill requirements. The solution is a system that allows communication without the unbelievable number of filters we now have, empowering commanders to fight with the joint force commander’s intent. A shared situational awareness is the challenge since once it is accomplished everything else is moot.

Col Whitlow correctly points out that percentages reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of airpower. All airframes cannot do all things. A–10s are not the same as F–15s, so why are they included in some percentage allocating sorties? It is as simple as this: the joint force commander indicates the main effort and supporting efforts by assigning areas of responsibility and designates supported and supporting commanders. After that subordinate commanders assist the supported commander in his mission. Victory—on land, at sea, or in the air—is the focus, not competition between components. Though there is a difference of opinion over Battlefield Air Interdiction, the fundamental premise in the article about “givens, main effort, and priorities” is right on.

Who’s in charge? The person assigned the main effort by the joint force commander, the one on the scene with the best information who is held responsible for success. Everyone else

helps. That framework, supported by mutual awareness, avoids food fights and leads to decisive victory.

Finally, Col Whitlow simply reignites the age-old debate over who controls the battlefield effects of a system—whether it is an Air Force air-to-ground platform or the Army Tactical Missile System with its ability to fire at operational depths. Is close air support a responsibility of a land force commander? Is the Marine Air-Ground Task Force the real model for fighting fires on the 21st century battlefield? How this issue is resolved will determine whether the adage “joint warfare is team warfare” is real or just a bunch of empty words. We look forward to future articles in *JFQ* on this and other joint issues.

—Maj James R. Hawkins, USAF
U.S. Strategic Command
LTC Joseph C. Barto III, USA
Joint Warfighting Center

To the Editor—While I read Col Whitlow’s article entitled “JFACC: Who’s in Charge?” (*JFQ*, Summer 1994) with interest, its flaws gave me concern. It contains false assertions about JFACC operations that reveal an unwillingness to accept the maturing character of the JFACC concept and a single-service focus that is the antithesis of operating in a joint environment.

The author starts off with the old argument over the JFACC as *commander* or *coordinator* and suggests that this is an issue on which many disagree. This is not the case. The JFACC is a commander except in those reticent circles of the Marine Corps where the concern is over keeping Marine aircraft under Marine control rather than ensuring the effective use of airpower throughout the theater of operations. (The Army-Air Force AirLand Battle concept, it should be noted, is not now nor has it ever been Air Force doctrine as the article suggests, but is an Army concept employed for corps operations on a conventional, linear battlefield.) Fortunately, Whitlow then makes a very important point. A commander must have the authority to direct the actions needed to accomplish the mission. If the JFACC was a coordinator he would lack the authority required to use airpower to accomplish the joint force commander’s objectives. As a joint component commander, the JFACC must understand airpower as well as land and naval forces so that those capabilities work in a cohesive way. To get the best results from airpower, the JFACC must be a commander.

The discussion of apportionment correctly condemns the emphasis on percentage allocation of air assets. The JFACC should receive and issue mission-type orders to air forces. But the idea that air superiority and close air support operations require constant levels of support is nonsense since both enemy force composition and the level of ground engagement vary greatly. In addition, the article fails to address how strategic attack sorties figure in apportionment. The bottom line is that emphasis in air operations depends on phases of a campaign, with more or less emphasis on certain types of missions (viz., strategic attack, air superiority, interdiction, and close air support) resulting in a shift in the number of sorties. As Whitlow points out, CAS should be a given, but not by dictating a constant percentage as he thinks necessary. Airpower always provided ground commanders with CAS when needed. It always will and with all aircraft in theater if required. It is better to use airpower in ways that will eliminate the call for CAS. To accomplish that, airpower must be commanded by a single air-minded commander—the JFACC. Complicating this job by creating a separate target planning system for a corps commander’s AO and depleting resources by dedicating aircraft to the corps only reduces the effectiveness of airpower.

I also take exception to the claim that the JFACC does not have a *purple* perspective. This assumes that because the JFACC is normally a component commander he will emphasize the needs of his service to the detriment of other components and services. What is the basis of this claim? There is no suggestion that the joint force commander is parochial because he belongs to a specific service. Is a joint force land component commander parochial because he comes from the service with a preponderance of land assets? Then why make similar assertions about the air component commander? The decision on what to do will be based on operational needs in the theater, not on the JFACC’s service. Anyone in a joint position must inherently act in a *purple* way.

The dream of independent service operations in a notional scenario at the end of the article is fantasy—an entirely Navy/Marine air war, with strategic bombing by B–52s as an afterthought. On land, of course, marines storm the beaches—something that has not been done in forty years. Miraculously, the “Army forces are present in theater and operational.” No mention of how they got there. Where is the joint forces land component commander? Quite naturally, “boundaries are drawn and separate AOs for land forces unfold.” One wonders if this is for span of control or to ensure that each land service gets a “fair share.” This scenario needs

to come to grips with reality. Col Whitlow "talks the talk," but his vision of combat is all too familiar and service-oriented.

—Col Michael A. Kirtland, USAF
Chief, Military Doctrine Research
Airpower Research Institute

The Fog of Wargaming

To the Editor—Peter Perla did us a great service by brilliantly summarizing the advantages and the disadvantages of wargaming ("Future Directions for Wargaming," *JFQ*, Summer 1994). One hesitates to challenge such an expert, but the article does prompt one question and two objections.

Where is the evidence that military wargamers are enamored of virtual reality and other high-tech "gee whiz" gadgetry? At the Naval War College—which holds over fifty events a year—this is not the case. But even if we were so enamored, consider this. The military was accused in the early 1980s of gold plating weapons to the detriment of operators and mission accomplishment. But the same Desert Storm which Perla trumpets as a success demonstrated that those gold plated weapons were a success. Thus my skepticism that the military, by relying on (if in fact they were) high tech gadgetry and "gee whiz" systems, would jeopardize the value of wargames.

During the July 1994 Global War Game—an annual event at the Naval War College—several advanced models were used to assess two nearly simultaneous MRCs. At one point, data from an extremely sophisticated air-to-ground attrition model rendered enemy losses in excess of 80 percent during one early 24-hour engagement. The assessors, to the doubtless pleasure of Perla, greatly tempered what they saw as erroneous data. Skeptical military players in the game, again to Perla's probable delight, demanded explanations from the assessors. An admiral in one cell wanted to know who was "smarter than the CINC." These examples demonstrate a healthy tension between players and assessors.

The article's comment that "the services cannot remain introspective as in the past" ignores current efforts. Last year the Naval War College gamed events across the spectrum from a relief mission in Nigeria to coalitions with 16 navies in the Western Hemisphere, Partnership for Peace initiatives in the Baltic, U.S.-Japanese actions, and two MRCs. All creatures great and small, therefore, are subject to gaming.

A caution on touting the Program Objective Memorandum Wargame: that game is viewed by the executors (galley slaves) as a charade used to justify various N- programs. But Perla must be commended for trying to keep wargaming honest. Such an authority should not be ignored.

—CDR M.K. Murray, USN
Naval War College

To the Editor—As a wargamer for ten years, I found Peter Perla's article excellent in almost every respect. But I disagree with his assessment of the Navy's BFTT program as a superior wargaming venue. My problem is the phenomenon described as "the fog of war," which accounts for basing decisions on incorrect assumptions and incomplete or erroneous data. When participants use actual equipment for tactical applications, wargame controllers cannot in good conscience allow the fog of war to fall too thickly since the result would be incorrect and invalid operational training, wasted time and resources, and even the wrong lesson for players.

In a wargaming facility, however, with the congruent displays and effective interfaces, the players are free to make critical errors and play them out to their conclusions. In debriefs, players can be apprised of their options, successes, and failures, as well as the influence of the fog of war. The post-Cold War environment facing decisionmakers is ambiguous enough to keep the fog of war issue relevant for the foreseeable future.

—William R. Cooper
Pacer Systems, Inc.

To the Editor—Peter Perla's article was interesting, though it reminded me of some disquieting facts about wargaming. In my limited experience games are counterproductive, at least in the case of those dealing with multinational peacekeeping, since they teach the wrong lessons—not wrong by design, but rather because of the law of unintended consequences.

I participate in many military-run peacekeeping operations simulation exercises, usually as part of the control or "political" team. By and large, I find these exercises to be well designed and sophisticated—serious attempts to deal with the ambiguities of multinational operations. But I also find them disappointing. The unavoidable contradiction between training and policy leads to the subtle dominance of the former over the latter. Conventional wisdom (*doctrine*) governs the play, since control teams and senior officers who sponsor games insist on conformity with doctrine. This is perfectly sensible in respect to training players but it quickly kills any

prospect of using the game to explore alternative options. An elaborate game played over days or weeks with numerous personnel of various ranks is driven by a training imperative and soon falls into step with approved doctrine. There is nothing wrong with this development as long as everyone knows what is going on. But there is a tendency to gussy up exercises with a "policy analysis and exploration" label.

Secondly, in exercises involving extensive resources, utilizing them dictates game play and control decisions. This parallels the pressure of doctrine controlling play. Presumably the assets for a game are chosen because doctrine indicates that they may be required. Marines sailed around without being landed during Desert Storm, and in the Caribbean other marines went home without invading Haiti. In a game, political decisions of this type—no military deployment or action—are not permitted. The lesson is that everyone who shows up gets to play.

Yet in political-military situations military deployments depend on political decisions and do not automatically follow from them. But the exercises in which I participate treat political decisions as a prefatory task to be performed quickly and perfunctorily in order to get on to the military game (the *real* game). While this process is understandable in terms of play, and game organizers make it clear that it is part of the artificiality of simulations, the fact is that it reinforces anti- or unpolitical attitudes on the part of many military professionals.

A recent large-scale game that I attended demonstrated all these problems. The dynamics of doctrine and the devoted resources exacerbated by the senior rank of major participants produced a game scenario in which the players embraced mission creep. Possibilities for exploring discreet, small-scale, combined political-diplomatic-military operations were discarded impatiently by control and senior players in a rush to deploy the "big battalions." In one sense that game may have only hinted at a more fundamental problem, that wargaming is inappropriate to multinational operations. Wargames deal with national crises that require mobilizing resources to obtain a specific, concrete outcome. They are about controlling a battlefield.

JFQ welcomes your
letters and comments. Write or
FAX your communications to
(202) 475-1012 / DSN 335-1012
or send them via Internet to
JFQ1@ndu.edu

Multinational peace operations are not. Instead they are concerned with real but limited national interests which we determine to pursue with other nations. This is not just a consideration: it is *the* defining quality.

My experience may be atypical. But wargames on multinational peacekeeping seem to me to be teaching the wrong lessons: unilateralism rather than multilateralism; strict military solutions rather than political-military integration; and the virtue of quick answers rather than coping with the ambiguities of peace operations. The tragedy is that the outcome may be the exact opposite of what is needed. I leave it to wargamers to decide if this result can be avoided.

—Ambassador Edward Marks
Visiting Fellow
National Defense University

On the Software Front

To the Editor—Being a software expert I found fault with Peter Emmett's "Software Warfare" (*JFQ*, Summer 1994). He implies there is a difference between software complexity and software functionality. As a rule, the more functionality in a system, the more complex the software. The design of a battlefield system that meets all the needs of a user would be incredibly complex. For a soldier on the ground to modify, on the fly, the code needed to manage the battlefield, it must have the requisite logic built in and thus simply provide the interface for a user to choose what change to make. Even with highly trained programmers on the front line, the time needed to modify and test software does not lend itself to a rapidly changing battlefield.

Another concept Emmett raises—that of AI working tactical problems on top of a database containing operational doctrine and scheme of maneuver—sets us up to become predictable. If the software reads and interprets the battlefield and database correctly, the generated reaction will either be the same or follow the same operational concept for every similar engagement.

But there are valid points in the article. Imbedded systems and software must be capable of surviving on a battlefield that operators cannot see with their eyes. The electromagnetic spectrum will be an area for future conflicts. Launching TLAMs against a target, only to have them rendered useless by high energy radio frequency weapons that damage the critical electronic circuitry, makes the software issue meaningless.

—1 Lt Chris A. Golden, USAF
Air Force Materiel Command

A Fallow Challenge to Civilian Control?

To the Editor—The superb essays by A.J. Bacevich and Mackubin Thomas Owens published in *Out of Joint* ("The State of Civil-Military Relations: Two Views," *JFQ*, Autumn/Winter 1994–95) demonstrate that serious minds are concerned about civilian control of the military. But like Kohn, Luttwak, Weigley, et al. analysts assume that strong civilian control is universally accepted as an unqualified civic virtue. Increasingly, however, it appears that a number of Americans aren't so sure.

Poll after poll indicates a growing antipathy towards elected officials, including those who exercise civilian control. Most of government is seen as bloated, scandal-ridden, and ineffectual. In contrast, the Armed Forces in the wake of the Gulf War, with approval ratings at all-time highs, succeeded in gaining the attention of a public looking for government that actually works. Indeed, traditional antimilitarism that underpinned civilian control since the Revolution has not only ended, it has been replaced by what might be called *postmodern militarism*.

This does not mean that our society is militarizing, nor that Americans are adopting martial virtues. Rather, it reflects a conviction that the Armed Forces are the only public institutions that altruistically and productively work for the national good. Predictably, the military is becoming the agent of first recourse for the U.S. Government's thorniest problems both at home and abroad.

The Armed Forces remedied—with startling effectiveness and speed—diplomatic disasters around the globe, from Panama to the Persian Gulf, Rwanda to Haiti. Domestically, the military succeeds at myriad tasks that befuddle civilian leaders. Be it performing disaster relief, conducting counterdrug operations, quelling civil disorder, providing medical care to disadvantaged localities, counseling troubled teens, building playgrounds, or tutoring failing students, a can-do military gets the job done. So striking are the achievements of the Armed Forces that their reputation remains untarnished despite a variety of controversies and embarrassments.

Many current issues concerning civilian control can be traced to the Vietnam era. Collective national guilt over the appalling post-war treatment of Southeast Asian veterans helped to transform the popular image of the conflict from a military fiasco to a virtual betrayal of the Armed Forces by incompetent officials. That memory of ineptitude by those who exercised civilian control lingers on today: when the public sensed that denying armored vehicles to Americans led to a disaster in the back alleys of

Mogadishu in October 1993, the Secretary of Defense was soon forced to resign.

Vietnam also complicated civilian control by altering the self-image of the American officer. No longer prepared to leave policy decisions to civilians of uncertain competence, many officers now see their responsibilities as extending beyond purely military matters to a very broadly defined notion of national security. Indeed, they consider themselves as much national leaders as military commanders. While many might agree with Bacevich that George Marshall's apolitical deference to civilian authority remains an exemplar, they would nevertheless likely argue that a dearth of able civilian leaders leaves senior military officers little choice but to fill the void.

With a sophisticated war-college education which Owens describes as heavy in politics and economics, officers in the late 1990s are well armed to challenge civilian leaders in many arenas. When the still-sizable charter of the military is broadened to include nontraditional operations other than war, the insinuation of the Armed Forces into highly-political policy matters is unsurprising. Abetting that development are bitter partisan battles that fragment political power and undermine the moral authority of civilian leaders. This allows the military to exert considerable influence while appearing to remain above the fray.

The shift in attitude by so many officers from military affairs to broader national concerns undermines Owens' contention that purported policy setbacks are proof of the vitality of the current state of civilian control. Almost all military leaders, for example, believe that defense budgets well below the heyday of the 1980s are necessary for the Nation's economic health. Thus, interservice squabbling over allocating resources should not be mistaken for opposition to budget reductions. And who can say that resolving issues such as women in combat and gays in the military means defeat for the military? Might it not be argued that the real stratagem all along was to merely slow the pace of social change in the Armed Forces to a more palatable rate? The point is that in the era of postmodern militarism it is unwise to underrate the poise and sagacity of senior military officers.

Americans do not realize that the Armed Forces are fundamentally unlike other institutions. The military is an unapologetically authoritarian establishment uniquely designed to counter man's darker impulses with savage fury when required. Its professional focus on violence and its effects creates fewer synergies with civilian society than those in the thrall of postmodern militarism may suppose. Since order and control

are quite literally life or death matters in war, the military loathes permissive individualism which in civilian settings stimulates creative social evolution. Likewise, because instantaneous and unquestioned obedience is imperative in combat, the military is deeply distrustful of the intellectual entrepreneurship that fuels advanced democratic societies.

The paradox of postmodern militarism is that it is ascendant as society's familiarity with all things military is diminishing. The lack of a draft along with downsizing and expulsion of ROTC from the campus have conspired to leave most Americans with little if any first-hand knowledge of people in uniform. Thus few grasp the potentially nefarious implications of reliance on military-derived solutions. Postmodern militarism celebrates the military without really understanding it.

The challenge to those who seek to reinvigorate civilian control of the military is to assure a politically alienated public that it is desirable to do so. They must develop and articulate practical as well as philosophical arguments in support of civilian control. Given the American penchant for short-term thinking, the power of postmodern militarism, and apparent intractability of resentment borne by the public toward government, this challenge is profound indeed.

—Col Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF
U.S. Strategic Command



Missing an Issue?

Copies of back numbers of *JFQ* are available in limited quantities to members of the Armed Forces and institutions. Please send your request to the Editor at the address or FAX number listed on the masthead.

JFQ

To the Editor—A.J. Bacevich's article, "Civilian Control: Still a Useful Fiction," only fans the embers of a misguided debate over civilian control of the military. If there is an underlying theme in this debate, it seems not to be civil-military relations but some distress over leadership traits and a redistribution of power in the defense establishment. Bacevich chides Washington "experts" for concluding that "nothing of substance had changed," which makes it all the more necessary to learn what, if anything, in fact has changed to incite a crisis in civilian control. There is no constitutional cause for alarm. The Constitution still empowers Congress to declare war and to control the purse. And the President clearly remains the Commander in Chief.

There have been legislative changes in the military. Indeed, much of the distress expressed in this debate suggests that Congress, by enacting Goldwater-Nichols, abdicated civilian control to the Chairman and Joint Staff. Nothing in the letter or spirit of this law suggests such a conclusion. The preamble to the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 (PL 99-433) states as its purpose and intent: "To reorganize the Department of Defense and *strengthen civilian authority* in the Department of Defense, to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense . . ." [emphasis added]. While the Goldwater-Nichols Act consolidates a lot of military authority in CJCS which arguably abraded the influence of the services, it in no way altered the principle of civilian control.

The core of this so-called crisis appears to be not in the law but in its application, and in the dynamic manner in which both Colin Powell and John Shalikashvili have functioned as chairmen. Here some will point to policies on homosexuals in the military and U.S. intervention in Bosnia as cases of the military overstepping its authority. The gays-in-uniform issue was resolved only after lengthy discussions among the President, Chairman, and service chiefs. And having listened to his military advisors, Congress, and the public, President Clinton adopted a policy at variance with his position during the 1992 campaign. Similarly, the administration's posture on Bosnia was formed after consulting with military leaders, again despite Clinton's statements on the campaign trail.

Politicians often find it wise, once elected, to modify their previous positions. This should be no surprise to anyone familiar with electoral politics. The fact that positions on defense matters are changed after consulting the military is reassuring. Were senior military officers guilty, under these conditions, of subverting presidential intentions? Yes, if one defines subversion as trying to change the President's mind. Clearly not,

however, if one accepts that the military leadership has an obligation to provide candid advice.

Did the military bypass the chain of command? Absolutely not. The established chain was followed. Civilians made the ultimate policy decisions. Military leaders did exactly what the law requires: provide advice to civilian leaders and carry out the resulting decisions. As far as contact with members of Congress is concerned, there is confusion between acceptable, often mandated contacts and subversive attempts to wrest control from civilians.

Bacevich turns to George Marshall to exemplify how things ought to be, but ignores other examples of threats to civilian control. The Truman-MacArthur row and the firing of a Chief of Naval Operations offer relevant precedents. Recently a Secretary of Defense—after consultation with the President—dismissed an Air Force Chief of Staff for exceeding his authority. Moreover, the President did not follow the advice, according to some accounts, of CJCS and CINCCENT in the early days of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait because he thought it overly-cautious.

Observing the military, we do find change. Arguably the political power of the military is a zero sum game: constitutional and legislative constraints have not forfeited civilian control, nor are they likely to. What has changed is the balance of power within the military. Goldwater-Nichols intentionally consolidated many service prerogatives under the Chairman. Prior to that act, in times of growing or stable budgets, one could divide resources among the three military departments and make the best of it. In times of shrinking budgets and a strong CJCS who, by enhancing the Joint Requirements Oversight Council process, has further consolidated the statutory powers that Goldwater-Nichols intended, the services (and entire communities within them) feel threatened. Thus, the true debate today is along inter-service and intra-military lines, not civil-military lines.

We agree with those experts who summarily dismissed Kohn's argument. In fact, nothing of substance has changed. The issues which Bacevich raised are not difficulties of civilian control. They are criticisms of decisions made by civilian leaders or a misguided perception of the authority vested in the Chairman and Joint Staff. Although these are absorbing and provocative subjects, the military remains firmly under civilian control.

—CDR Timothy C. Young, USN
Office of the Judge Advocate General
Department of the Navy
Col John S. Burkhart, USAF
National Defense University

Learning from Rwanda

By STEVEN METZ and JAMES KIEVIT



Rwandan refugee camp at Kitali.

Combat Camera Imagery (Val Gempis)

While many Americans may be numbed by the violence and human suffering that plagues Sub-Saharan Africa, the horror of Rwanda was so acute that it moved all save the most hardened observers. Moreover, coming on the heels of the debacle in Somalia, Rwanda raised the prospect of a mounting series of events across Africa which might require U.S. or multinational responses. In addition to easing the plight of the Rwandan people, we must draw strategic lessons from this crisis in order to mitigate the impact of similar disasters in the future.

Several lessons are clear. Efficient and effective responses to African disasters must escape the clumsiness of past U.S. policies and be based on an understanding of the

historic, economic, social, and political context of each event. Moreover, an assessment of the proper response must be placed in the wider framework of an emerging post-Cold War national security strategy. What happens in Africa will affect the image, credibility, and moral standing of the United States around the world. It will also influence public attitudes on the appropriate extent of our involvement in the Third World. The level of global attention that Rwanda received makes this event a critical albeit unintended factor in determining American policy toward the Third World. If the United States is incapable of responding to disasters in Africa, isolationism will be strengthened. We can rebound from one Somalia but probably not from two. The symbolism of Rwanda in strategic terms may outweigh its immediate significance. By examining this situation, we may develop the insights and means to make maximum use of scarce resources when the next African disaster explodes.

Rwanda will not be the last disaster to require military intervention. Many African states have the requisite mix of primal conflict, political elites, and fragile institutions that frustrate efforts to seek nonviolent solutions to their problems. They are buffeted by economic disintegration or stagnation, population strains, ecological decay, and regional conflict. And with the capabilities of the United States, United Nations, and nongovernmental organizations to respond to disasters on the rise as the situation in Sub-Saharan Africa gets worse, life in refugee camps will become more attractive to the beleaguered peoples of Africa. It is an irony that demand grows in proportion to competence. The Nation will soon find that this holds for disaster relief: the better we become, the more we will be asked to do.

Rejecting calls for help can be unethical or politically infeasible. Americans want quick and effective response to disasters. Only the Armed Forces have the training, assets, and experience to respond rapidly to such events when public order and services collapse. Moreover, our military can make a major contribution to a multinational approach to controlling disaster. Whether because of political or resource constraints, African states are unable to react to large-scale disasters without outside aid. This means that the Armed Forces—together with international bodies like the United Nations, nongovernmental organizations, and other states—will remain involved in African relief efforts. Our competency must stay one step ahead of rising demands.

When the United States takes part in relief operations in Sub-Saharan Africa, its objectives must be limited. We do not have pressing geostrategic or tangible interests at stake. Our concerns are moral and

Steven Metz and Lieutenant Colonel James Kievit, USA, are analysts in the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. This article is excerpted from a longer study entitled *Disaster and Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa*.

symbolic. The limitations on our interests should fashion our goals: when we get involved the immediate objective is to ameliorate the catastrophe and meet basic human needs. Our long-term objective is to create or reestablish minimum standards of human rights. This problem may occur under national authorities or international organizations. Those who argue that such an approach leaves the root causes of disasters untouched and that the ultimate solution is establishing viable democracies or economies are correct but naive. The limits of our interests and extent of our global commitments simply will not permit sustained, expensive engagement in Africa. Memories of Somalia are still fresh. We will support long-term solutions but seldom if ever assume sole responsibility. The key to increased efficiency and effectiveness in disaster intervention lies in the process of establishing and refining concepts and procedures to deal with it.

When to Intervene

No decision is harder yet more critical than the timing of an intervention. Many analysts take an early-is-better approach. To limit suffering, they argue, one must preempt disaster. If that is not viable, intervene as early as possible.¹ According to the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the 1994 mission undertaken in East Africa to organize international support for preventing a drought from triggering famine probably saved more lives than parallel efforts in Rwanda.² Similarly, the DOD relief coordinator has stated: "The most important thing for all of us is to get better at creating an early-warning system, not just for famines but [for] man-made regional conflicts."³

While the early-is-better approach sounds rational, it underestimates the severe constraints placed on U.S. policymakers and strategists. We did not, after all, delay involvement in Rwanda because of amorality or incompetence. Absent a clear, unmitigated disaster, it is often difficult to generate a consensus among

the public and in Congress for anything more than diplomatic action. However much they were moved by the tragedy, few Americans supported putting our troops in harm's way when Rwandans themselves appeared unwilling to stop the killing. Furthermore, the notion of a conflict being ripe for resolution is relevant when contemplating intervention.⁴ As morally painful as it may be, there are conflicts in which hate and violence must subside before any settlement can be reached. Just as the horrors of World War II made the conflict in Europe open to a resolution, the bloodbath in Rwanda may set the stage for an ultimate settlement to that nation's problems. If the United States or some multinational force had stopped the conflict before one side triumphed, a reservoir of ethnic hatred might have continued to simmer only to boil over again.

The distinction between controlled and uncontrolled disasters also suggests a real strategic dilemma. Controlled disasters should be easier to resolve because they are normally engineered by regimes and are more limited in scope. This implies that if the United States is unwilling to stop or prevent disasters, the next best solution may be assuring control over them, even if this results in maintaining the status quo. This is an inescapable dilemma of security policy. Some argue that it is best to retain influence over repressive regimes in order to ultimately change their conduct. This, for instance, was the basis of the Reagan administration's policy on constructive engagement with regard to the minority government of South Africa. While that argument had some validity during the Cold War when global geostrategic interests overrode other issues, it makes little sense today. A regime that orchestrates a human disaster, even if controlled, is beyond the moral pale. The risk of unleashing larger disasters must be taken to change the conduct of repressive regimes.

U.S. policy will generally be apparent when a disaster is either con-

trolled or uncontrolled. If it is controlled we should pressure the regime engineering that disaster directly or by mobilizing international support. If the regime alters its policy we should support multinational relief efforts. If a regime does not respond, America can attempt to build a coalition for coercive intervention and relief or even contribute military forces, but in peripheral areas the Nation will not act alone. For clearly uncontrolled disasters, relief must come first and political efforts to pass control to civilian authorities second. The major problem, however, will come when disasters cannot be classified as controlled or uncontrolled. As always, gray areas are very complex. When they appear, we must decide on a case-by-case basis whether political pressure or immediate relief should take priority.

Decisions to intervene are not made in a vacuum. Intervention in Somalia must be viewed in a broader framework of attempts to create a new world order; intervening in Rwanda may have been directly related to American frustration over Haiti at the time. In a perfect world transitory public opinion would not determine policy, but in peripheral regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, with no tangible national interests at stake, it is opinion that will primarily determine policy.

Multi-Dimensional Conflict

When Americans try to grapple with African conflicts, they often overemphasize the primal dimension. Tribes, clans, and elites are relevant but are not the only determinants of conflict and often not even the most important. In African conflicts primalism often begins as a secondary consideration and only grows as it is manipulated in a power struggle. Since this also occurred in the Southern part of the United States in the 1950s and 1960s when some politicians fanned the flames of racial hatred to advance their careers, Americans should understand it. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the tendency to manipulate tribal, ethnic, and other differences for personal power is even more pronounced precisely because the politi-

cal stakes are so high. Winners not only gain power to govern but also wrest control over a country's economy and patronage associated with jobs, contracts, and national treasure. Defeat often means losing everything. This makes competitors in the political arena willing to stoop to anything, even patent manipulation of tribal or ethnic distrust.

Regional factors are equally critical. Disasters are shaped, sometimes caused, by what goes on beyond national frontiers. Conflict in neighboring states, for instance, often creates refugees. When political boundaries bear little resemblance to ethnic or tribal dividing lines and violence is endemic, refugees become a permanent fact of life. Thus few conflicts are strictly internal. Events in Rwanda were affected by violent repression in Burundi and Uganda that led to a refugee exodus which altered migrant communities. Furthermore, conflicts in neighboring states sometimes breed antagonisms that generate external support for rebel and insurgent groups.⁵

Rwanda also demonstrated the significance of personalities in the politics of Sub-Saharan Africa. Americans, accustomed to perceiving things in terms of institutions, parties, movements, et al., can overlook

this dimension. But politics in Africa are often characterized by "a personal or factional struggle to control the national government or to influence it, a contest restrained by private and tacit agreements, prudential concerns, and personal ties and dependencies rather than public rules and institutions."⁶ Thus policymakers and strategists should frame their approach with due regard for key personalities rather than using oversimplified notions of tribal conflict.

Finally, in cases where limited national interests are at risk, the United States is unlikely to preempt a conflict or intervene to stop a war. Rwanda suggests that we will intervene when there is a natural disaster but not in order to halt violence. There is no consensus among Americans to support armed intervention in internal conflicts. The public can tolerate violence in peripheral areas (or at least considers the cost of stopping it too great). We have grown accustomed to human evil. But the public will not abide human suffering from natural or preventable causes. Preemption may be realistic in regions of strategic importance but not in areas like Sub-Saharan Africa. In sum, we appear doomed to react to disasters rather than prevent them.

Operational Considerations

Given limited national interests in Africa, the impact of our actions on wider perceptions is central. This implies that the ultimate success of an operation will be determined as much by how America and the world community perceive it as by what unfolds on the ground. Somalia serves to illustrate this phenomenon. In ameliorating suffering and staving off a mass disaster, the effort by the United States was a success, although it is often portrayed as a failure. Similarly, the limits of our interests in Africa mean there will be little support for sustained, expensive operations. This makes a quick hand-off to civilians all the more vital.

Coherent military planning depends upon a clear notion of the desired outcome. This is surely true of military participation in disaster relief. Most often success will be defined in terms of bringing a disaster under control and passing responsibility for relief operations over to civilians, either under multinational or national auspices. Determining indicators of unresolvability is more difficult. Once forces are in place, there is a possibility of succumbing to mission creep. Disasters involve a multitude of tasks, some directly connected to relief operations and

Symposium on Command and Control in Joint Operations


The National Defense University will convene a symposium on June 27–28, 1995, in Washington, D.C., on aspects of command and control in the conduct of joint operations to include joint planning, training, doctrine, and infrastructure.

For information, contact:

National Defense University
Institute for National Strategic Studies (Symposia)
Fort Lesley J. McNair
Washington D.C. 20319-6000

Telephone: (202) 287-9230 / DSN 667-9230
FAX: (202) 287-9239 / DSN 667-9239
Internet: grahamj@ndu.edu

others subsidiary. The desire of the Armed Forces to be efficient and effective leads to assuming responsibility for tasks rather than leaving them undone or in what may be seen as incompetent hands. Establishing security is especially tempting. Disasters are disorderly by their nature. Armed men abound, be they regular soldiers, militiamen, or simple thugs. In fact, these categories are often blurred in Sub-Saharan Africa. But when security degenerates, operations become peace en-



Americans convoying water during Support Hope.

Combat Camera Imagery (Mary Krause)

forcement rather than disaster relief. At that point, the rules change.

In peripheral areas like Sub-Saharan Africa, it is vital for the U.S. military to avoid mission creep and for policymakers to accept the intractability of some situations and resist urges to assume responsibility for peace enforcement. We should not automatically eschew involvement in peace enforcement in areas where national interests are minimal, but we should limit our contributions to air transport, logistical support, and intelligence. Finally, determining how to hand relief activities over to civil authorities is a vital strategic decision that must be worked out early.

Because time is so precious in responding to disasters, the proper chain of command will probably only be clarified as each operation progresses. It would be immoral and politically inept to argue over lines of authority as innocent people die. Force mixture requires somewhat greater attention. The less developed the infrastructure in a disaster area,

and the less stable a region, the greater our military role. This is especially true when relief operations are subjected to threats of violence. As a rule of thumb, civil agencies should exercise the maximum degree of responsibility possible for disaster relief. This will minimize the diversion of military resources and reflects the fact that civilian organizations are better equipped to sustain the efforts needed to bring a disaster-ridden area to some semblance of normalcy. Within the U.S. military, combat forces in particular should be kept to the lowest possible level. Those forces would play a major role only in coercive intervention to stop a controlled disaster. When there is little threat of violence, only combat support and combat services support forces might be involved.

Stepped-up training and exercising of JTFs for humanitarian relief should be explored even at the expense of diminished time and resources for combat training. No service should consider humanitarian relief its primary mission, but such operations will be an important secondary one for the foreseeable future. The goal should be to provide appropriate time and money to training and planning for these sorts of operations—neither too much nor too little.

Although the Marines did a superb job in Somalia, Bangladesh, et al., the Army will likely play the principal role in future African disasters. The Marine Corps is hard pressed to maintain its warfighting proficiency and, in addition, it lacks some resources that the Army has, particularly for conducting sustained operations inland and psychological operations. The likelihood of large-scale disaster relief requires a serious, zero-based approach to force structure issues. A shortfall exists in active Army combat support and combat service support units which is made up by the Reserve component in wartime. In operations other than war, such as humanitarian relief, the Army will have to either overtax

strained active forces or mobilize Reserve units, a decision that has long-term implications for recruitment and retention. There is no easy solution to such issues, but they must be tackled head-on and resolved.

It would be easy for the Armed Forces to view humanitarian relief in Sub-Saharan Africa as a distraction. No doubt such operations are costly for forces hard-pressed to retain proficiency in primary warfighting skills. But three facts remain clear. First, human disasters born of conflict will continue to plague the region. Second, Americans will continue to demand engagement. And finally, only the military can respond efficiently and effectively when order collapses or authorities resist relief efforts. The more joint planners and commanders appreciate the nature of African strife and the more they prepare before conflicts occur, the greater the likelihood of fulfilling expectations with minimum cost to other efforts. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ This is the theme, for instance, of Douglas Jehl in "U.S. Policy: A Mistake?" *The New York Times*, July 31, 1994, p. E15, and Milton Leitenberg in "Anatomy of a Massacre," *The New York Times*, July 31, 1994, p. E15.

² J. Brian Atwood, "Suddenly, Chaos," *The Washington Post*, July 31, 1994, p. C9.

³ Quoted in Eric Schmitt, "Military's Growing Role in Relief Missions Prompts Concerns," *The New York Times*, July 31, 1994, p. 3.

⁴ For an elaboration of this subject, see I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 220–51.

⁵ Earl Conteh-Morgan, "Conflict and Militarization in Africa: Past Trends and New Scenarios," *Conflict Quarterly*, vol. 13, no. 1 (Winter 1993), p. 33.

⁶ Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), p. 1.

Writing Joint Doctrine

By CHARLES M. EDMONDSON

Tasked with the distribution and review of joint doctrine publications at the Naval Doctrine Command, I quickly learned they fall into two categories. One consists of well written pubs that truly present joint principles and precepts, the other of thinly veiled service works masquerading as joint doctrine. The latter are not always as patently self-serving as one might suspect. One-sided, provincial publications are a result of the process used to write them rather than intentional efforts to force particular views on other services. It is my intention to briefly outline a systematic process for writing joint doctrine which offers equitable representation for all services.

The current process of writing joint doctrine formally begins with the designation of a lead agent by the Joint Staff. An agent might be an individual service, combatant command, or Joint Staff element charged with developing, coordinating, reviewing, and maintaining doctrine. Few rules or strictures obtain especially in the development stage. An agent may decide to write a pub or assign it to a primary review authority (PRA). In either case, however, Joint Pub 1-01, *Joint Publication System—Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program*, sets out responsibilities to be followed by an authority in writing a doctrinal pub:

- ▼ consider existing joint and combined as well as service doctrine to ensure the draft reflects service and combatant command perspectives
- ▼ ensure that all sentences, paragraphs, and passages taken from previously approved pubs are quoted

Lieutenant Commander Charles M. Edmondson, USN, is a radar intercept officer currently assigned to the Joint/Combined Doctrine Division at the Naval Doctrine Command.

verbatim; changes to previously approved language resulting from developing joint doctrine will be highlighted for consideration during the staffing process

- ▼ employ previously approved terminology contained in JCS Pub 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, to the greatest extent possible.

Along with those responsibilities a PRA is *encouraged* to conduct coordination meetings to initiate early dialog with combatant command and service coordinating review authorities (CRAs). These meetings also highlight perspectives and/or doctrinal differences that should be considered in developing the initial draft. But the point is that coordination meetings or joint working groups are *not* required. Unfortunately, this means that a draft pub can be developed without joint input.

Often a PRA will simply assign the writing to an action officer with a warfare specialty that relates to the subject at hand or at least some background knowledge. The worst case is assigning it to an officer with little knowledge or practical experience of the subject. Either way, the process from then on is usually left up to the action officer who begins with a program directive (requirement) under one arm and a deadline under the other, and who determines the methodology and can:

- ▼ sit at a computer and write the pub alone
- ▼ hire a contractor to write the pub
- ▼ hold a series of joint working groups with subject matter experts from the services to jointly develop the pub
- ▼ undertake a combination of the above actions.

In fact, the joint working group is the best approach.

A good illustration of an agency that uses working groups is the Air,

Land, Sea Application (ALSA) Center. A four-service, major command-level agency that develops multiservice concepts, tactics, techniques, and procedures, ALSA was chartered by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Naval Doctrine Command, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and Air Combat Command. The center is governed by the Joint Actions Steering Committee comprised of general and flag officers who represent the chartering commands. The ALSA process is centered on multiservice working groups which identify similarities and differences in service doctrine and facilitate the means to resolve differences. The groups are conducted in series and last three to five days depending on the complexity of the task. This results in a product that is forwarded to service doctrine commands for review and comment. Based on this review, ALSA may either reconvene a working group to resolve any conflicts or incorporate minor changes in the pub for final approval. While ALSA pubs are not subject to Joint Staff or CINC review, its products are uniquely joint.

ALSA has proven to be quite productive and, in mediating among the services, it has been used partly as the PRA for Joint Pub 3-09.3, *JTTP for Close Air Support*. While not chartered to write joint doctrine, ALSA has been successful at it largely through an effective use of multiservice working groups. Time and resources can be saved in this way by offering the best joint product in an expeditious and efficient way. Contentious issues will arise in dealing with the complexities of certain subjects and divergent service perspectives; such problems, however, are best dealt with if identified early in the process and resolved at the action officer level.

A number of points should be considered in forming working groups to develop joint pubs:

IN BRIEF

▼ work through service doctrine centers—identify points of contact and subject matter experts from various commands (a mix of 20–25 action officers at the O4/O5 level with all services equally represented and CINC participation constitutes a highly desirable working group)

▼ research prior efforts on the subject—build on extant material, avoid duplication, and remember that plagiarism is a form of flattery but that earlier efforts must be properly acknowledged

▼ ensure that follow-up meetings include the same participants—continuity is important

▼ PRAs must exercise control of groups—entertain all views, but when impasses occur, note them and press on; facilitate compromise (using different phrasing sometimes can satisfy all parties, but in the worst case take the contributions of all sides into account)

▼ PRAs must act as honest brokers and avoid parochialism—attempt to reduce acrimony within a working group (prior liaison with all members helps to clarify goals, schedule briefings, encourage parties to bring relevant material to the table which sets stage for productive work)

▼ the host should provide the best computer assets possible—all working group members should leave with at least a written outline of the pub's direction (this allows them to adequately brief their chains of command on progress, receive responses on contentious issues, and identify portions of the pub that may be show-stoppers in the review process).

The above recommendations are not all-inclusive, but they offer a starting point for forming joint working groups. Experience shows that

there is frequently more common ground among the services than may be apparent at first. Face-to-face arbitration, negotiation, and explanation will help dispel distrust and parochialism. There are admittedly some issues that working groups cannot resolve and that must be tackled at higher levels, which is to be expected. But most can be addressed at the working group level in a manner that is satisfactory to all members. Starting with a genuinely joint effort in writing a doctrinal pub not only communicates the appropriate intent to the consumer, it gives each service pride of ownership in the resulting product. That approach goes far to ensure the eventual approval of the draft document as a full-fledged joint publication.

JFQ

... new from


INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Strategic Assessment 1995

U.S. Security Challenges in Transition

This 205-page illustrated summary of critical global security trends and challenges facing the United States offers a comprehensive analysis of the following regions and topical issues—

Asia-Pacific • Europe • Russia and Its Neighbors
Greater Middle East • Western Hemisphere
Sub-Saharan Africa • Oceans and the Law
Weapons of Mass Destruction • Force Structure
Arms Transfers and Export Controls
Information Technologies • Peace Operations
Transnational Threats • Trends in the Sovereign State
Economics



To order a copy [stock # 008-020-01342-1] at \$19.00 (\$23.75 foreign), send a check or provide a VISA/MasterCard number (with expiry date) to the Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954. Telephone orders can be made from 0800 to 1600 hours at (202) 512-1800; 48-hour Federal Express delivery is available for a flat rate of \$8.50 per order. FAX credit card orders can be placed 24 hours a day at (202) 512-2250.

JTFs: Some Practical Implications

By SUSAN J. FLORES

Last summer the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University held a symposium on "Standing Up a Joint Task Force" which focused on establishing, tailoring, training, and employing a joint task force (JTF). The discussions dealt with the services, CINCs, and Joint Staff as well as the role of U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) as the joint force integrator.

What are the key functional areas to address in standing up a JTF? How does planning and executing tasks in these areas impact on the outcome of a JTF mission? How do the areas interact? The functional areas consist of intelligence, planning, logistics, medical, C⁴, training, personnel, resources, force management, and interfaces. The issues considered by symposium participants to be pivotal in the successful accomplishment of a JTF mission fell under six categories: command and control, doctrine, information management, interfaces, JTF missions, and training/education.

Command and Control

The area of command and control is undoubtedly at the center of mission accomplishment. To develop these capabilities in a JTF, headquarters must use *real* participants in training evolution when possible. Links between billet-holders and their counterparts build teamwork which cannot be developed if stand-ins are used in training. The most cost-effective and performance-oriented scenarios include real staff members and JTF players developing relationships required for mission accomplishment. Virtual

Lieutenant Colonel Susan J. Flores, USMC, is a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.



U.S. Marine Corps (Timothy E. LeMaster)



U.S. Navy

training cannot supplant real training with actual participants.

There are some difficulties in defining a proper chain of command today. When operations involve other nations or agencies unity of command is more difficult. JTF commanders should not only be conscious of mission responsibilities, but also of the duty to translate the risks and options identified in the planning process up the chain so that nonmilitary leaders understand the military implications of their actions. Specifically, if JTF commanders translate risks into potential losses and expenditure of resources, this information should be passed to the leadership.

Doctrine

The subject of doctrine attracted a good deal of attention during the symposium, particularly its role in the training cycle. There was little agreement on those adjustments needed to offer better doctrinal guid-



U.S. Air Force (Conrad M. Evans II)

ance to leaders of JTFs. Some complained that there is too much doctrine and others too little. Between these two extremes were those who indicated that the scope and the specificity of doctrine needs work. There was a sense that significant voids exist in doctrine and that a better framework with common definitions and procedural recommendations is required. Comments also pointed to the need to integrate such information into planning and executing missions.

Participants were reminded that CINCs vote on doctrinal topics so the resulting pubs reflect their input. In the discussion one participant asserted that there was no need for

C-130s, F-16s, and C-141s on flight line for JTF-180.

U.S. Air Force (Betty Tsosie)

Joint Pub 4-06, *JTTP for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations*, while another stated that in Desert Storm there was such a need. But since it is a CINC's responsibility to return bodies from the theater, and service logistics channels must be used, this publication deconflicts roles and provides a sound framework to ensure the smooth transportation of deceased Americans back home.

Other publications identified as being in need of improvement are Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, and Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*. Some participants felt that Joint Pub 3-0 was cobbled together and offers little guidance on interfaces and integration. The discussion of the time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) in Joint Pub 5-0 also was cited as needing improvement. This document is normally sponsored and prepared by the J-5 in a joint command; yet it is logisticians who must execute much of it. And it is logisticians who suffer most of the criticism if materiel does not flow to a theater in the proper priorities. Again, interfaces and integration are vital in managing this important planning tool.

Finally, there was a discussion of joint doctrine as a catalyst in generating a joint culture. Many felt that the actual development of such a culture is key to the better planning and execution of JTFs. Although service cultures are important to successful mission execution by components, it is a joint culture that will enhance joint planning

and execution and strengthen the interfaces and integration processes in all functional areas.

Information

Proper receipt, tailoring, and use of information affects how well the JTF commander can influence actions in the conduct of his mission. Information impacts on command and control as well as on interfaces. And as handled by the media it also impacts on mission accomplishment. Passing ever larger amounts of information begets command and control-interface burdens. In the information age, there is such a thing as too much data, a glut that overwhelms JTF ability to filter input to determine what is mission essential.

There were differing views expressed on what information should be passed up the chain of command, how much should be provided, and what channels to follow. For example, a JTF surgeon has functional responsibilities to pass medical information that may conflict with certain prerogatives of the commander. Does a surgeon pass this information through his own functional channels? Should he always clear it through the commander first? Should it all go up through the command channels vice functional channels to ensure unity of purpose and reporting in the JTF? Many functional managers find themselves in this dilemma. The issue is compounded if the force is multinational and the event political, since there are several chains—multinational, national level politico-military including the National Command Authorities (NCA), and national theater



UH-60 Blackhawk dropping off scouts.

U.S. Air Force (Russ Pollanen)

level. All channels want to exert proprietary control over a commander's information and input. Finally, this situation could tempt a JTF commander to consider not forwarding information up the chain of command. Though blasphemy, there are advantages to not having direct connectivity to the NCA.

The JTF commander does not usually have command and control over all the governmental and non-governmental organizations in his area of responsibility. He has no tasking authority and little ability to influence these players. One of his strongest tools is the power of information. It is through the coordination process that players are brought together to share useful information and that the commander gains a level of influence and cooperation among many of these entities.

Interfaces

Most participants thought the term *interfaces* meant *all* interfaces—with multinational forces as well as both governmental and nongovernmental agencies, up and down the chain of command, across organizational lines to parallel commands, and among staffs within various commands.

In training JTF headquarters, particular attention must be paid to

staff positions that require an interface, since it is interface points and the management of information through them that often cause problems and inefficiencies in conducting JTF missions. Responsibility for positions should be identified, and individuals involved should be regularly trained and exercised. Where possible, they should be familiar with their counterparts in other staff elements, commands, and agencies. Assignments should be made with continuity and stability in mind, and individuals should not be frequently moved. Personnel turbulence at interface points hurts efficiency and effectiveness.

In terms of logistics, it is not only interfaces that matter; more important is the integration of operational plans and other information into logistic plans that provides the best logistic support. Further, a key interface point for this support is at the theater/strategic level, where joint theater logistic planners must be able to coordinate with service logistic providers. The greatest successes or failures in logistic support are determined here. If the JTF logistics function cannot tap into the theater/strategic logistic interface, it loses what can be mission-essential support. Both service and joint responsibilities are vital to a healthy interface.

Cautionary Notes

The NCA need not stand up a JTF for every contingency. There are occasions when one service or department can handle a crisis, and forming a JTF simply for the sake of jointness violates the principle of simplicity. Forming JTFs with service components as foundations means changing the mindset of component staff members, which normally does not occur easily or rapidly. Once a decision is made to stand up a JTF, the commander needs to rapidly promote a joint focus, and the staff needs to be promptly peopled with multiservice expertise.

The term *ad hoc* can have negative and positive meanings. Some participants thought that it was a

pejorative term suggesting a lack of planning and preparation, that various elements of a JTF had been thrown together at the last minute. Others thought it was synonymous with flexibility, the way in which elements of a JTF can be rapidly tailored to fit a specific mission. These individuals said that new concepts such as adaptive joint force packaging were merely the further development of a process of providing flexibility in the tailoring of a force for a mission.

Planners also need to think about JTF mission planning and execution in nontraditional or nonstandard ways. There are many missions that do not fit into the traditional mold and cannot be planned and executed using traditional norms. For example, it may be helpful to think of interagency task forces as a JTF variant in any operation where other governmental agencies have large roles. JTF planning routinely *excludes* other agencies because it is not customary to open the planning process to outsiders, a reluctance that must be overcome if JTFs are to succeed in interagency and multinational environments.

Training and Education

It is through joint training and education that a viable joint culture will be developed. The education community should start at the intermediate college level teaching doctrine in curricula that are systemic versus single service in focus. It is establishing doctrine as the framework for joint operations that will inculcate joint culture in the minds of all personnel. But there is a caution here. Many members of the joint community believe that one cannot be an effective joint officer without first being proficient in the core capabilities of one's own service. In other words, how can service expertise be provided in a joint planning framework without knowledge of service capabilities?

Many JTFs are stood up to respond to international crises that require a quick reaction, the first 16 to 72 hours being critical in planning. The key to quick mission execution is the level of training reached by

the JTF staff. Again, interface points are critical in effective mission planning. To *train to plan* well, the staff must actually *plan in training*.

Whatever training system is ultimately designed for JTFs, it must be mission-focused since training responds to operational requirements. If mission requirements are identified then the focus can be put on tasks, conditions, and standards to be established. As the force integrator ACOM will be intimately involved in this process.

Each of these themes impacted on the functional areas raised during the symposium. There was considerable cross-discussion among the panelists on these topics, which would suggest the close relationship and interconnectivity that functional areas have on each other. In addition, there are also several fairly clear messages that can be derived.

The more complexity that is built into a chain of command, the more difficult successful command and control becomes. Training that uses real billeteholders in actual planning exercises is most effective in finding successful means of dealing with complex command structures. Further doctrine development and integration is required, along with continued development of a distinctive joint culture to facilitate through informal cultural channels those tasks that must be done through formal working channels. With the advent of the information age, managing voluminous amounts of information available to the JTF commander is vital. Working interfaces are crucial at all levels. While flexibility can be beneficial, training and exercising the functional areas with their interfaces enhances a JTF's ability to perform missions. There are a number of creative approaches in use to accomplish JTF training and exercises. There is no right way. CINCs who have developed useful training procedures for JTFs should employ them. And there is still plenty of room to engage the joint force integrator, ACOM. Every successful training plan increases JTF effectiveness.

JFQ

Doctrine

JOINT PUBS UPDATE

The following joint publications have recently been approved:

▼ Joint Pub 3-56.1, *Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and Procedures for Joint Operations (Procedures and Formats)*, offers basic principles and doctrine for command and control (C²) of joint air operations which apply across a range of military operations—in war and operations other than war (OOTW)—to ensure unity of effort for the benefit of a joint force as a whole; addresses operational relationships, policies, procedures, and options for C² of joint air operations by designating a JFACC or using the joint force commander's staff (November 14, 1994; Joint Staff sponsor: J-7, lead agent: Air Force).

▼ Joint Pub 4-02, *Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations*, establishes doctrine for planning and employing health service support to joint forces and contains chapters on the health service support system, support planning, support in special operations, and support in OOTW; contains appendixes on medical threat, medical intelligence, and references (November 15, 1994; Joint Staff sponsor: J-4, lead agent: Army). JFQ

JOINT DOCTRINE WORKING PARTY

The Joint Warfighting Center hosted the 14th Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP) at the Naval Air Station in Norfolk on October 25-26, 1994. Sponsored by the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), Joint Staff, semi-annual working party meetings include representatives of combatant commands and services as well as the Joint Staff.

The Chairman's interest in doctrine has resulted in several initiatives. First, joint pubs are being revised and recast in a more readable 6 x 9-inch full-color format. Second, a *Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer* has been developed to offer a

survey of the primary publications. Third, a proposal to improve distribution of joint publications is currently in staffing. Finally, the entire system of publications may be revised to reflect the changes in priorities on certain topics.

JDWP voted to develop *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy* in the 2 series (Joint Staff sponsor: J-2, lead agent: ACOM). Action also was taken in favor of accelerating revision of Joint Pub 3-01.5 through publication of *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Missile Defense*. The information now contained in Joint Pub 3-01.5 will be included in Joint Pub 3-01, *Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats*, which is under development (Joint Staff sponsor: J-3, lead agent: Army, technical review authorities: Air Force, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command).

Another revision that was approved involves developing guidance on the joint operation of lines of communications which will be included in the next edition of Joint Pub 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*; the Joint Staff (J-4) will incorporate this requirement into the program directive for the revision.

Finally, the Army proposed developing doctrine for information operations, although there was discussion on delaying work in this area until more guidance is available and a joint warfare capability assessment is completed on information warfare. But JDWP decided that information warfare doctrine was important and an opportunity existed to incorporate it in Joint Pub 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare Operations*, which is under development. The Army was invited to provide information warfare input to be considered for inclusion in the next draft of Joint Pub 3-13 which will be retitled *Joint Doctrine for Information Warfare*.

Moreover, JDWP deleted two titles from the Joint Doctrine Publication System, namely, Joint Pub 1-06, *Joint Symbols and Graphics* (with the information to be included in non-doctrinal publications), and Joint Pub 1-09, *Employment of Selected*

Weapons Systems (information which is found in other doctrinal pubs).

Information briefings were presented on reorganizing joint pubs within the 2 series; Joint Special Operations Forces Institute (see item below); Joint Targeting Coordination Board; British and NATO approaches to peacekeeping; Joint Warfighting Center peace operations initiative; and Joint Pub 3-07 series on operations other than war.

The next JDWP will be hosted by U.S. Space Command in April 1995. JFQ

NEW NAVAL PUBS

A year in the making, the second in the series of six naval doctrinal publications has been issued as four others near completion. The series is issued by the Naval Doctrine Command which was established in 1993 to codify naval doctrine and bridge the gap between the refocused strategy laid out in the white paper, . . . *From the Sea*, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. With the end of the Cold War with its focus on a monolithic adversary, naval leaders made a shift in strategy to address the threats posed by regional conflicts. The publications spell out the concept that naval doctrine must fully support and be a logical extension of joint doctrine, and that the Navy/Marine team is committed to a full partnership in joint operations.

The first title which appeared in the series, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, *Naval Warfare*, reasserts the Navy/Marine team as the primary forward deployed mobile force projection resource available to the Nation. While naval forces are organized to fight and win wars, perhaps equally important is their contribution to deterrence. Naval doctrine places great emphasis on preventing conflict and controlling crises through its forward deployment and engaged presence.

Naval Doctrine Publication 2, *Naval Intelligence*, addresses the shift

in focus to operations in littoral regions, where outcomes can be controlled or influenced from the sea. The new focus of national strategy leaves the nature of potential threats more difficult to predict, thereby making naval intelligence perhaps more needed than ever before.

These publications may be obtained from the Navy Publications and Forms Directorate, 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19120 (cite SN 0700LP0000100 for NDP 1 and SN 0700LP0000200 for NDP 2). All comments should be sent to the Commander, Naval Doctrine Command, 1540 Gilbert Street, Norfolk, Virginia 23511. **JFQ**

SOF INSTITUTE

U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) created the Joint Special Operations Forces Institute (JSOFI) in 1994 to develop and integrate joint special operations doctrine, training, and education and research. JSOFI reviews joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for special operations, psychological operations, and civil affairs. It is coordinating review authority for joint doctrine and TTP and assigns technical review authority for specialized expertise within SOCOM. It also ensures that joint special operations doctrine and TTP are consistent with both other current joint and service doctrine and TTP.

The institute, which is located at Fort Bragg, also monitors development of joint training, participation in training exercises, and use of training facilities. It coordinates special operations simulations and programs as well as courses for quotas offered at component and national agency schools which are joint or common in nature. In addition, JSOFI is the proponent for Professional Military Education (PME) and integrates special operations-unique instruction at intermediate and senior-level colleges. It serves as the proponent for SOCOM-sponsored curricula and fellowships. It will also direct a library and research center, facilitate publication of literature on

special operations, and support SOCOM participation in national security fora and symposia. **JFQ**

CLEARINGHOUSE FOR SOF IDEAS

To help keep pace with a complex world, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is seeking innovative ideas from those who think that they have a better way. Accordingly, SOCOM has established a Special Operations Forces Clearinghouse to identify, nurture, and institutionalize innovative ideas on organizational structure, roles and missions, training, education, employment concepts, personnel policies, and command relationships within the special operations community.

Ideas do not have to be submitted in any particular format. And, though encouraged, it is not necessary to forward them up the chain of command. Unfiltered ideas are often more valuable than those that have had their controversial aspects finessed. But classified material or suggestions relating to current operations should not be forwarded. Any ideas submitted with the intention to contract for goods or services must be sent to the SOCOM Competition Advocate General.

All proposals will be acknowledged and sent to the appropriate agency for appraisal. Send ideas to SOF Clearinghouse, Headquarters, U.S. Special Operations Command, ATTN: SOCC-CIG, 7701 Tampa Point Boulevard, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, 33621-5323; FAX (813) 840-5109/DSN 299-5109. For further information call (813) 828-2646/DSN 968-2646. **JFQ**

Lessons Learned

RECENT OPERATIONS AND EXERCISES

Haiti. Operations Support, Uphold, and Sustain Democracy have taken center stage among operations other than war (OOTW). Moreover,

operations at Guantanamo exceed the scope of the 1991-93 Operation GTMO by receiving over 20,000 Cubans and involving two battalions, a brigade headquarters, and a combat arms battalion to support migrant movement. Another 8,000 Cubans in Panama required two battalions to augment security. The joint issues which surfaced at the strategic and operational levels during these operations include interagency processes, funding, public affairs, rules of engagement, selective Reserve call-up, personnel accounting, airlift of non-DOD personnel, linguist support, C4I, and availability of both the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) and the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS). The U.S. Atlantic Command interim joint after action report (AAR), due 90 days after the start of sustained operations, will yield many OOTW lessons from ongoing Haiti and migrant operations.

Southwest Asia. Iraq's positioning of forces on Kuwait's border last autumn resulted in Operation Vigilant Warrior, which raised familiar issues such as deliberate versus crisis planning, intelligence support, prepositioning, funding, coalition agreements, C4I, transportation planning, and Reserve call-up. The Exercise and Analysis Division, Directorate for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), Joint Staff, assessed air operations in Operations Provide Promise/Deny Flight. Under a combined task force (CTF), Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) operations feature complex planning, command lines, and coordination procedures under a multinational organization. Despite these factors, both operations were successful and benefitted from strong leadership and orientation. Such OOTW missions have political objectives with restrictive rules of engagement and heavy, top-down control—problems exacerbated by a confusing United Nations, NATO, and American command structure that is seemingly contrary to the principle of unity of command.

Lessons include the previously identified need for the services to offer component forces OOTW training and the requirement to provide re-deployed aircrews refresher training in order to maintain proficiency in normal combat skills. Other concerns include the fact that systems like the Contingency Theater Automated Planning System are not employed in the NATO environment, a lack of joint doctrine for reference, and the impact of indefinite sustained operations on the character of JTFs. Recommendations include reviewing Deny Flight/Provide Promise in the course of developing multinational and combined doctrine.

Rwanda. The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) AAR for Operation Distant Runner, the Rwandan noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO), is a superb example of comprehensive, useful, and timely lessons learned. In addition to the AAR required by the Joint Staff, EUCOM published a booklet containing an executive summary of major lessons, chronology of events, and listing of the eight Joint Universal Lessons Learned (JULLs) through both the EUCOM Center for Lessons Learned and CJCS JULLS database. In addition to mission statements the report presents key NEO actions and participants. Lesson topics include satellite communications with embassy staff, diplomatic clearance, liaison officers, USKAT 1949 keymat for deployed units, shipboard material such as maps, and joint crisis action planning methodology.

Asia-Pacific. In December 1994 a team fielded by the Exercise and Analysis Division (J-7) helped U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) evaluate joint exercises and observe JFACC operations aboard a carrier. While this was the second time a Tandem Thrust exercise placed the JFACC on a carrier, it was the first comprehensive test during a fully developed field training exercise. Part of a well established PACOM JTF training program, Tandem Thrust '95 had an independent JFACC (not a dual-hatted

service component commander) on *USS Kitty Hawk*, which released a roughly 200-sortie per day air tasking order with a 50-target set. While Ocean Venture '93 and Tandem Thrust '93 utilized sea-based JFACCs with their CJTFs aboard *USS Mount Whitney* and *USS Blue Ridge*, respectively, putting JFACCs on carriers raises questions of connectivity, berthing, and synergy because they are not collocated with the CJTF and Joint Targeting Coordination Board (the naval forces component commander was also embarked on *USS Kitty Hawk*).

For the JFACC, operating from a carrier was successful and highlighted the importance of functional component commanders maintaining independence by not blurring the responsibilities associated with dual-hatting service component staffs. Overall, C⁴I aspects of the exercise went smoothly and, though some off-loading occurred, berthing did not pose a significant problem. While most off-loading was done for the convenience of the exercise, in a large-scale operation alternate berthing arrangements may be needed to accommodate added staff and a full air wing. Other joint issues raised during Tandem Thrust '95 included synchronizing the air tasking order cycle with a CJTF apportionment decision, ensuring full input from component commanders, and operating in a real-world environment for effective joint training.

As in Provide Promise/Deny Flight, joint pubs were generally unavailable for reference, compounding the situation found across warfighting CINCs that joint doctrine often does not reach service component staffs—although this is the level from which combatant commanders normally draw their CJTFs and core staffs. (To counter this problem the Joint Staff is implementing a push-down distribution system to ensure that warfighters get joint pubs.)

Under the FY94 CJCS Evaluation Program, the Exercise and Analysis Division (J-7) also observed ULCHI Focus Lens '94, a major command post exercise. CINCPAC delegated exercise planning, execution,

and evaluation to CINC Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea. The areas observed were war planning, exercise execution and design, combined air operations, C⁴I/GCCS, theater missile defense, logistics, and compliance with joint doctrine. The joint issues addressed in a secret CJCS Summary Observation Report include exercise simulations, Patriot fire unit employment, Contingency Tactical Air Control Automated Planning System terminals and operator training, and the Combined Air Component Command's use of draft standard operating procedures. Again joint doctrine publications were largely unavailable at various headquarters. Though force commanders operating as part of a multinational command should follow doctrine and guidance ratified by the United States, the use of terms and procedures that deviate from joint doctrine causes confusion for non-theater personnel augmenting theater forces. Since most contingencies require augmenting forces, many of the benefits of standardized joint training are negated when commands employ non-joint terminology and procedures. Under CJCS statutory authority, guidance contained in joint doctrine is authoritative and will be followed unless, in the judgment of a commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.

— Contributed by
CAPT Rosemary B. Mariner, USN
Exercise and Analysis Division (J-7)
Joint Staff

JFQ

Education

SUN TZU WANTS YOU!

To stimulate innovative thinking on information warfare, the National Defense University Foundation is sponsoring the Sun Tzu Art of War Award for writing on all aspects of information warfare. Topics can range from measures that prohibit

adversaries from exploiting information to those that ensure integrity, availability, and interoperability of friendly information assets. Entries with a strategic or operational emphasis are particularly encouraged.

The competition is open internationally to military personnel and civilians. Unclassified as well as classified entries are accepted. Winners will receive prizes of \$500 for papers and \$1,000 for monographs. Entries in this year's competition must be received no later than April 15.

For further details contact Robert E. Neilson at (202) 287-9330 or on Internet at neilson@ndu.edu or by writing the Information Resources Management College, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319-6000.

JFQ

CALL FOR AUTHORS

Acquisition Review Quarterly, the professional journal of the acquisition corps, is soliciting papers reflecting scholarly examination, disciplined research, or supported empirical experience in the field of defense acquisition. In addition, articles on defense acquisition policy will be accepted. Consult the journal for style guidelines or contact the Defense Systems Management College Press directly at (703) 805-2892 [FAX: (703) 805-3856] for a copy of the guidelines.

The journal also is seeking referees. Interested parties should forward a short biography citing credentials in acquisition, publications, and research together with name, address, telephone and FAX numbers, and Internet address to *Acquisition Review Quarterly*, Defense Acquisition University, 2001 North Beauregard Street (Room 420), Alexandria, Virginia 22311.

JFQ

JFQuarterly Survey of Joint Literature

BOOKS

Michael D. Doubler. *Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994. 354 pp. \$40.00. [ISBN 0-7006-0675-0]


Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor. *The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995. 551 pp. \$27.95. [ISBN 0-316-32172-9]

Dennis S. Ippolito. *Blunting the Sword: Budget Policy and the Future of Defense*. Institute for National Strategic Studies. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1994. 185 pp. \$7.00. [ISBN 0-16-045229-5]

The Big "I" in World War II

The Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the 50th Anniversary of World War II Commemoration Committee are cosponsoring a symposium on wartime logistics on June 13, 1995 at the National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. Papers will be presented by scholars and specialists on issues relating to industrial mobilization, acquisition, national economic policy, infrastructure construction, Lend-Lease, and joint logistics at the theater level.

This event will focus on the pivotal role of logistics in the grand strategy of World War II. For details on registration, please contact COL Ross at (202) 475-0986/DSN 335-0986.



The Dock
(Port of Spain,
West Indies, 1943).

Painting by James Turnbull (Courtesy of U.S. Army Art Collection)

Paul D. Mather. *M.I.A.: Accounting for the Missing in Southeast Asia*. Institute for National Strategic Studies. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1994. 207 pp. \$9.50. [ISBN 0-16-036391-8]

Stephen J. McNamara. *Air Power's Gordian Knot: Centralized versus Organic Control*. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, August 1994. 191 pp.

Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin H. Bernstein, editors. *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 680 pp. \$34.95. [ISBN 0-521-45389-5]

James H. Toner. *True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics*. Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 1995. 202 pp. \$25.00. [ISBN 0-8131-1881-6]

MONOGRAPHS AND PROCEEDINGS

Center for Advanced Command Concepts and Technology. *Command and Control in Peace Operations*. Workshop no. 2. Institute for National Strategic Studies. Washington: National Defense University Press, December 1994. 12 pp.

Norman B. Hutcherson. *Command and Control Warfare: Putting Another Tool in the War-Fighter's Data Base*. Research report no. AU-ARI-94-1. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, September 1994. 63 pp.

James G. Lee. *Counterspace Operations for Information Dominance*. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, October 1994. 43 pp.

Ralph E. McDonald. *Cohesion: The Key to Special Operations Teamwork*. Research report no. AU-ARI-94-2. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, October 1994. 90 pp.

Fariborz L. Mokhtari, editor. *Peace-making, Peacekeeping and Coalition Warfare: The Future Role of the United Nations*. Proceedings of a conference cosponsored by the

National Defense University and Norwich University. Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1994. 293 pp.

ARTICLES

A.J. Bacevich, "The Use of Force in Our Time," *The Wilson Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 50-63.

John R. Ballard, "Marines Can Be Joint to the Core," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 120, no. 11 (November 1994), pp. 30-33.

Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 6 (November/December 1994), pp. 20-33.

John L. Clarke, "Which Forces for What Peace Ops?" *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 121, no. 2 (February 1995), pp. 46-48.

Eliot A. Cohen, "What To Do About National Defense," *Commentary*, vol. 98, no. 5 (November 1994), pp. 21-32.

John H. Dalton et al., "Forward . . . From the Sea," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 120, no. 12 (December 1994), pp. 46-49.

Wayne Danzig, "Coalition Forces in the Korean War," *Naval War College Review*, vol. 48, no. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 25-39.

Jonathan T. Dworken, "Rules of Engagement: Lessons from Restore Hope," *Military Review*, vol. 74, no. 9 (September 1994), pp. 26-34.

———, "What's So Special about Humanitarian Operations?" *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 13, no. 4 (October-December 1994), pp. 391-99.

Donald D. Gabrielson, "We Need Joint Data Fusion Centers," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 121, no. 1 (January 1995), pp. 66-68.

Stephen T. Ganyard, "Where Air Power Fails," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 121, no. 1 (January 1995), pp. 36-39.

Douglas Johnson and Steven Metz, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States: The State of the Debate," *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 18, no. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 197-213.

Terry J. McKearney, "Rethinking the Joint Task Force," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 120, no. 11 (November 1994), pp. 54-57.

Jeffrey McManus, "Develop a Joint Data Link," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 121, no. 1 (January 1995), pp. 64-66.

Paul David Miller, "U.S. Atlantic Command: Focusing on the Future," *Military Review*, vol. 74, no. 9 (September 1994), pp. 5-11.

Allan R. Millett, "Why the Army and the Marine Corps Should Be Friends," *Parameters*, vol. 24, no. 4 (Winter 1994-95), pp. 30-40.

Robert J. Muise, "Cleansing Maneuver Warfare Doctrine," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 120, no. 11 (November 1994), pp. 47-49.

Juan C. Neves, "Interoperability in Multinational Coalitions: Lessons from the Persian Gulf War," *Naval War College Review*, vol. 48, no. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 50-62.

Kevin E. Pollock, "Desert Storm Taught Us Something," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 121, no. 1 (January 1995), pp. 68-69.

James J. Schneider, "War Plan Rainbow 5," *Defense Analysis*, vol. 10, no. 3 (December 1994), pp. 285-304.

Martin N. Stanton, "Task Force 2-87, Lessons from Restore Hope," *Military Review*, vol. 74, no. 9 (September 1994), pp. 35-41.

DOCUMENTS

Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer*. Washington: Government Printing Office, July 15, 1994. 56 pp.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. *User's Guide for Joint Operation Planning*. Washington: Government Printing Office, September 11, 1994. 33 pp.

Naval Doctrine Command. *Naval Doctrine Publication 2. Naval Intelligence*. Washington: Government Printing Office, September 1994. 68 pp.

JFQ


JFQ lists recent selected titles of interest to its readers. Publishers are asked to forward new works to the Editor.

A READER'S GUIDE TO THE KOREAN WAR

A Review Essay by
ALLAN R. MILLETT

Just which Korean War one reads about depends on what lessons the author intends to communicate, for the history of the war reeks with almost as much didacticism as blood. For an indictment of American and United Nations intentions and the conduct of the war, see Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, *The Unknown War: Korea* (New York: Pantheon, 1988). Their sympathy for the plight of Korea is justified, but their bias toward the communists is much less compelling. British authors have written significant books: David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War* (London: Macmillan, 1964); Callum A. MacDonald, *Korea: The War before Vietnam* (New York: The Free Press, 1986); and Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). These authors give short shrift to politics, but offer historical perspective and emotional distance. After publishing the above work, however, MacDonald drifted into the Halliday-Cumings camp of anti-American criticism in his subsequent articles.

John Toland and Clay Blair, two of America's most popular (in both senses of the term) military historians, have few reservations about the legitimacy of intervention or the Republic of Korea's right of self-defense. They are more interested in assessing U.S. military performance, however, individual as well as collective. Although Toland integrates South Korean and Chinese interviews to great effect, his focus is on the American effort. Blair's strengths are a knowledge of the 8th Army and a keen eye for operational



President-elect Eisenhower in Korea, 1952.

U.S. Army Military History Institute

matters and sharp characterization. The two books in question are John Toland, *In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950–1953* (New York: Morrow, 1991), and Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953* (New York: Times Books, 1987).

Works by disgruntled critics of America, the Truman administration, and the Army have a place in a Korean War library. The key political jeremiad is I.F. Stone, *The Hidden History of the Korean War, 1950–1951* (Boston: Little Brown, 1952), which portrays Truman as the dupe of the sinister Asia First partisans at home and abroad, led by John Foster Dulles and Chiang Kai-shek. The military counterpart of Stone is T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: A Study of Unpreparedness* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), a sharp critique of American culture's weakening effect on soldiers and politics which was reprinted by the Army in 1993. A more recent book in the same genre is Bevan Alexander, *Korea: The First War We Lost* (New York: Hippocrene, 1986), and Joseph Goulden, *Korea: The Untold Story* (New York: Times Books, 1982), which is short on original information and insight. Robert Leckie's *Conflict: The History of the Korean War* (New York: Putnam, 1962) reflects an admiration for the American infantryman and support for the war. Burton I. Kaufman, *The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis,*

Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), is a measured study of the Truman administration's conduct of the war.

Anthologies of informed, scholarly essays (sometimes mixed with good oral history) offer easy entrée to the issues. The best of a full field are edited by Francis H. Heller, *The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective* (Lawrence: Regent's Press of Kansas for the Harry S. Truman Library, 1977); Bruce Cumings, *Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943–1953* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983); William J. Williams, *A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World* (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1993); James I. Matray and Kim Chull-Baum, *Korea and the Cold War* (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1993); Nagai Yonosuke and Akira Iriye, *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Korean War Research Committee, War Memorial Service-Korea, *The Historical Reillumination of the Korean War* (Seoul: War Memorial Service, 1990); and James Cotton and Ian Neary, *The Korean War as History* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1989).

Causes of the War

A Civil war—as Korea surely was—has internal and international dynamics and its own shifting sets of political actors, all of whom have agendas of their own. The Korean

Allan R. Millett is professor of history and Associate Director of the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University; he is the author of *Semper Fidelis: The History of the U.S. Marine Corps* and is working on a history of the Korean War.

War is no exception. It was one of many such wars in this century in which the "great powers" chose to make a smaller nation a battleground. Of course, small nations (often plagued with politicians with large ambitions and imaginations) are perfectly capable of enticing larger nations to help sway the local political balance against domestic rivals or other great powers. The Yi dynasty in Korea, for example, struggled to maintain its isolation and independence by playing the Chinese off against the Japanese, then appealed to Czarist Russia and the United States to protect it from its patrons. This too-clever but desperate bit of diplomacy resulted in two wars, the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, and thirty-five years of misery.

Just how much background one seeks is a matter of taste and time. There is ample reading: Carter J. Eckert, Lee Ki-Baik, Young Ick Lew, Michael Robinson, and Edward W. Wagner, *Korea: Old and New* (Seoul: Ilchokak, Publishers for the Korea Institute, Harvard University, 1990); George M. McCune and Arthur L. Grey, *Korea Today* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950); Choi Bong-Youn, *Korea—A History* (Rutland, Vt.: C.E. Tuttle Company, 1971); Donald Stone Macdonald, *The Koreans* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988); and Andrew C. Nahm, *Korea, Tradition and Transformation: A History of the Korean People* (Elizabeth, N.J.: Holly International, 1988).

Literature on Korean-American relations before 1950 stands as a monument to the power of after-the-fact wisdom. Nevertheless, the idea of a communist plot, orchestrated by Moscow, that fell on an innocent South Korea basking in peace and prosperity, must be relegated to the dustbin of history. Ravaged by forced participation in World War II, with an elite compromised by two generations which survived under Japanese rule, Korea was divided by more than occupying armies and the 38th Parallel. It was caught between two modernizing movements,

tainted legitimacy, authoritarian instincts, romantic economic dreams, and a dedication to political victory and control over a unified Korea. Kim Il Sung or Syngman Rhee would have felt comfortable on the throne of the kings of Unified Shilla at Kyong-ju. For perspective on the trials before 1950, see Kwak Tae-Han, John Chay, Cho Soon-Sung, and Shannon McCune, editors, *U.S.-Korean Relations, 1882–1982* (Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1982).

Works notable for their successful effort to link U.S. foreign policy with Korean political history include James I. Matray, *The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941–1950* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985); Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); James Merrill, *Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989); William J. Stueck, Jr., *The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947–1950* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981); Charles M. Dobbs, *The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945–1950* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981); and Lisle Rose, *Roots of Tragedy: The United States and the Struggle for Asia, 1945–1953* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976).

Whether regarded with awe or dismay (or both), an inquiry that stands alone for its ability to define the causes of the conflict is Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, vol. 1, *Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), and vol. 2, *The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947–1950* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). While Cumings may see wheels within wheels where none exist, and be a master of inference, he knows Korean politics and recoils from the cant of American politicians, generals, and diplomats. He is no admirer of the communists and especially Kim Il Sung, but his political bias prevents him from seeing any legitimacy in the anticommunist leadership in

South Korea, and he ignores the power of organized Christianity in the struggle for the soul of Korea. Also, Cumings has a limited understanding of the Armed Forces, so he often finds a malevolent purpose in simple bungling. While he writes too much, most of it is required reading.

The convoluted course of American diplomacy did not change in 1950. Arguments on the political direction of the war are found in Rosemary Foot, *The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), as well as in *A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990). Stueck's work on this aspect of the war is *The Necessary War: Korea, An International History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming 1995).

A major work by a Japanese scholar-journalist, Ryo Hagiwara, who covered North Korean politics for a Japanese communist newspaper, places the onus for initiating the 1950 invasion to Kim Il Sung. In *The Korean War: The Conspiracies by Kim Il Sung and MacArthur* (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju Press, 1993), he concluded that Pyongyang pursued a course of risky opportunism that assumed reluctant support from China and Russia.

Assessments of the literature are found in Rosemary Foot, "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," *Diplomatic History*, vol. 15, no. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 411–31, and Judith Munro-Leighton, "A Postrevisionist Scrutiny of America's Role in the Cold War in Asia, 1945–1950," *Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, vol. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 73–98. In addition, see Keith D. McFarland, *The Korean War: An Annotated Bibliography* (New York: Garland, 1986). Two other valuable references are James I. Matray, editor, *Historical Dictionary of the Korean War* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991), and Harry G. Summers, *Korean War Almanac* (New York: Facts-on-File, 1990).

U.S. Political Direction

After presiding over the end of World War II as an accidental President, Harry S. Truman certainly did not need another war but got one. His version of events is found in his two-volume *Memoirs* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955–56), a selective but vital account to understanding problems at home and abroad. Truman biographies abound in uneven quality: David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); Robert Donovan, *Tumultuous Years: the Presidency of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Norton, 1982); Richard F. Haynes, *The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973); Robert H. Ferrell, *Harry S. Truman and the Modern American Presidency* (Boston: Little Brown, 1983); Donald R. McCoy, *The Presidency of Harry S. Truman* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984); Bert Cochran, *Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1973); and William E. Pemberton, *Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer and Cold Warrior* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989).

Secretary of State Dean Acheson provided a personal interpretation of the war in *Present at the Creation*

(New York: Norton, 1969) and in an abridged account, *The Korean War* (New York: Norton, 1971). The standard biography of Acheson is Gaddis Smith, *Dean Acheson* (New York: Cooper Square, 1971), vol. 16 in the American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy series; see also Ronald L. McGlothlen, *Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia* (New York: Norton, 1993), and Douglas Brinkley, editor, *Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

Accounts by other participants include U. Alexis Johnson and J. Olivarius McAllister, *The Right Hand of Power* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984), and Harold J. Noble, *Embassy at War* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975). The institutional participation of the Department of State must be gleaned from documents published in *The Foreign Relations of the United States of America*, a standard though controversial publications program; volumes covering the period of 1950 to 1953 total 29 and were published between 1976 and 1984. (National Security Council documents are contained in the National Security Archive.)

The basic study on American intervention is Glenn D. Paige, *The Korean Decision, June 24–30* (New York: The Free Press, 1968). Distressed by postwar Korean politics, Paige later denounced the book as too sympathetic to Truman and Acheson, but it remains a good work.

Koreans on the War

Treatments of the war written by Koreans and translated into English reflect a wide range of perspectives—except of course in official (there is no other) accounts by North Korea. Among the South Korean sources, however, one can find various degrees of outrage over intervention, remorse over the role of the Koreans themselves in encouraging foreign intervention, deep sadness over the consequences of the war, pride and contempt over the military performance of Koreans, a tendency to see conspiracy everywhere, and a yearning for eventual unification, peace, economic well-being, and social justice. There is no consensus on how to accomplish these goals, only the certainty that war ruined hope of a better Korea for the balance of the century. The literature also reflects a search for innate order and the rule of law, against a pessimistic conclusion that politics knows no moral order. Among the more scholarly and insightful works by Korean scholars are Kim Myung-Ki, *The Korean War and International Law* (Clairmont, Calif.: Paige Press, 1991); Pak Chi-Young, *Political Opposition in Korea, 1945–1960* (Seoul: National University Press, 1980); Cheong Sung-Hwa, “Japanese-South Korean Relations under the American Occupation, 1945–1950” (doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, 1988); Kim Chum-Kon, *The Korean War, 1950–1953* (Seoul: Kwangmyong, 1980); Kim Joung-Won A., *Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945–1972* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975); Kim Gye-Dong, *Foreign Intervention in Korea* (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth Publishing, 1993); Cho Soon-Sung, *Korea in World Politics, 1940–1950* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); and, in



U.S. Army Military History Institute



U.S. Army Military History Institute

Korean, Kim Yang-Myong, *The History of the Korean War* (Seoul: Ilshinsa, 1976).

Syngman Rhee is mythic in the depth of his failure and the height of his success, including keeping America involved in Korea, more or less on his terms. He succeeded where Chiang Kai-shek, Ferdinand Marcos, and Ngo Dinh Diem failed. Robert T. Oliver, Rhee's American advisor and information agent, wrote two admiring books noted for their conversations and speeches: Robert T. Oliver, *Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1955) and *Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960* (Seoul: Panmun Books, 1978). A less sympathetic view is found in Richard C. Allen, *Korea's Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait* (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1960). Rhee's political contemporaries, who often shifted between being rivals and supporters, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. An exception is Louise Yim, *My Forty Year Fight for Korea* (London: Gollancz, 1952). Collective portraits of Korea's civilian and military leaders are found in Lee Chong-Sik, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1963), and Kim Se-Jin, *The Politics of the Military Revolution in Korea* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971).

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's account is *The U.S. Imperialists Started the Korean War* (Pyongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1977). For general background, see Robert A. Scalapino and Lee Chong-Sik, *Communism in Korea*, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), and Suh Dae-Sook, *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). For a biography of the late Great Supreme Leader, see Suh Dae-Sook, *Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) which is rich in data and insight. Expatriate North Korean officers discuss the war in Kim Chull Baum, editor, *The Truth About the Korean War* (Seoul: Eulyoo Publishing, 1991) along with Russian and Chinese participants.

Military Allies, Political Doubters

The study of political and military relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea is

not exactly a "black hole" in Korean War historiography, but it is certainly a gray crevice. Activities of the Military Advisory Group Korea (KMA) are described in very measured terms by Robert K. Sawyer, *KMA in War and Peace* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962), which is largely silent on atrocities, corruption, nepotism, and incompetence in the ROK officer corps. Little of the work deals with the 1950-53 period and it ignores the impressive fighting ability of some ROK army units and the professionalism of some of its officers. Sawyer is also less than frank in discussing U.S. Army policies that crippled the ability of the ROK army to resist the Korean People's Army invasion from the North. How, for example, could a ROK division manage with no tanks and only one battalion of limited-range 105-mm howitzers? Some of these problems receive attention in Paik Sun-Yup, *From Pusan to Panmunjom* (Washington: Brassey's, 1992), the memoirs of an outstanding corps and division commander. Paik, however, and his brother Colonel Paik In-Yup are quiet on their past in the Japanese army and their dogged pursuit of the communist guerrillas in the South, 1948-1950. The late Chung Il-Kwon, another ROK army founder, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. Frustrations over nation-building are more directly addressed in Gene M. Lyons, *Military Policy and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1950-1953* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1961).

The American military of 1950-53, absorbed with its own problems of survival, showed little understanding of the greater agony of Korea, including a much-maligned South Korean army. But there is no longer any excuse for such insensitivity. A novel by Richard Kim and Donald K. Chung, *The Three Day Promise* (Tallahassee, Florida: Father and Son Publishing, 1989), relates a heart-rending story of family separation and ravaged dreams. The war is summarized in a work published by the Korean Ministry of National Defense, *The Brief History of ROK Armed Forces* (Seoul: Troop Information and

Education Bureau, 1986). Soldiers of the 8th Army could not avoid dealing with Koreans since many served in American units under the Korean Army Training with the U.S. Army (KATUSA) program, still in effect today, but often a haven for well-born conscripts who speak some English. An official history of the KATUSA program prepared by Richard Weinert and later revised by David C. Skaggs was published as "The KATUSA Experiment: The Integration of Korean Nationals into the U.S. Army, 1950–1965," in *Military Affairs*, vol. 38, no. 2 (April 1974), pp. 53–58.

The Armed Forces

The body of literature on the strategic and operational performance of the Armed Forces in the Korean War is substantial and dependable, at least for operational concerns. Building on its commitment to a critical history in World War II, the military establishment worked with the same stubborn conviction that both the public and future generations deserved to know what happened in Korea and why. The products are generally admirable. For a big picture start with Doris Condit, *The Test of War, 1950–1953* (Washington: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988), the second volume in the History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense series. For the perspective on the Joint Chiefs see James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol. 3, *The Korean War* (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1979).

As one might expect, the Department of the Army went to work with a vengeance on the Korean War, but faded in the stretch. It produced an important policy volume: James F. Schnabel, *United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972). It published two theater-level operational titles: Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (1961), which covered the 8th Army and X Corps from June until late

November 1950, and Walter Hermes, Jr., *Truce Tent and Fighting Front* (1966), on the "stalemate" period from October 1951 to July 1953. The much-delayed tome by Billy Mossman, *Ebb and Flow* (1990), plugged the chronological gap from November 1950 to July 1951. The candor void is filled by Roy Appleman who dedicated his later years to writing tough-minded critiques, all published by the Texas A&M University Press: *East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea* (1987); *Escaping the Trap: The U.S. Army in Northeast Korea, 1950* (1987); *Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur* (1989); and *Ridgway Duels for Korea* (1990). His work is required reading for anyone interested in tactical expertise on cold weather and night operations. While Appleman does not quite supersede S.L.A. Marshall, *The River and the Gauntlet* (New York: Morrow, 1953) or *Pork Chop Hill* (New York: Morrow, 1956), he shares the battlefield. So does Shelby Stanton with *America's Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1989), which resurrects the reputation of LTG Edward M. Almond, USA, a commander who was endowed with intelligence and skill yet cursed by a wretched personality. Battle books of the coffeetable variety abound. For a detached analysis, see Russell A. Gugeler, *Combat Actions in Korea* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954; reissued in 1970 and 1987).

The official Marine history is Lynn Montross et al., *History of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950–1953*, 5 vols. (Washington: Historical Branch, G–3, Headquarters, Marine Corps, 1954–1972), which covers the experience of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. Of other semi-official Marine Corps books the best is Robert D. Heinl, *Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968).

The Navy published a one-volume official history: James A. Field, Jr., *History of United States Naval Operations Korea* (Washington: Director of Naval History, 1962); but two officers with line experience in World War II produced an earlier

and livelier account: Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, *The Sea War in Korea* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1957). Naval aviation receives special treatment in Richard P. Hallion, *The Naval Air War in Korea* (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing, 1986).

The Air Force published one large monograph on the Korean War, the literary equivalent of a one-megaton blast with endless fallout: Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953*, revised edition (Washington: Office of the Chief of Air Force History, 1983), which is encyclopedic on the Air Force's effort to win the war alone and too coy about the actual results. Recent anthologies from the Office of Air Force History on the uses of combat aviation include essays on air superiority, strategic bombing, and close air support in Korea, but their modification of Futrell will be slow.

Books by or about senior American leaders are generally well done and show how wedded these officers were to World War II norms. Two Army officers of high repute wrote histories of the war: J. Lawton Collins, *War in Peacetime* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), and Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967). But larger shadows blur the Collins-Ridgway war: Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall, Statesman, 1945–1959* (New York: Viking, 1987); D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur, Triumph and Disaster, 1945–1964* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985); and Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). D. Clayton James with Anne Sharp Wells, *Refighting the Last War: Command and Crises in Korea, 1950–1953* (New York: The Free Press, 1993), argues that World War II spoiled generals and distorted understanding of such concepts as proportionality and the relationship between ends and means. Limited war did not suit the high commanders of the 1950s, but only MacArthur challenged Truman's policy. This cautionary tale remains best told in John W. Spanier, *The*

Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1959). For naval leaders, see Robert W. Love, Jr., editor, *The Chiefs of Naval Operations* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980). The view from the top of the Air Force is found in Phillip S. Meilinger, *Hoyt S. Vandenberg* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989).

Logistics and Coalition Warfare

Korea provided an early test of whether the Armed Forces could support a limited war coalition expeditionary force and extemporize a regional, long-term base system at the same time. The answer, with many qualifications, was yes. The global picture (for one service) is described in James A. Huston, *Outposts and Allies: U.S. Army Logistics in the Cold War, 1945-1953* (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1988). A more detailed account of the combat theater by the same author is *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War* (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1989). An earlier study is John G. Westover, *Combat Support in Korea* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955). The best place to start the study of Korean War manpower and materiel mobilization is Terrence J. Gough, *U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War* (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1987). There are no comparable separate logistical histories for other services whose historians dealt with such matters as part of operational histories.

The Allies

The political environment on Korean affairs at the United Nations is found in the works of Stueck (see above); Yoo Tae-Hoo, *The Korean War and the United Nations* (Louvain, Belgium: Librairie Desbarax, 1965); and Leon Gordenker, *The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: The Politics of Field Operations, 1947-1950* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959).

At the height of the war the U.N. Command included ground



U.S. Army Military History Institute

forces from fourteen countries excluding the United States. Nineteen nations offered to send ground combat units as part of the U.S. 8th Army, but four proposed contributions were too little, too late. Three infantry divisions offered by the Chinese Nationalist government fell in another category: too large, too controversial. The largest non-U.S. contribution was the Commonwealth Division, organized in 1951 from British army battalions and similar units from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The smallest were companies from Luxembourg and Cuba. The ground forces included a Canadian brigade, Turkish brigade, New Zealand artillery regiment, and reinforced battalions from France, Thailand, Ethiopia, Belgium, Australia, Colombia, and the Netherlands. The force reveals a careful political and geographic balance: contingents from Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Air and naval forces were similarly reinforced. Eight navies and four air arms deployed combat elements while eight nations sent air and sea transport. Six nations sent medical units, five of which (Denmark, India, Italy, Norway, and Sweden) provided only medical assistance.

Since the limited size of non-U.S. and non-ROK contingents precluded them from having a great impact on the operational course of the war, their participation has been largely ignored in the United States. The exception is the dramatic participation of one or other units in a specific battle, for example, 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, which fought to the last bullet and trumpet call on the Imjin River in April 1951. This approach overlooks the potential lessons about coalition warfare represented in U.N. Command. It also ignores the useful exercise of seeing one's military practices through the eyes of allies, in this case nations that sent their best and toughest soldiers to Korea for experience. To honor them Korea published short accounts in English of these national military contingents: Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, *The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War*, 6 vols. (Seoul: War History Compilation Commission, 1975). The battlefields of Korea also have excellent monuments (many erected by Korea) to U.N. forces. The United States has made no comparable effort to recognize these forces, many of which were more effective given their size than comparable American

units. (For example, the most vulnerable corridor into the Han River valley was defended in 1952 and 1953 by the 1st Marine Division and Commonwealth Division.) Most American treatments of foreign contributions, such as they are, are incorporated in U.S. organizational histories.

The Commonwealth Division experience provides the most accessible account of service with the 8th Army and only muted criticism of the high command. The British history was written by a member of 1st Glousters, an esteemed general and able historian, Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley. His books are *The British Part in the Korean War*, vol. I, *A Distant Obligation* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1990) and vol. II, *An Honourable Discharge* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1994). They supersede C.N. Barclay's *The First Commonwealth Division: The Story of British Commonwealth Land Forces in Korea, 1950–1953* (Aldershot, U.K.: Gale and Polden, 1954). Other accounts include Norman Bartlett, *With the Australians in Korea* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1954); Robert O'Neill, *Australia in the Korean War*, 2 vols. (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1981 and 1985); Herbert Fairlie Wood, *Strange Battleground: The Official History of the Canadian Army in Korea* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery,

1966); Historical Section, General Staff, Canadian Army, *Canada's Army in Korea* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1956); and Tim Carew, *Korea: the Commonwealth at War* (London: Cassell, 1967). For an insightful review, see Jeffrey Grey, *The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988). An ambitious effort to integrate national history and the war is Ian McGibbon's *New Zealand and the Korean War*, vol. I, *Politics and Diplomacy* (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992) with a volume on operations to follow. Dennis Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) is a comparable work. On naval cooperation, see Thor Thorgrimsson and E.C. Russell, *Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters, 1950–1953* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965).

Russia and the War

From the beginning there were the Soviets—until they were written out of the history of the Korean War by their own hand and by those Western historians who could not identify a bear even if he was eating out of one's garbage can. The Soviet Union may not have started the war, but it certainly gave it a big bear hug and embraced it past Stalin's death and a period of détente in the mid-1950s. The collapse of the Soviet

Union has reopened the issue of Russian connivance and collaboration, bolstered by tantalizing glimpses of communist internally-oriented histories and supporting documents. Retired Russian generals and diplomats have become regular participants in Korean War conferences, but Russian histories are not translated or widely available to Western scholars with the requisite language skills. Nevertheless, the Russian role as sponsor continues to receive clarification and is not diminished. Early plans emerge in Eric Van Ree, *Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945–1947* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). Most recent admissions and revelations come from Soviet veterans who have talked to the media or participated in international conferences, including pilots and air defense specialists. Documentary evidence has come primarily from Communist Party and foreign ministry archives. Material from the armed forces and KGB has been limited. Few documents have been translated and published, although Kathryn Weathersby, a Russian historian at Florida State University, has taken up the grail of translation and interpretation through the *Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project* and working papers which have been issued by Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars in Washington. The British scholar Jon Halliday has also been active in interviewing Russian veterans.

Much of Moscow's involvement is found in works on Sino-Soviet relations primarily interpreted from a Chinese perspective. Two titles in this genre are Robert R. Simmons, *The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow, and the Politics of the Korean War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), and Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993).

China and the War

The recent release or leakage of Chinese sources, especially the war-time correspondence of Mao Zedong, has resulted in a new wave of scholarship by Hao Zrifan, Zhai Zhihai,



U.S. Army Military History Institute



Chen Jian, and Michael Hunt in both article and essay form. These scholars add texture to such earlier works as Joseph Camilleri, *Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and Its Aftermath* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980); Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China: 1941–1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); and Melvin Gurtov and Byoong-Mao Hwang, *China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).

One result of international collaboration on exploring the conflict between the United States and China is Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, editors, *Sino-American Relations, 1945–1955* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1989). A critical view of the People's Liberation Army is found in Zhang Shu-gang, *Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, forthcoming 1995), based largely on a self-assessment. Three Western works of lasting value are Alexander L. George, *The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and Its Aftermath* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (New York: Macmillan, 1960); and Walter A. Zelman, *Chinese Intervention in the Korean War* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967). For a face of battle account of

PLA struggles in the winter of 1950–51, see Russell Spurr, *Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950–1951* (New York: Henry Holt, 1988), which is based on interviews with veterans.

Aftermath

Finally, the impact of the war is discussed with care in the anthologies by Heller and Williams cited earlier. Also see the work edited by Lee Chae-Jin, *The Korean War: A 40-Year Perspective* (Claremont, Calif.: Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1991). One beneficiary of the war was Japan—or at least those Japanese political groups allied to America, capitalism, and the social status quo. War-fueled prosperity and the diminished ardor for social reform is captured in Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989), and Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, vol. 2 (Spring 1993), is dedicated to “The Impact of the Korean War” with essays on Korea, China, Japan, and the United States.

JFQ

GETTING TO KNOW JOMINI

A Book Review by
MICHAEL D. KRAUSE

The Art of War

by Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini,
with a new introduction
by Charles Messenger
Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1992.
410 pp. \$35.00
[ISBN 1-85367-119-3]

If one sampled a group of officers today about the influence of Jomini, few would respond with any real insight. This is peculiar since many concepts and terms (such as logistics, lines of communication, and structure of military organization) are based on his work. By contrast, the name of Clausewitz is instantly recognized, and his trinity—government, military, and people—as well as the center of gravity, friction, and fog of war are widely held tenets of military theory. Moreover, his views on the objectives and conduct of war are well known. One can readily discern the Clausewitzian hand in the concept of defense over offense as well as in the culminating point of offensive operations. The aphorism “war is the continuation of policy by other means” is a widely held article of faith. All of this makes Clausewitz the leading theorist of war in American military circles.

Jomini, however, is relatively unknown despite the fact that his ideas are implicit in military structure and doctrine. *Précis de l'Art de Guerre* (*The Art of War*) appeared in Paris in 1838 and was reprinted augmented with an appendix in 1855. The English translation under review here, which has an introduction by Charles Messenger, is a facsimile edition. When it was first published in 1862 tactics as taught at West Point

Colonel Michael D. Krause, USA (Ret.), is a defense analyst and has taught military history at both the National War College and the U.S. Military Academy.

were largely derived from this book and it was said that every Union and Confederate commander rode into battle with a sword in one hand and a copy of Jomini in the other.

Antoine de Jomini (1779–1869), a Swiss of French extraction, joined Napoleon's army as a volunteer aide-de-camp to Marshal Ney during the Austerlitz campaign. He had earlier served on the Swiss general staff and commanded a brigade. His four-volume *Traité des Grandes Opérations Militaires* brought him to Ney's attention. Appointed a colonel by Napoleon, Jomini earned many honors including a barony. He was Ney's chief of staff in Spain and gained the rank of general in the French and Russian armies, a conflict of interest that excused him from the disastrous Russian campaign. Later he was made an aide-de-camp to the Czar and devoted himself to establishing a staff college in Moscow before retiring to write. He was recalled to St. Petersburg as an advisor to the Czar during the Crimean War and subsequently returned to France where he lived out his days.

When rumors of renewed war with Prussia spread in 1806, Jomini had predicted that the enemy would advance through the Erzgebirge pass at Hof. He advised Napoleon to concentrate his forces at Bamberg, a short distance away, and prepare for a counteroffensive. When Napoleon asked how he could be certain of the enemy's intentions, Jomini reputedly said that he had studied the map of Europe and read history. This advice aroused Bonaparte to amass his troops, take the offensive, catch the Prussians before they could assemble, and crush them at Jena and Auerstadt. Jomini was at Jena as was Karl von Clausewitz; the former epitomized the practical and scientific approach to war and the latter represented the theoretical.

Jomini gained wide acceptance because of his distillation of the his-

tory of war into practical principles. Moreover, his ideas on the military instrument were adopted in the United States. Like Sun Tzu's five conditions for victory, Jomini identified twelve for an effective military instrument. He wrote at a time of intense upheaval as the French Revolution and Napoleonic era spawned the start of modern war. Europe remained continuously in conflict between 1789 and 1815. Empires and kingdoms rose and fell; millions fought and tens of thousands died. New means of harnessing military power were forged and states that failed to grasp them were destroyed. Jomini and Clausewitz witnessed these events and contrasted Napoleonic warfare with the limitations of the Frederician style of war.

In his treatise on practical application, *The Art of War*, Jomini stipulates that an effective military must have a good recruiting system, organization, and national reserves. Reserves should be able to double as standing forces. Increases in potential necessitate quick and dramatic means of organization vis-à-vis order of battle—from company level to corps—and a structure to govern and support forces. There also must be a recruitment system, either voluntary or compulsory, based on a national consensus and a commitment to defend the state.

The military must be provisioned and then sustained in battle. Jomini's term for this, logistic support, is familiar. By contrast, Clausewitz divorced logistics from the conduct of war.

One basic aspect of an effective military is superiority in weaponry: "... armament is still susceptible of great improvement;

the state which takes the lead in making them will secure great advantage. The means of destruction are approaching perfection with frightful rapidity." Jomini warned that the quantity-quality equation might offer advantages but cannot assure victory: "The superiority of armament may increase the chances of success in war: it does


not, of itself, gain battles, but it is a great element of success."

Another condition for an effective military is doctrine, which Jomini characterized as "good combat, staff, and administrative instructions." He grounded his ideas about doctrine in history. In addition, he indicated that engineers and artillerymen needed to interact on doctrinal matters and recognized the technological complexity of engineering and gunnery.

Jomini viewed a general staff—though not the German model—as applying principles on the battlefield. Inherent in his approach was a staff officer well versed in both theory and practice, a concept that runs throughout his work and that influenced many military institutions. On the functions of a general staff he stated: "In times of peace [it] should be employed in labor preparatory for all possible contingencies of war. Its archives should be furnished with all statistical, geographical, topographical, and strategic treatises and papers for the present and future." Operational plans must be drawn up to prepare for all possible contingencies. In short, nothing should be omitted by the general staff in readying for conflict. Jomini refers to a chain of "command . . . directing the principle operations of war." He also outlined a system for selecting theater commanders.

In sum, his conditions for an effective military instrument call for:

- ▼ thorough recruitment
- ▼ sound organization
- ▼ national reserves
- ▼ combat, staff, and administrative instructions (doctrine)
- ▼ discipline, punctuality, and subordination based on conviction
- ▼ well developed rewards
- ▼ thoroughly trained engineers and artillery
- ▼ superior armaments
- ▼ general staff officers with a theoretical and practical education
- ▼ commissaries, hospitals, and general administration
- ▼ a system of assigning command and directing principle operations of war
- ▼ means "to excite and keep alive the military spirit of the people."



Antoine de Jomini

nal, educational, theoretical, and leadership development in our view of military history. There is also a strong case to be made for the primacy of Jomini's ideas in all areas of our military in theory and practice.

Jomini originated the idea of principles of war that were adapted by the American military. He said that if force is applied at the right time, in the right place, and in the right way, success follows. One principle underpins operations: "... [throwing] by strategic movement the mass of one's army at the decisive point of a theater of war; and also upon the communications of the enemy and as much as possible without compromising one's own ... to engage a fraction of the enemy army with the mass of one's own ... to engage the enemy line at the most critical juncture [and] critical time and with ample energy." This work makes a practical appeal to military history.

Jomini and Clausewitz witnessed a revolution in military affairs (RMA), change in military structure that harnessed the people in defense of the nation. Furthermore, Napoleon's contribution in terms of organization was the corps. This was revolutionary because a corps included infantry, cavalry, artillery, and support elements in a coherent organization that could fight unaided against superior forces and march 15–20 miles a day. A corps moved from one location to another with alacrity and assurance. This enabled Napoleon to plan operations and then campaign with mutually supporting forces for simultaneous action at points of concentration which yielded decisive results. Recruiting, training, and equipping were based on *levee en masse*. These organizational changes revolutionized the conduct of operations. The dominance of maneuver was restored to accomplish decisive results in battle. And battles won campaigns which, in turn, gained the objective of war: an opponent's will. Both Jomini and Clausewitz wrote guides to this RMA.

Amphibious operations are categorized by Jomini as descents, which

rank "among the most difficult in war when in presence of a well prepared enemy." He also points out the joint nature of this effort: "Since the invention of gunpowder and the changes effected by it in navies ... an army can make descent only with the assistance of a numerous fleet of ships of war which command the sea, at least until the debarkation of the army takes place." Such advice must have influenced the selection of beachheads in World War II. "Deceive the enemy as to the point of landing, choose a spot where the vessels may anchor in safety and the troops land together; infuse as much activity as possible into the operation, and take possession of some strong point to cover the development of the troops as they land; put on shore at once a part of the artillery." For the German defenders of Normandy he seems to have added: "I can only advise the party on the defensive not to divide his forces too much by attempting to cover every point. ... Signals should be arranged for giving prompt notice of the point where the enemy is landing, and all the disposable force should be rapidly concentrated there, to prevent his gaining a firm foothold ... an army landing upon a coast should always keep its principal mass in communication with the shore ... first care should be to make sure of the possession of one fortified harbor, or at least of a tongue of land which is convenient to a good anchorage. ..."

Clausewitz, who was chief of staff to General Scharnhorst at Jena when Jomini faced him, foresaw disaster in the Prussian campaign plan with its lack of unity of effort and command. He was resolved to discover why Prussia was so severely defeated by France and, in so doing, he wrote *On War*, which was published as an incomplete work by his widow in 1831. But Jomini wrote for another thirty years and became the more practical thinker, which appealed to American military minds.

Why is Jomini almost eclipsed by Clausewitz? To claim that he was

right and Clausewitz was wrong on key issues is to suggest that one man's theory bested the other's. Clausewitz was indeed wrong to divorce the conduct of war from logistics. Jomini saw logistics—getting forces to a theater or battle—as vital to commanders and the outcome. In coining the term logistics he asked if it was simply a science of detail. In discussing what logistics meant previously (march orders, laying out camps), he provided an all-encompassing way to set an army in motion, and to get it to a new location, while maintaining maneuver momentum. He cited what must be done "in harmony and concert" to support a commander's concept of operations. Jomini brought together logistics and operations in a revolutionary way so that today deploying and sustaining forces are central to a successful campaign. Jomini conceived of national military organizations in practical terms while Clausewitz advanced his trinity. Both men used history and recognized the RMA of their day as fundamental to the conduct of war. Jomini was not a philosopher but his views are imbedded in American military culture whereas Clausewitz has only recently gained ascendancy in this country. It is therefore an irony that Clausewitz is well known and Jomini remains virtually obscure.

In sum Jomini is practical in the way he advocates art in war. His basic principle is to mass force at the right point, at the right time, and in the right way so that the outcome will be decisive. Logistics is an integral part of the military equation. If you read Clausewitz, do not neglect Jomini. He is a must for every student of joint warfighting. Invest in *The Art of War*.

JFQ

JOINT IN SPITE OF THEMSELVES

A Book Review by


BRIAN R. SULLIVAN

Most Americans would agree that the Nation needs a powerful Navy. But even advocates disagree sharply over its size, shape, and functions. For a century, such disputes involved more than academic arguments or bureaucratic squabbles. They ultimately determined the way the Navy prepared for war and the outcome of battles waged by its sailors and their ships. In *One Hundred Years of Sea Power*, George Baer tells the story of the modern Navy by explaining the theories on which it was built and the consequences of those theories in the six major wars since 1898.

The author is an eminent historian and a fine writer; but *One Hundred Years of Sea Power* benefits in particular from what he has learned as chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College, where so much of our naval theory has been developed and tested. The book not only demonstrates a deep understanding of the thinking that has propelled the Navy over the last century but does so in a vivid, clear, and exciting way. Despite his evident sympathy for the men who charted the Navy's course, however, Baer does not hesitate to point out the failures in their theory. In fact, the core of the book is a critique of the patron saint of the Naval War College as well as the intellectual father of the modern Navy, Alfred Thayer Mahan.

Mahan was not an intellectual cast among sea dogs, but an articulate advocate of commonly-held ideas on seapower shared by senior officers and Navy Department officials in the late 1880s. To sway both

SH-3 Sea King landing on USS Barry in the Arabian Gulf.



U.S. Navy (Craig McCutcheon)

One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990

by George W. Baer

Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.

553 pp. \$42.50

[ISBN 0-8047-2273-0]

the public and Congress, he wrote *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*, which was published in 1890. It became the most powerful work written on the purpose of naval forces. While the book appeared to be a history of Britain's rise to world primacy through seapower, Mahan used the story of the Royal Navy in the age of sail to argue for an American naval policy in the age of steam. To be a global power, he strongly suggested, the Nation needed a large force of battleships to defend its shores. In time of war, this concentrated battle fleet would take offensive action against an enemy fleet, defeat it or drive it into harbor, and control the sea. Obviously, that required the building and maintenance of a battle fleet in peacetime.

The Influence of Sea Power appealed to a readership ready to be persuaded. Congress had already approved the first two modern American battleships in 1886 and it authorized construction of another three even more powerful ships in 1890. These and the cruisers ordered with them gave the Navy the force it needed to smash the Spanish fleets in Manila Bay and outside Santiago harbor in 1898. As a result, the United States acquired an empire and status as a world power. Mahan's

theories seemed vindicated by success in war.

After former Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt entered the White House in September 1901, Mahan's thought became government policy. While disagreeing with Mahan over details, the new President agreed on the prime importance of battleships, the need to keep the battle fleet concentrated in war, and its use as an offensive weapon. Indeed, as Baer points out, Roosevelt's major motivation to build the Panama Canal was to allow the unification of the battle fleet for war, since in peace it was divided as a precaution between the Atlantic and Pacific.

The American emphasis on battleships increased as a result of the Royal Navy's creation of the all-big-gun *Dreadnought* in 1905–06. In fact, the Navy had already considered such a ship but delayed construction until plans were perfected. When Roosevelt left office, the United States had laid down six dreadnoughts and set a pattern of authorizing two battleships per year indefinitely. By the outbreak of World War I, America had the world's third largest battleship fleet.

President Woodrow Wilson's insistence on strict neutrality conflicted with the desire of the naval leadership for readiness. But the

Brian R. Sullivan is a member of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. He has taught military history at the Naval War College and Yale University.

President, naval leaders, and Congress agreed to the Naval Act of 1916 as the best way to protect freedom of the seas, regardless of the outcome of the war. The 1916 act projected a gigantic five-year building program of 156 ships, including sixteen huge battleships and battle cruisers, to make the Navy the most powerful in the world by 1922–23.

Mahan's stress on the primacy of the battleship had been criticized by other naval thinkers for years. Critics said that the Navy needed light craft, especially for operations in the Caribbean, but that Congress had been mistakenly convinced by Mahan to fund a navy top heavy with capital ships. Experience during World War I seemed to support such criticism. The struggle the Navy actually had to wage bore no resemblance to that envisioned by Mahan. The German High Seas Fleet had already been driven into port by the Royal Navy. As a result, no American battleship fired a single broadside in anger in 1917–18.

Germany contested control of the Atlantic with U-boats. Instead of offensive fleet actions, the Navy fought to gain sea control in partnership with the Royal Navy by defensive troop convoy protection, patrolling by light anti-submarine craft, and mine laying. It had not occurred to Mahan that, despite defeating its surface fleet, an enemy might contest control of the seas by other means. Yet advances in technology made ideas about seapower based on 18th century models obsolete.

Just before the November 1918 armistice, Wilson and his naval advisors agreed to augment the battle fleet by an additional 16 capital ships. They considered the naval events of 1917–18 an aberration. The goal of the new building program was to ensure American strategic independence in the postwar world through battleship superiority over Britain and Japan. Such plans did not long survive. In 1921, President Warren Harding and Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes decided to avoid a post-war arms race by proposing world disarmament. They could hardly offer to reduce American land armaments in return

for similar reductions by foreign powers. The Army was far too small for such a pledge to have meaning; but the Navy was large and growing.

Hughes opened the Washington disarmament conference in 1921 by advocating that most battleships should be scrapped, plans for new battleship construction canceled, parity in British and U.S. battleships established, and smaller ratios for other powers set. The conference agreed and the Washington Treaty followed. But the accord did not restrict submarines and America held the right to build 135,000 tons of aircraft carriers. Over the next sixteen years, the Navy received little funding for construction because of treaty limits, isolationism, lack of a perceived threat, and the Great Depression. But it built two large aircraft carriers in the 1920s, *USS Lexington* and *USS Saratoga*, based on the hulls of uncompleted battle cruisers. The fleet problems of 1929 and 1930 proved carriers to be more versatile than battleships. Taking advantage of the balance of the 135,000 tons allowed for carrier construction, Congress authorized four more by 1935.

The Navy probably had its greatest friend ever in Franklin Roosevelt, who like his cousin Theodore also had been an Assistant Secretary of the Navy. But it was not until 1938 that Japan's aggression in China combined with rejection of the Washington Treaty persuaded the President and Congress to authorize a larger navy. In response to a growing sense of danger, three construction bills passed in 1938–40. As planners designed a balanced fleet, the emphasis was on battleships and carriers. But the Navy also ordered over a hundred fleet submarines, designed to attack large warships. With these appropriations, the Navy was able to get about any type of ship it wanted.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor crippled much of the battle fleet that had survived the Washington Treaty. Out of necessity the Navy turned to carriers and submarines for offensive operations.

Both types of ships won notable victories, carriers earlier and spectacularly, starting at Midway; submarines later but just as importantly by strangling Japan's home islands in 1944–45. In the Atlantic, the Navy helped win a second, longer struggle against German U-boats. But in the Atlantic as well as the Pacific, the war showed that American naval experiences in 1917–18 were not an aberration. Contrary to Mahan's ideas, the Navy conducted joint campaigns in both oceans, particularly in support of gigantic amphibious operations. It was the Japanese navy that fought an independent naval war based on Mahan's principles and suffered crushing defeats.

Among other reasons, it was the extraordinary flexibility of aircraft carriers that persuaded the naval leadership to make them the centerpiece of the post-war Navy. Carrier air could attack enemy fleets, as at the Coral or Philippine Seas, and they could sink submarines, protect convoys, support amphibious landings, strike land targets, shoot down planes, and provide reconnaissance, all at ranges and speeds beyond anything possible for battleships. These capabilities also assumed political importance since no enemy navies survived the war. At the time, the Soviet navy could offer only feeble coastal defense and other navies of significance were allied to the United States. Under such circumstances, control of the seas by America and its allies seemed a given even after the start of the Cold War. But carriers could perform many tasks besides sea control.

The Navy struggled through a difficult period between World War II and Korea, however, thanks to the advent of the atomic bomb and long range jet bombers. With no serious naval rival to prepare against, and pushed aside in perceived importance by the Air Force, the Navy attempted to define a role around atomic weapons. Naval leaders proposed supercarriers large enough to launch bombers on nuclear strikes against Soviet targets. But President Harry Truman denied the Navy supercarrier. To add insult to injury,

Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson proclaimed amphibious operations obsolete. In the first years of Truman's administration, the Navy shrank to one-fifth of its size on V-J Day. In 1950, what did the United States need a Navy for?

The Korean War provided the answer by indicating the effectiveness of naval operations in limited conflicts against allies of continental powers like the Soviet Union and China. In particular, the Korean peninsula, surrounded on three sides by water, allowed carrier air to strike anywhere that land-based air could. The landings at Inchon and Wonsan and the evacuation from Hungnam proved that amphibious operations were not only feasible but effectual. The success of carriers created increased support for supercarriers. *USS Forrestal*, authorized in 1952, was the first in a line of huge carriers that the Navy will receive into the next century.

Developments in submarine technology provided the Navy with another purpose. In 1955, the first nuclear submarine, *USS Nautilus*, became operational. Able to remain under water for months rather than hours, nuclear submarines provided enormous potential for undersea warfare. For example, as *USS Nautilus* went into service, the Navy began work on larger submarines capable of launching intermediate range ballistic missiles. The first Polaris entered service in 1960 and the Navy gained a central role in strategic nuclear deterrence. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, the Navy had undergone a great revival, with two types of warships contending for the central role of capital ship.

For reasons of sea control, supercarriers—not ballistic missile submarines—provided the Navy's capital ships. By the 1960s aviators had come to dominate the service. Naval participation in Vietnam accentuated this trend by giving prominence to carrier strike operations over the North. Using tactical naval aviation to carry out a strategic bombing campaign created enormous strains on the Navy's air wing. Furthermore, the commitment of naval resources to that aspect of the

Vietnam War deprived riverine and coastal interdiction operations of the requisite support. Naval activities in Vietnam bore little resemblance to Mahan's notions about the proper use of American seapower; but his influence lived on in the Navy's emphasis on capital ship operations.

The Soviet navy expanded significantly in the 1970s and 1980s. After Vietnam, the Navy focused on that threat. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, the Chief of Naval Operations in 1970–74, tried to reorient the service from carriers and submarines to a mixture of frigates, light helicopter carriers, patrol boats, and air-cushion skimmers to deal with the growing Soviet submarine fleet. Zumwalt believed the eighty year-old doctrinal stress on offensive strikes into enemy waters by capital ships had been rendered obsolete by missiles, tactical nuclear weapons, and high-performance aircraft. He proposed cruise missiles for strike operations but failed to get support from inside or outside the Navy. Instead, during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations, the Navy scrapped its last World War II construction but laid down few replacements. Successive Presidents expected a war with the Soviets to be either a strategic nuclear exchange or a short, intense land war in Europe. Aside from ballistic missile submarines, the Navy could play little role in either case. For the first time since Mahan, the Navy had lost the support of both the public and politicians.

In the late 1970s, naval leadership developed a concept for employment in a war against the Soviet Union known as maritime strategy. As Baer notes, its purpose was to create a coherent war plan, build a consensus in the Navy, and regain public support. In 1985 maritime strategy was presented to Congress and made public the next year. This strategy proposed an immediate naval offensive against the Soviets if war broke out to shape the conflict into a protracted, non-nuclear struggle on a global scale. With the support of President Ronald Reagan and

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman asked Congress for a 600-ship navy with heavy emphasis on carriers, attack submarines, and amphibious ships to back maritime strategy. Congress gave Lehman most of the ships he requested.

In effect, the Navy reintroduced the ideas of Mahan with the capabilities of the late 1980s. It presented the Nation a strategic plan that, if accepted, would have made the Navy the foremost service, free to wage independent war as advanced in the era of Theodore Roosevelt. But though the service got the majority of ships it wanted and regained public support, it ultimately failed to persuade national leaders of the wisdom of maritime strategy. To replace nuclear deterrence with a doctrine based on a war of attrition that could escalate into nuclear war seemed much too risky. In any event, as the Soviet threat collapsed in 1989–91, so did the rationale for maritime strategy.

The Persian Gulf War allowed the Navy to play an important if secondary role. The crisis presented it with a mission to justify its existence after the virtual disappearance of its Soviet rival from the high seas. The following year the Navy issued a white paper entitled . . . *From the Sea*, a basic shift from open-ocean warfighting on the sea toward joint operations conducted from the sea. As Baer observes: "In 1992 the U.S. Navy, after one hundred years, closed its book on seapower doctrine in the image of Mahan. For how long remained to be seen."

One Hundred Years of Sea Power tells a complex story in an exciting way. By examining the history of the modern Navy in detail, it explains how and why the service struggled so hard to preserve its independence. Baer's book makes equally clear why the Navy has finally embraced jointness. Naval officers should read this book for a better appreciation of their service; officers of other services should read it to understand why the United States needs a navy.

JFQ

A NOTE TO READERS AND CONTRIBUTORS

DISTRIBUTION: *JFQ* is published four times each year for officers of the Armed Forces. One copy is distributed for every two officers on active duty assigned to joint billets and one copy for every four majors/lieutenant commanders and lieutenant colonels/commanders across all the services.

Copies are distributed to the field and fleet through respective service channels. Corrections in shipping instructions, quantities received, and addresses for service distribution should be directed to the appropriate activity listed below.

▼ **ARMY**—Contact the installation Publications Control Officer or write to the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Maryland 21220-2896 (reference Misc. Publication 71-1).

▼ **NAVY**—Contact the Aviation Supply Office, Navy Publications and Forms Directorate (Code 10363), 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19120-5000; FAX: (215) 697-2601/DSN 442-2601.

▼ **MARINE CORPS**—Contact the Marine Corps Logistics Base Atlantic, Warehouse 1221, Section 5, Albany, Georgia 31704.

▼ **AIR FORCE**—Contact the base Publishing Distribution Office to establish requirements. Service-wide functional distribution is then made by the Air Force Distribution Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Maryland 21220-2896.

▼ **COAST GUARD**—Contact the Commander, Coast Guard Atlantic Coast Area (AO), Governor's Island, New York, New York 10004-5098, or Commander, Coast Guard Pacific Area (PO), Coast Guard Island, Alameda, California 94501-5100; or write to U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, ATTN: Defense Operations Division, 2100 2^d Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20593-0001.

In addition, distribution is made to the Office of the Secretary of

Defense, defense agencies, Joint Staff, unified commands, service colleges, and other selected activities. Changes of address for these copies must be communicated to the Editor.

SUBSCRIPTIONS: *JFQ* is available by subscription from the Government Printing Office (see the order blank in this issue). To order for one year, cite: *Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ)* on the order and mail with a check for \$19.00 (\$23.75 foreign) or provide a VISA or MasterCard account number with expiration date to the Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15220-7954, or FAX the order to: (202) 512-2233.

CONTRIBUTIONS: *JFQ* welcomes submissions on all aspects of joint and combined warfare from members of the Armed Forces as well as from defense analysts and academic specialists from both this country and abroad, including foreign military personnel. There is no standard length for articles, but contributions

of 3,000 to 5,000 words are appropriate. Other submissions, however, to include letters to the editor, items of commentary, and brief essays are invited. Reproductions of supporting material (such as maps and photos) should be submitted with manuscripts citing the source and indicating their availability; do *not* send originals.

CHARIVARI

Clark Murdock—the author of “Mission-Pull and Long-Range Planning” which appeared in *JFQ*, number 6 (Autumn/Winter 1994-95)—wishes to acknowledge the efforts of a number of his former colleagues on the Policy Planning Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense who developed the mission-pull planning concept and contributed to the article: Col Donald Selvage, USMC, Wade Hinkle, Mark Sawoski, Seth Carus, and LTC Robert Johnson, USA.

One of the citations in the *JFQuarterly Review of Joint Literature* on page 120 of number 6 (Autumn/Winter 1994-95) contained typographical errors in both the author's name and the title. The correct cite is: Jon T. Hoffman, *Once A Legend: “Red Mike” Edson of the Marine Raiders*.

—The Editor



To facilitate review, provide three copies of the manuscript together with a 150-word summary. Place personal or biographical data on a separate sheet of paper and do not identify the author (or authors) in the body of the text. Follow an accepted style guide in preparing the manuscript, but endnotes rather than footnotes should be used. Both

the manuscript and the endnotes should be typed in double-space with one-inch margins.

If possible submit the manuscript on a disk together with the typescript version. While 3.5- and 5.25-inch disks in various formats can be processed, WordPerfect is preferred (disks will be returned if requested). Further information on

the submission of contributions is available by calling (202) 475-1013 / DSN 335-1013, FAX (202) 475-1012 / DSN 335-1012, or writing:

Editor

Joint Force Quarterly


ATTN: NDU-NSS-JFQ

Washington, D.C. 20319-6000

JFQ

*In every battle it is not numbers and untaught
bravery so much as skill and training that generally
produce victory.*

—Flavius Vegetius Renatus
Epitoma Rei Militaris





coming next . . .

commemorating World War II: a final reprise

plus

**war termination and joint planning,
reforming defense management,
transforming the Joint Staff,
and more in the Summer 95 issue of JFQ**

JFQ

J O I N T F O R C E Q U A R T E R L Y

Published by the
Institute for National Strategic Studies
National Defense University
Washington, D.C.